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I. INTRODUCTION
[He] had me read to him from the Times the whole of Justice
Blackmun's [Bowers v. Hardwick] dissent. He talked about it for
days whenever one of his lawyer friends would call. [He] was the one
who made me understand that a great dissent could over the course
of time acquire the moral force to alter bigoted laws that seemed
impregnable.
Paul Monette'
[The dissenter is] the gladiator making a last stand against the lions.
Benjamin Cardozo 2
Legal interpretation takes place in a field of pain and death.
Robert Cover 3
Cases such as these provide for me an excruciating agony of the
spirit. I yield to no one in the depth of my distaste, antipathy, and,
indeed, abhorrence, for the death penalty, with all its aspects of
physical distress and fear and of moral judgment exercised by finite
1. PAUL MONETTE, WEST OF YESTERDAY, EAST OF SUMMER: COLLECTED POEMS xvii (1994).
2. BENJAMIN CAROzo, LAW & LrrERATURE 34(1931) (quoted in Board of Educ. of Kiryas
Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. 2481, 2493 (1994)). 1 am grateful to Henry
Schwartzschild for bringing the reference to my attention.
3. Robert Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 Yale L.J. 1601, 1601 (1986).
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minds. That distaste is buttressed by a belief that capital punishment
serves no useful purpose that can be demonstrated. For me, it
violates childhood's training and life's experiences, and is not
compatible with the philosophical convictions I have been able to
develop. It is antagonistic to any sense of "reverence for life."
Justice Harry Blackmun, dissenting from
the majority holding that capital
punishment violated the Constitution4
A. Capital Punishment and the Modern Court: An Overview
At a press conference the day after announcing his retirement from
the Supreme Court, Thurgood Marshall said when interviewing
prospective law clerks he always asked if they liked working on dis-
sents. "If they said 'no,' they didn't get a job," Marshall said. "I
only picked those that liked to write dissenting opinions." 5
The retirements of William Brennan, Thurgood Marshall, and
Harry Blackmun mark the end of an era-several eras, actually-and
provide a fitting time to reexamine what made their judicial careers
unique. This Article explores one aspect of their uniqueness: relentless
dissents in capital cases.
Until 1991, capital cases in the U.S. Reports invariably included dis-
sents by Justice Brennan, Marshall, or both. Brennan and Marshall
doggedly voted against the death penalty in virtually every case since
1976, when the Court first upheld the constitutionality of capital pun-
ishment.6 Sometimes their dissents were in detail and sometimes in
boilerplate. The Justices dissented not only to the imposition of capi-
tal punishment in cases granted certiorari review, but also in almost
every capital case where certiorari was denied. In more than 2100
cases, Brennan and Marshall reiterated their opinion that the death
penalty is cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth
Amendment.7
According to Alan Bigel, in forty-two capital cases decided during
the Burger era (1969-1986), excluding petitions for certiorari and stays
4. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 405-06 (1972) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
5. Anthony Lewis, Marshall Urges Bush to Pick "the Best, " N.Y. TiMEs, June 29, 1991,
at A8.
6. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
7. Search of WESTLAW, Supreme Court database ("Brennan Marshall /s dissent! &
(death /2 penal!) & DA(aft 1955) & DA(bef 1991)") March 1, 1995; see also Robert A. Burt,
Disorder in the Court: The Death Penalty and the Constitution, 85 MicH. L. REV. 1741, 1768
(1987) (quoting E. Villarreal, Dissents to the Denial of Certiorari in Death Penalty Cases of
Justices Brennan and Marshall (July 11, 1985) (unpublished Yale Law School seminar paper,
listing result of LEXIS search) (noting that Brennan and Marshall had dissented from the denial
of certiorari in more than 400 cases between 1976 and 1985)).
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of execution decided without opinion, Brennan wrote ten full
opinionsg and a brief concurring statement in fifteen others.9 Mar-
shall wrote sixteen full opinions 0 and added ten brief statements re-
iterating his categorical opposition to the death penalty. I" During his
tenure on the Rehnquist Court (1986-1990), Brennan wrote ten full
opinions for death penalty cases' and a brief statement in five
8. See Alan I. Bigel, Justices William J. Brennan, Jr. and Thurgood Marshall on Capital
Punishment, 8 Nomns DAME J.L. ETmcs & Pua. POL'Y 11 (1994); Glass v. Louisiana, 471 U.S.
1080 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307 (1985); Wainwright v.
Witt, 469 U.S. 412 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668
(1984) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37
(1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Maggio v. Williams, 464 U.S. 46 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing); Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring);
McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
9. Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28 (1986) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part); Cabana v. Bullock, 474 U.S. 376 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Baldwin v. Alabama,
472 U.S. 372 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Campbell v. Washington, 471 U.S. 1094 (1985)
(Brennan, J., concurring); Smith v. Kemp, 464 U.S. 1032 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring); En-
mund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982) (Brennan, J., concurring); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S.
104 (1982) (Brennan, J., concurring); Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981) (Brennan, J., concur-
ring); Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38 (1980) (Brennan, J., concurring); Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S.
625 (1980) (Brennan, J., concurring); Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95 (1979) (Brennan, J., con-
curring); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (Brennan, J., concurring); Dobbert v. Florida,
432 U.S. 282 (1977) (Brennan, J., concurring); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976) (Bren-
nan, J., concurring); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (Brennan, J., concur-
ring).
10. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986); Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985);
Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (Marshall,
J., dissenting); California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Barclay v.
Florida, 463 U.S. 939 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983)
(Marshall, J., dissenting); Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Cole-
man v. Balkcom, 451 U.S. 949 (1981) (Marshall, J., concurring); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586
(1978) (Marshall, J., concurring); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (Marshall, J., concur-
ring); Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U.S. 153 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (Marshall,
J., concurring); Gray v. Lucas, 677 F.2d 1086 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 910, and
cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1237 (1983).
11. Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28 (1986) (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part); Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981) (Marshall, J., concurring); Adams v. Texas, 448
U.S. 38 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring); Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625 (1980) (Marshall, J.,
concurring); Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95 (1979) (Marshall, J., concurring); Bell v. Ohio, 438
U.S. 637 (1978) (Marshall, J., concurring); Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282 (1977) (Marshall,
J., dissenting); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (Marshall, J., concurring);
Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976) (Marshall, J., concurring); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S.
262 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
12. Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting, also applied to Lewis
v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764 (1990)); Demosthenes v. Baal, 495 U.S. 731 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing); Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Blystone v. Pennsylvania,
494 U.S. 299 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989) (Bren-
nan, I., dissenting); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and
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others. 3 Marshall wrote six full opinions 4 and two brief concurring
statements. 5 In 1991, Marshall wrote an opinion in three 6 of seven 7
capital punishment cases. Brennan wrote just three" majority opinions,
and Marshall spoke for the Court on four occasions.' 9 Except for Strick-
land v. Washington,2° Brennan and Marshall always voted identically,
writing separate lengthy opinions for the same case on just one other
occasion. 2' Thus, from 1972 until Brennan's retirement in 1990, Brennan
and Marshall took different perspectives in just two capital cases.
The constant in the jurisprudence of Marshall and Brennan (and in
the end, Justice Harry Blackmun) on the constitutionality of the death
penalty was that they advocated forestalling execution. If they joined the
majority in limiting the application of the death penalty in specific con-
texts, they simply concurred.? If they wrote for the majority, they clari-
fied or expanded the scope of a principle curtailing application of the
death penalty.2 When dissenting, if beyond simply reiterating that exe-
dissenting in part); South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805 (1989), overruled by Payne v. Ten-
nessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991); McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting);
Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
13. Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738 (1990) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part); Hildwin v. Florida, 490 U.S. 638 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Johnson v.
Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578 (1988) (Brennan, J., concurring); Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367
(1988) (Brennan, J., concurring); Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356 (1988) (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
14. Shell v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 1 (1990) (Marshall, J., concurring); Sawyer v. Smith, 497
U.S. 227 (1990) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149 (1990) (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting); McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433 (1990); Satterwhite v. Texas, 486
U.S. 249 (1988) (Marshall, J., concurring); Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231 (1988) (Marshall,
J., dissenting).
15. Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370 (1990) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Hildwin v. Florida,
490 U.S. 638 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
16. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Mu'Min v. Virginia,
500 U.S. 415 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting); McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467 (1991) (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting).
17. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991); Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624 (1991);
Mu'Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415 (1991); Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391 (1991); Lankford v.
Idaho, 500 U.S. 110 (1991); McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467 (1991); Parker v. Dugger, 498
U.S. 308 (1991).
18. South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805 (1989); Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307
(1985); Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979).
19. McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433 (1990); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399
(1986); Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985); Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985).
20. 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part; Marshall,
J., dissenting).
21. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring and Marshall, J.,
concurring).
22. E.g., Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978);
Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
23. E.g., Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986); Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320
(1985).
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cutions violate the Constitution, the dissent incorporated two rationales.
First was a brief refrain of their position that the death penalty is per se
unconstitutional.Y Second was a more detailed explanation of why the
state may not execute that particular person even if the state may exe-
cute in the abstract.A
Tison v. Arizona 6 illustrates the latter approach. The majority held
the death penalty was constitutionally applied to the felons whose crimi-
nal participation was substantial and whose mental state evidenced
"reckless indifference to the value of human life," even though the con-
demned did not kill nor had actual intent to kill. 27 Brennan's ringing
dissent spent little time arguing that the death penalty is unconstitutional
in all cases but instead concentrated on attributes of the class of culpa-
bility that made the death penalty inappropriate in that particular case.
A few years ago, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor began a capital opin-
ion with breezy, lawyerly detachment: "[t]his is a case about federal-
ism." By striking rhetorical contrast, Justice Harry Blackmun's
impassioned dissent against the execution of Bruce Edwins Callins in
Texas3° was in large part a revolt against pronouncements such as
O'Connor's. Blackmun's understanding, articulated shortly before he
retired, came from decades of grappling with capital cases as a justice
and as an intermediate appellate court judge." "[Tihe death penalty re-
mains fraught with arbitrariness, discrimination, caprice, and mistake
.... From this day forward, I no longer shall tinker with the machin-
ery of death .... I feel morally and intellectually obliged simply to con-
cede that the death penalty experiment has failed.' '32 These comments
24. E.g., Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 916 (1983) (dissenting opinion of Marshall, J.,
joined by Brennan, J., in which Marshall reiterates his adherence to his dissents in Gregg and
Furman).
25. Id.
26. 481 U.S. 137 (1987).
27. Id. at 157.
28. Id. at 168.
29. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 726 (1991). Roger Coleman claimed he was inno-
cent. Jill Smolowe, Must This Man Die?, TnmE, May 18, 1992, at 40. He was executed on Janu-
ary 23, 1992.
30. Callins v. Collins, 114S. Ct. 1127 (1994).
31. E.g., Pope v. United States, 372 F.2d 710 (8th Cir. 1967), vacated, 392 U.S. 651 (1968);
Feguer v. United States, 302 F.2d 214 (8th Cir. 1962).
32. Callins, 114 S. Ct. at 1129-30 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Subsequent to the United
States Supreme Court's denial of a stay, Callins received a stay from a lower court.
David von Drehle wickedly described Blackmun's Callins opinion as revealing "the secret":
IT]he American government-lawmakers, executives and courts-has been keeping a
secret from the public. Supreme Court Justice Harry Blackmun recently raised the
veil....
Predictably, Blackmun got some stern scoldings. These came from insiders, well aware
of the secret-like Blackmun's colleague, Justice Antonin Scalia. Also from outsiders,
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from his Callins dissent came at the end of twenty years of voting for
capital punishment, which began in 1976 when Blackmun was among
the majority voting to uphold the federal constitutionality of capital
punishment.33
Though Blackmun's journey was incremental, he had moved toward
his Callins dissent for some years; his judicial language about capital
punishment had grown progressively more urgent. "[Plerilously close to
simple murder" was how Blackmun described the death sentence of
Leonel Herrera, who was executed in Texas shortly afterward. In time,
Blackmun's words may resonate even in the ears of justices who are
today absorbed with fine-tuning judicial balancing acts. 5
still beguiled, like columnist George Will. This is the familiar fate of government
whistleblowers, now visited on Harry Blackmun.
Last year, the number of executions climbed steeply, reaching the highest level in 30
years. Yet for every execution, there were roughly six new death sentences. Death rows
continue to expand rapidly-the main force containing them is the number of death
sentences reversed on appeal. These far outnumber the executions, owing to a perma-
nent confusion as to the standards governing capital punishment. The population of
America's condemned is approaching 3000.
Here is the truth: If the United States suddenly outlawed all death row appeals, and
began executing prisoners at the swiftest rate in history-200 per year -death row
would keep growing. What should a man on death row fear most: electrocution, gas-
sing or lethal injection?
Try: Old age.
Anyone who wants to take the time to dig can unearth the secret. This isn't some
gentle whim of Blackmun's; it has been bubbling through the legal community for
more than a decade.
David von Drehle, When Harry Met Scalia: Why the Death Penalty is Dying, WASH. POST, Mar.
6, 1994, at C3.
33. Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
34. Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853, 884 (1993) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
35. Former Justice Lewis Powell's post-judicial conversion to the abolitionist position is
worth a footnote. As described by his biographer, Powell in retirement came to believe capital
punishment unconstitutional. JoHNc C. JEFaiats, JR., JusTicE LEwis F. POWELL, JR. 451-52
(1994). 1 prefer the view of Powell held by Scharlette Holdman and Gail Rowland of the Florida
Clearinghouse on Criminal Justice, an" operation existing to find and help lawyers willing to
represent Florida death row inmates pro bono:
Gail Rowland's puppet, for example. At the U.S. Supreme Court, one justice was
assigned to each region of the country to handle emergency appeals. Florida's justice
was Lewis Powell; naturally he became a particular target of Holdman's scorn. So
Rowland made a hand-puppet that she called "Mr. Justice Powell," and the puppet
offered running commentary on events in the office. Say Holdman and Craig Barnard
were talking about filing an appeal based on an inmate's deprived background. Mr.
Justice Powell would pop up and shout, "Oh, shut up! Not another bed-wetting
darkie!" Or Jimmy Lohman would strum a folk tune on his guitar, and Mr. Justice
Powell would chime in with some grossly racist, sexist lyrics. Holdman either laughed
or cried; it was a time of emotional extremes; her nerves glowed like incandescent
filaments.
D. VON DREHLE, AMONO THE LOWEST OF THE DEAD (scheduled for publication in 1995).
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This Article explores the historical, jurisprudential, and strategic legit-
imacy of relentless dissent 36 to capital punishment. Part 1I seeks legiti-
macy for the sustained dissents of Justices Thurgood Marshall and
William Brennan by tracing the history of dissents in general and the
sustained dissent in particular. Part III seeks legitimacy in theory by
evaluating the jurisprudential function and value of the sustained dis-
sent. Part IV focuses on the strategic wisdom and tactical usefulness of
such dissents, drawing upon the recently released papers of Justice Mar-
shall.
B. The Evolving Law of Death: "The Supreme Court's Obstacle
Course"37
In Washington, rain fell softly, steadily, on the white marble grandeur
of the U.S. Supreme Court, and on a small group of protesters across
the street, keeping a vigil against the death penalty. There were perhaps
fifty of them, religious leaders, civil rights workers, a member of the
District of Columbia City Council. They had been there since early
evening. At half-past midnight, a man burst from the building, running
wildly. "Marshall stayed John Spenkellink's execution!" he shouted,
and a voice called back, "Amen." 38
The "abolitionist" position of Brennan and Marshall occurred within
a context: the Court may fairly be said to have decided that the death
penalty is not per se unconstitutional. The "brooding spirit of the law"
and the "intelligence of a future day" 39 are not likely to reverse the
Court's mind on the question of the death penalty's constitutionality, at
least within the foreseeable future.
The Court's modern jurisprudence on the constitutionality of death as
punishment began with McGautha v. California4" in 1971, although
pressure for a ruling on the constitutionality of the death penalty was
building for at least a decade. 4' In McGautha, Dennis McGautha argued
that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment mandates
standards to guide capital sentencers' discretion. The Court rejected
McGautha's challenge partly because development of such standards
36. Professor Kelman refers to repeated dissent on the same issue as "sustained dissent."
Maurice Kelman, The Forked Path of Dissent, 1985 Sup. Cr. REv. 227, 248-58.
37. The phrase is the subtitle to RAOUL BERGER, DEATH PENALTIES (1982).
38. VON DREHLE, supra note 35, at 77-78. The stay proved merely temporary.
39. CHARLES E. HuGsS, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 68 (1928).
40. 402 U.S. 183 (1971).
41. See generally M. MELTSNER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL (1974) (tracing pre-Furman litigation
strategy of death penalty abolitionists).
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seemed impossible.42 Justice Harlan, writing for the majority, reasoned
that to "identify before the fact those characteristics of criminal homi-
cides and their perpetrators which call for the death penalty, and to ex-
press these characteristics in language which can be fairly understood
and applied by the sentencing authority, appear to be tasks which are
beyond present human ability." 4 Justice Harlan concluded that the "in-
finite variety of cases and facets to each case would make general stan-
dards either meaningless 'boiler-plate' or a statement of the obvious that
no jury would need. ""
One year later, in Furman v. Georgia,45 the Court held the death pen-
alty was forbidden by the Eighth Amendment when statutes left a jury
with undirected discretion over the death decision. Furman vacated
death sentences for all 629 persons on death row nationally at that
time.4 The short per curiam opinion stated without elaboration, "the
imposition and'carrying out of the death penalty in [the cases before the
Court] constitute[s] cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments." 47
Each of the nine justices wrote separately, and no justice in the five-
person majority joined any other. 4 The individual opinions of the three
key justices suggest that of central concern was that the statutes at issue
in Furman lacked sentencing standards. Justice Douglas wrote that "we
deal with a system of law and justice that leaves to the uncontrolled
discretion of judges or juries the determination whether defendants
committing these crimes should die or be imprisoned." 49 Given this ab-
sence of guidance, Justice Douglas saw the death penalty as cruel and
unusual when applied "selectively to minorities whose numbers are few,
who are outcasts of society, and who are unpopular, but whom society
is willing to see suffer though it would not countenance general applica-
tion of the same penalty across the board."' 50 Justice Stewart also
stressed the randomness of the penalty:
These death sentences are cruel and unusual in the same way that being
struck by lightning is cruel and unusual. For, of all the people
convicted of rapes and murders in 1967 and 1968, many just as
42. 402 U.S. at 183.
43. Id. at 204.
44. Id. at 208.
45. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
46. Jack Greenberg, Capital Punishment as a System, 91 YALE L.J. 908, 915 (1982).
47. Furman, 408 U.S. at 239-40.
48. See Daniel D. Polsby, The Death of Capital Punishment? Furman v. Georgia, 1972
SUP. CT. REV. 1 (analyzing separate opinions).
49. 408 U.S. at 253 (Douglas, J., concurring).
50. Id. at 245.
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reprehensible as these, the petitioners are among a capriciously selected
random handful upon whom the sentence of death has in fact been
imposed."
Justice White reached the same conclusion.12 Because Justice
Brennan53 and Justice Marshall 4 would have declared the death penalty
unconstitutional per se, the "holding" of the case should be found in
the opinions of Justices Douglas, Stewart, and White."
State legislatures, confronted with McGautha's statement that formu-
lation of capital sentencing standards was impossible and Furman's
statement that unbridled sentencing discretion violated the Eighth
Amendment5 6 set about redrafting their death penalty statutes. Florida
and Georgia were the first two states to rewrite their death penalty sta-
tutes, and by 1976, thirty~five jurisdictions had reinstituted the death
penalty.
5
The Florida and Georgia statutes were similar. Both were "guided dis-
cretion" statutes, designed to channel the sentencer's discretion by speci-
fied aggravating and mitigating factors to be weighed when deciding
who dies. 8 Both statutes, however, also provided for a catch-all aggra-
vating circumstance that has continually concerned the Court.5 9 Subsec-
51. Id. at 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
52. Id. at 313-14 (White, J., concurring).
53. Id. at 257-306 (Brennan, J., concurring).
54. Id. at 314-71 (Marshall, J., concurring).
55. The Court has in subsequent opinions noted that:
[a] fair statement of the consensus expressed by the Court in Furman is 'that where
discretion is afforded a sentencing body on a matter so grave as the determination of
whether a human life should be taken or spared, that discretion must be suitably di-
rected and limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious ac-
tion.'
Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 874 (1983) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189
(1976)).
56. The tension between McGautha and Furman was noted by the dissenters in Furman,
408 U.S. at 399 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 427 n. I1 (Powell, J., dissenting), and by several
commentators. See, e.g., Polsby, supra note 48, at 1-4; Margaret Jane Radin, Cruel Punishment
and Respect for Persons: Super Due Process for Death, 53 S. CAL. L. REv. 1143, 1148-49 (1980);
Ernest A. Renda, The Bitter Fruit of McGautha: Eddings v. Oklahoma and the Need for Weigh-
ing Method Articulation in Capital Sentencing, 20 AM. CaIM. L. REv. 63, 63-64 (1982). See
generally Robert Weisberg, Deregulating Death, 1983 Sup. CT. REv. 305.
57. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 179-80 n.23.
58. Most of the listed aggravating circumstances referred to objectively ascertainable facts:
whether the crime was committed for pecuniary gain; whether the defendant was under sentence
of imprisonment at the time of the offense; whether a defendant has a significant history of
prior criminal history; and whether the defendant was previously convicted of a felony. Com-
pare Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 166 n.9 with Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 249 n.6
(1976).
59. E.g., Espinosa v. Florida, 112 S. Ct. 2926, cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2926 (1992); Sochor
v. Florida, 112 S. Ct. 2114 (1992); Stringer v. Black, 112 S. Ct. 1130 (1992); Lewis v. Jeffers,
497 U.S. 764 (1990); Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356 (1988).
RELENTLESS DISSENT
tion (b)(7) of the Georgia statute authorized a death sentence if the jury
found that the crime was "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or
inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind or an aggravated
battery to the victim. ' 6" Florida's statute authorized the death penalty if
the crime was "especially heinous, atrocious or cruel. "61
The facial constitutionality of these new statutes was decided in 1976,
when the Supreme Court held that "[oln their face these [new] proce-
dures seem to satisfy the concerns of Furman. "6 In Gregg v. Georgia,
the Court stressed the "limited grant of certiorari" and emphasized it
was reviewing the "'vagueness' and 'overbreadth' of the statutory ag-
gravating circumstances only to consider whether their imprecision ren-
ders this capital-sentencing system invalid under the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments because it is incapable of imposing capital
punishment other than by arbitrariness or caprice." 6 The Court noted
that Georgia's counterpart to Florida's "heinous, atrocious, or cruel"
circumstance could be construed to include "any murder involving de-
pravity of mind or an aggravated battery." The Court also observed,
however, that the statutory language "need not be construed in this
way, and there is no reason to assume that the Supreme Court of Geor-
gia will adopt such an open-ended construction."" Similarly, the Court
in Proffitt v. Florida" held that Florida's catch-all circumstance "must
be considered as ... construed by the Supreme Court of Florida."
In 1978, despite Justice Rehnquist's charge that the Court was going
from "pillar to post," 6 and despite Chief Justice Burger's recognition
that the Court's death penalty decisions were far from consistent,B the
Court held that a sentencer must be permitted to consider any relevant
60. GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-30(bX7) (1973). This provision has received much attention in
the legal literature. See, e.g., CHuuARs L. BLACK, JR., CAPrrAL PUNISHMENT: THE INEVITABILITY
oF CAPRIc E AND MISTAKE 74-78 (2d ed. 1981); Jom H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 175
(1980); George E. Dix, Appellate Review of the Decision to Impose Death, 68 GEo. L.J. 97, 112-
17 (1979); John J. Donohue, Godfrey v. Georgia: Creative Federalism, the Eighth Amendment
and the Evolving Law of Death, 30 CATm. U. L. REv. 13 (1980); Reed C. Richards & Stephen C.
Hoffman, Death Among the Shifting Standards. Capital Punishment After Furman, 26 S.D. L.
REV. 243 (1981); Kathryn W. Riley, Note, The Death Penalty in Georgia: An Aggravating Cir-
cumstance, 30 AM. U. L. RaV. 835 (1981); Lennine Occhino, Note, Constitutional Procedure
For the Imposition of the Death Penalty-Godfrey v. Georgia, 30 DEPAUL L. REV. 721 (1981).
61. FLA. STAT. § 921.141(5)(h) (1983).
62. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 198 (1976).
63. Id. at 201 n.51.
64. Id. at 201.
65. Id.
66. 428 U.S. 242, 255 (1976).
67. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 621 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part).
68. Id. at 597-602 (opinion of Burger, C.J., joined by Stewart, Powell and Stevens, JJ.).
1995]
602 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LA WREVIEW [Vol. 22:591
evidence proffered in mitigation.69 This notion was reaffirmed in subse-
quent cases. 70 The Court has since fine-tuned the capital punishment sys-
tem approved in 1976, sometimes ruling in favor of condemned
inmates, 7' but holding against them 72  more frequently since
69. Id. at 604-05 (opinion of Burger, C.J.) (recognizing that although individualized sen-
tencing is premised on public policy in noncapital cases, individualized decision is constitution-
ally required for the "profoundly different" sentence of death).
70. See, e.g., Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989); Sumner v. Shumann, 483 U.S. 66
(1987); Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393 (1987); Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1 (1986).
Justice Scalia recently questioned the Lockett line of cases as inconsistent with Furman. See
Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring in part). For a discussion of the
tension between Furman and Lockett, see Scott E. Sundby, The Lockett Paradox: Reconciling
Guided Discretion and Unguided Mitigation in Capital Sentencing, 38 UCLA L. Rev. 1147
(1991).
71. E.g., McFarland v. Scott, 114 S. Ct. 2568 (1994); Espinosa v. Florida, 112 S. Ct. 2926
(1993); Lankford v. Idaho, 500 U.S. 110 (1991); McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433 (1990)
(jury cannot be required to agree unanimously on the existence of mitigating circumstances);
Johnson v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578 (1988) (sentencer's consideration of invalid prior conviction
tainted resulting death sentence); Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987) (use of victim impact
statement, including family's emotional reaction to and characterization of murderer and his
crime held to violate Constitution), overruled by Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991); Ford
v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986) (mere cursory review used to determine inmate's sanity prior
to execution held insufficient); Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985) (prosecutor's and
judge's comments to jury indicating that appeals court would correct any mistakes by jury held
to be error of constitutional magnitude); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982) (death sen-
tence inappropriate for felony murder when defendant did not himself kill, attempt to kill, or
intend that killing take place or lethal force be used); Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430 (1981)
(state's request for death penalty on retrial violated double jeopardy clause when jury had previ-
ously imposed lesser sentence); Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980) (no showing of "con-
sciousness materially more 'depraved' than that of any person guilty of murder" when victims
were killed immediately, defendant suffered extreme emotional distress as a result of their
deaths, and defendant admitted responsibility shortly after crimes); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S.
586 (1978) (limitation on sentencer's consideration of mitigating factors held unconstitutional);
Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (death penalty unconstitutionally disproportionate sen-
tence for crime of rape of an adult woman).
72. E.g., Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991); Mu'Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415
(1991); Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370 (1990); Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989);
Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1 (1989); Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164 (1988); Ricketts v.
Adamson, 483 U.S. 1 (1987) (no double jeopardy bar to reprosecution for first degree murder
when defendant breached plea bargain to second degree murder); McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S.
279 (1987) (no constitutional violation on showing of statistical disparity between imposition of
death penalty in cases of black defendants with white victims and cases of white defendants with
black victims); Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 158 (1987) (upholding death sentence on showing
of "major participation" in felony-murder and "reckless indifference to human life"); Califor-
nia v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 542 (1987) (affirming death sentence following instruction that jury
should not be swayed by "mere sentiment, conjecture, sympathy, passion, prejudice, public
opinion or public feeling," because jury would not single out "sympathy" and would likely
consider instruction an admonishment not to consider sympathy arising from other than aggra-
vating and mitigating circumstances presented); Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527 (1986) (proce-
dural default); Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168 (1986) (finding no constitutional violation in
excluding juror who would refuse to impose death penalty or in prosecutor's improper closing
arguments); Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162 (1986) (no constitutional error in removal of
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the 1982 Term.73
The "deregulation" 7 4 of substantive capital punishment doctrine by
the Supreme Court must be understood in the context of the Court's
increasingly restrictive view of habeas corpus. Death row inmates are
unpopular; habeas petitioners only slightly less so.7 The combina-
tion of the two can be explosive, as illustrated by the public and po-
litical reaction to the Eleventh Circuit's 1985 decisions in the Alday
jurors who would not impose death sentence under any circumstances); Poland v. Arizona, 476
U.S. 147 (1986) (finding no double jeopardy bar to further capital sentencing proceedings when
appeals court found evidence insufficient to support sole aggravating factor but judge miscon-
strued availability of another aggravating factor); Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82 (1985) (find-
ing no double jeopardy bar to prosecution when defendant is tried for murder by one sovereign
(Alabama) after having pled guilty to offense arising from same occurrence in prosecution by
another sovereign (Georgia)); Baldwin v. Alabama, 472 U.S. 372 (1985) (statute requiring jury to
impose death sentence if it convicted defendant of aggravated crime did not violate Constitution
because jury's sentence is only a recommendation and the judge must weigh mitigating and ag-
gravating circumstances at a separate sentencing hearing); Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412
(1985) (no constitutional violation in exclusion of juror who would not vote for death penalty
regardless of circumstances of crime); Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447 (1984) (no Eighth
Amendment violation when judge sentences defendant to death despite jury's recommendation
of life sentence); Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37 (1984) (no Eighth Amendment requirement that
states conduct proportionality review in capital cases).
73. In all but one of the 15 fully argued capital cases decided between 1976 and 1981, the
Court reversed or vacated the death sentence. Weisberg, supra note 56, at 305 n.l. The Court
rendered four judgments in capital cases at the end of the 1982 Term, all of which found against
the condemned inmate. See California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992 (1983) (rejecting challenge to jury
instruction stating governor may commute life sentence without parole); Barclay v. Florida, 463
U.S. 939 (1983) (finding no constitutional violation in sentencer's consideration of nonstatutory
aggravating circumstances); Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983) (upholding procedures for
expedited consideration of capital habeas cases and allowing use of psychiatric testimony on
future dangerousness at capital sentencing proceeding even when based on hypothetical ques-
tions concerning particular defendant); Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862 (1983) (holding that inva-
lidity of one aggravating circumstance did not render death sentence unconstitutional when other
valid aggravating factors were present).
74. This use of the term "deregulation" is taken from Weisberg, supra note 56. Some states
have responded to this "deregulation" by interpreting their own constitutions more broadly than
the federal Constitution. See generally James R. Acker & Elizabeth R. Walsh, Challenging the
Death Penalty Under State Constitutions, 42 VANo. L. REv. 1299 (1989). Cf. Michael Mello,
The Jurisdiction to Do Justice: Florida's Jury Override and the State Constitution, 18 FLA. ST.
U. L. REv. 923 (1991).
75. For a sampling of the academic debate surrounding the federal courts' redetermination
of federal questions previously decided in state criminal proceedings, see Paul M. Bator, Finality
in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 HAv. L. REv. 441 (1963);
William J. Brennan, Jr., Federal Habeas Corpus and State Prisoners: An Exercise in Federalism,
7 UTAH L. REV. 423 (1961); Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on
Criminal Judgments, 38 U. Cm. L. REv. 142 (1970); Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90
HARv. L. Rav. 1105 (1977); Gary Peller, In Defense of Federal Habeas Corpus Relitigation, 16
HAv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 579 (1982); Ira P. Robbins, The Habeas Corpus Certificate of Proba-
ble Cause, 44 Omo ST. L.J. 307 (1983); Peter W. Tague, Federal Habeas Corpus and Ineffective
Representation of Counsel: The Supreme Court Has Work to Do, 31 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1978).
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family murder cases76 and that court's 1986 stays in the Ted Bundy
76. In the Alday family murder cases, the Eleventh Circuit unleashed a firestorm of criticism,
much of it directed specifically at the court that ordered new trials for three inmates based on perva-
sive pretrial publicity. The Eleventh Circuit's opinions are reported as Coleman v. Kemp, 778 F.2d
1487 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1164 (1986); Isaacs v. Kemp, 778 F.2d 1482 (11th Cir.
1985), cert. denied 476 U.S. 1164 (1986). Three days after the rulings, one newspaper reported that
editorial pages across Georgia blasted the decision. Most State Editorial Pages Decry Alday Ruling,
MACON TELEGRsAPH & NEWS, Dec. 12, 1985, at B1. See also Grimm, "We'll Never Be The Same:"
Court's Decision Granting New Trial to Defendants in Alday Rulings Case Has Opened Old
Wounds, MACON TELEGRAPH & NEWS, June 10, 1986, at B1 ("Mhose rulings are regarded as the
inexplicable acts of madmen. They solidified all the local mistrust of everything urban and Washing-
ton, of slick lawyers and their technical maneuvering, of ivory tower judges and their niggling fasci-
nation with the seemingly irrelevant. 'Ought to hang them judges."'); Measure Hits Court Ruling in
Alday Case, ATLANTA J.-ATANTA CoNsT., Jan. 18, 1986, at B3 (40 Georgia state Representatives
signed resolution condemning Alday rulings); Justice Left on Legal Scrap Heap, MACON TELEGRAPH
& NEws, Dec. 20, 1985, at AI I (letter to the editor) ("[lit is just such stupid decisions by men such
as [the Eleventh Circuit panel of judges] that one day will force the very best of men to begin to take
revenge, for most good men in America have about come to feel that there is no justice at all left.");
McKerley, Anger, Disbelief Greet A/day Ruling, MACON TELEGRAPH & NEWS, Dec. 11, 1985, at Al
(describing "anger and frustration" of local residents concerning the rulings); Montgomery, Ruling
in Alday Case Reopens Old Wounds: Anger of Seminole Community Mirrors "Outrage" of Gover-
nor, ATLANTA CoNsT., Dec. 11, 1985, at Al; Woolner, Alday Murder Convictions Overturned, AT-
LANTA CONST., Dec. 10, 1985, at Al (quoting Georgia lieutenant governor as calling the rulings the
"outrage of the century" and saying that "[t]he judges ought to be required to go down to Seminole
County, lay down on the Alday family graves and apologize"). But cf Editorials, Decision Shocking
But Also Necessary, MACON TELEGRAPH & NEWS, Dec. 12, 1985 at A14 (state courts "dropped the
ball. Finally, after all these years, the federal appeals court had to pick it up and do what the state
courts apparently lacked the courage to do-something unpopular, yet important to our freedoms");
Teepen, Buck Stopped at 11th Circuit, ATLANTA CoNST., Dec. 12, 1985, at A22; Tough, But Cor-
rect, Alday Ruling, ATLANTA CONST., Nov. 11, 1985, at A12.
A Georgia grand jury reportedly accused the Eleventh Circuit judges of "callous disregard
for the rights of crime victims and their families." Lowndes Grand Jury Faults Judges' Lifetime
Appointment, ATLANTA J.-CoNsT., Feb. 15, 1986, at C7. In a voluminous petition, 100,000
citizens asked Congress to impeach the three Eleventh Circuit judges who took part in the Alday
decisions. See Dart, Congress Asked to Impeach Judges in Alday Appeal, ATLANTA CONST.,
Mar. 20, 1986, at A28; Beasley, Petitions to Impeach Judges in A/day Ruling Spreading Across
State, ATLANTA CONST., Jan. 29, 1986, at A20.
The Alday rulings prompted Georgia officials and legislators to call for "reforms" in the
federal judiciary and in habeas corpus. E.g., McDonald, Judges in Alday Case Can't Be Im-
peached, Panel Rules, ATLANTA CONST., Oct. 17, 1986, at A26 (quoting U.S. Rep. Charles
Hetcher as saying he planned to "co-sponsor legislation ... that would limit the powers of
federal courts in deciding whether to overturn or grant new trials for convicted murderers");
McAlister, A [day Case Calls for New Legislation, Not Outrage, ATLANTA J., June 4, 1986, at
A14 ("At the federal level, Rep. Newt Gingrich has called on Congress to enact a law to speed
action in death-penalty cases."); Death Appeals Resolution Approved, ATLANTA CoNST., Feb. 7,
1986, at A8 (describing Georgia State Senate resolution urging Congress to require all appeals in
death cases to be filed within 12 months); Cowles, Court Won't Reconsider Alday Ruling, AT-
LANTA CONST., Feb. 1, 1986, at BI (quoting Georgia lieutenant governor as saying "he will lead




In particular, the Court's procedural default cases,7" retroactivity
decisions, and successive habeas corpus petition cases,79 have curtailed
radically the availability of the writ.80
Furman and its progeny, therefore, stood for the proposition that
in the view of seven justices, the death penalty is not per se unconsti-
tutional. Case law expounding the principles of Furman reiterated axi-
omatically that state legislatures may constitutionally enact the death
penalty for punishing certain classes of defendants in crimes in which
life is taken, if sentencers' discretion is properly guided.,' The state
may, if adhering to the strictures of a measure of due process that is
theoretically greater than that required for deprivations of liberty or
property, execute a member of the class of criminals for whom death
is deemed appropriate. Although this nutshell statement does not pose
as an exhaustive summary of death penalty jurisprudence, it can be
said to be "the law."
The question is how to deal with "the law." Justices Brennan and
Marshall dealt with the law by rejecting it. This Article's thesis is that
these two justices acted legitimately. The remainder of this Article
77. Eleventh Circuit panels twice stayed Bundy's execution and twice remanded Bundy's
cases for evidentiary hearings. The public was not pleased. See, e.g., Leguire, Grant Blasts
Bundy Delays, LAE CrTY [FLA.] REP., Feb. 22, 1988, at Al. The federal district judge in Bun-
dy's case disingenuously cited the case as an example of lawyers manipulating the legal system.
The judge said this at a time when he must have known Bundy's case was likely to come before
him again, as in fact it did. Bill Cotterell, Death-Appeals Process Examined. TALLAHAssEE DEM-
OCRAT, Feb. 27, 1988, at C3.
78. See, e.g., Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991); Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764
(1990); Dugger v. Adams, 489 U.S. 401 (1989); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 (1986); Wain-
wright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
79. McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467 (1991); Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484 (1990); Butler v.
McKellar, 494 U.S. 407 (1990); Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227 (1990); Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S.
288 (1989). See generally Marc M. Arkin, The Prisoner's Dilemma: Life in the Lower Federal
Courts After Teague v. Lane, 69 N.C. L. Rv. 371 (1991); John Blume & William Pratt, Under-
standing Teague v. Lane, 18 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANo 325 (1990-91); Bruce Ledewitz,
Habeas Corpus as a Safety Valve for Innocence, 18 N.Y.U. Rav. L. & Soc. CHANGE 415 (1990-
91); James S. Liebman, More Than "Slightly Retro:" The Rehnquist Court's Rout of Habeas
Corpus in Teague v. Lane, 18 N.Y.U. Rav. L. & Soc. CHANGE 537 (1990-91); Robert Weisburg,
A Great Writ While it Lasted, 81 J. Cww. L. & CRmINOLOGy 9 (1990).
80. Congress is poised to go even further than the Court. See, e.g., S. 635, 102d Cong. 1st
Sess. (1991); H.R. REP. No. 1400, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); S. 1760, 101st Cong., 1st Sess.
(1989); Report on Habeas Corpus in Capital Cases, 45 CRIM. L. RaP. 3239 (1989). For outstand-
ing critiques of these proposals to "reform" capital habeas, see Vivian Berger, Justice Delayed
or Justice Denied?-A Comment on Recent Proposals to Reform Death Penalty Habeas Corpus,
90 CoLtUM. L. REv. 1665 (1990); Ira P. Robbins, Toward a More Just and Effective System of
Review in State Death Penalty Cases, 40 AM. U. L. Rav. 1, 53 (1990).
81. See generally Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242
(1976); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
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traces three sources of this legitimacy: history, jurisprudence, and tac-
tical/strategic prudence.
II. LEGITIMACY IN HISTORY
A. The Supreme Court: "Nine Scorpions in a Bottle"82- "[Aind the
first one now will later be last" 3
The dissenting opinion as an institution within the United States Su-
preme Court has received both scorn and reverence." Historically, the
emergence of dissents and separate concurrences is a relatively recent
phenomenon. However, one of the earliest reported opinions of our
Supreme Court contained two dissents, which, in the days when opi-
nions were delivered orally, probably accounted for the fact that the
decision was reported at all.85
Chief Justice John Marshall, who broke from the English tradition
of seriatim opinion delivery to adopt the precedent of a single opinion
of the Court, prized unanimity and managed to achieve consensus to a
degree unparalleled since his era.86 Marshall's personality-arguably
the most forceful in the Court's history-partially explains the seem-
ing harmony of the Court during Marshall's dominance. The reasons
Marshall urged unanimity deserve careful note.
The Court as an institution was not yet established. Marshall un-
doubtedly wanted the Court to speak with one voice to send America
a strong signal: the role of the Court is to have the last say. Thus,
individual views had to yield to the will of the institution.Y
Thomas Jefferson, Marshall's political foe and a champion of indi-
vidual conscience, disagreed. Jefferson believed that there should be
individual opinions in every case; each justice should "[tjhrow himself
82. MAx LERNER, NINE SCORPIONS IN A BoTn: GREAT JUDGES AND CASES OF THE SUPREME
COURT (Richard Cummings ed., 1994).
83. BoB DYLAN, The Times They Are A-Changin (Columbia Records 1964).
84. See generally ALAN BARTH, PtoPHsS WrrH HONOR: GRAT DISSENTs AND GREAT Dis-
SENTERS IN THE SUPREE COURT (1974); William J. Brennan, Jr., In Defense of Dissents, 37
HASTINGS L.J. 427 (1986); J. Louis Campbell, Il, The Spirit of Dissent, 66 JUDICATURE 304
(1983); Kelman, supra note 36; Karl M. ZoBell, Division of Opinion in the Supreme Court: A
History of Judicial Disintegration, 44 CORNELL L. Q. 186 (1959).
85. Georgia v. Brailsford, 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 415 (1793) (Iredell, J., dissenting) ("It is my
misfortune to dissent from the opinion . . . but I am bound to decide, according to the dictates
of my own judgment.").
86. For a thorough analysis of the English practice and that of the Marshall era, see ZoBell,
supra note 84, at 187-98.
87. See LEARNED HAND, THE BaR oF Rjoirs 72-77 (1958) ("[D]isunity cancels the impact
of monolithic solidarity on which the authority of a bench of judges so largely depends.").
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in every case on God and his country; both will excuse him for error
and value him for his honesty. '"89
With the passing of the John Marshall era-and perhaps because
the Court was imbued with some of the institutional security that was
Marshall's legacy-dissents became more frequent and influential, as
exemplified by those of Justice Holmes. In Lochner v. New York,89
perhaps Holmes' most famous dissent, Holmes began by stating "I
regret sincerely that I am unable to agree with the judgment in this
case, and that I think it is my duty to express my dissent."' 9 Although
Holmes' opinion savagely mocked the majority, 9' we have no reason
to doubt the sincerity of his regret. Holmes was not the only dissenter
who believed in the consensus opinion as the institutional voice of au-
thorityY Having once stated opposition to the adoption of a particu-
lar proposition, Holmes and other dissenters often acquiesced to the
force of precedent when required to apply earlier cases.
B. Early History of Dissent
1. Seriatim Opinions
The earliest published reports of the United States Supreme Court
recount a history of freedom of expressing individual opinion in both
concurrences and dissents. Integral to this freedom was the English
practice of delivering opinions seriatim. History indicates that the
Court consciously decided to follow the seriatim practice, employing
this method when delivering potentially controversial or significant
decisions.
In one of the first-reported opinions of the United States Supreme
Court, in 1792, the Court followed the English seriatim practice, but
in the uniquely American order of inverse seniority.9 3 In Georgia v.
88. 10 PAUL L. FoRD, Tu Wirrmos os THOMAS JEFFERSON 246-48 (1899). Notably, Jeffer-
son feared a strong federal judiciary.
89. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
90. Id. at 74.
91. Seeid.at75.
92. E.g., West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 646-47 (1943) (Frankfurter,
J., dissenting).
93. See ZoBell, supra note 84, at 192 ("During most of its first decade, the Supreme Court
followed the custom of The King's Bench-its decisions were announced through the seriatim
opinions of its members. (Unlike King's Bench practice, however, the opinions were delivered in
inverse order of seniority.)"); See also Evan A. Evans, The Dissenting Opinion-Its Use and
Abuse, 3 Mo. L. REv. 120 (1938); A. J. Levin, Mr. Justice William Johnson, Creative Dissenter,
43 MICH. L. Rv. 497, 512 (1944); Charles Warren, The First Decade of the Supreme Court of
the United States, 7 U. Cm. L. REv. 631, 637-38 (1940) [hereinafter Warren, First Decade].
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Brailsford,94 each of the six justices on the Court gave an opinion con-
cerning Georgia's motion for an injunction in a suit in equity against
two citizens of another state. The majority of the Court gave opinions
supporting the injunction, and two justices opposed the injunction.
Because of the American inverse seniority method, junior Justice
Thomas Johnson's dissenting opinion was one of the first Supreme
Court opinions reported. 95
In Hayburn's Case,96 the Court reviewed a Congressional act direct-
ing circuit courts to settle the claims of widows and orphans, and to
establish and regulate the claims of invalid pensioners.9 The question
before the Court was whether Attorney General Edmund Randolph,
acting alone and ex officio, could superintend the decisions of the cir-
cuit courts.98 The official report reveals only that the Court "being
divided in opinion on that question, [Randolph's] motion, made ex
officio was not allowed.' '99 Yet, newspaper accounts of the time stated
"the debate continued from day to day until Saturday last .... The
discussion was full and the Bench divided on the question. Judges Ire-
dell, Johnson and Blair, declaring in favor of the Attorney General
and Judges Wilson, Cushing and the Chief Justice entertaining the
contrary opinion."'0 Attorney General Randolph wrote to Madison
that, "[ilt continued from day to day until yesterday, when Johnson,
Iredell, and Blair were in favor of my power, and the other three
against it."101
Thus, confronted with division, the justices of the early Court were
not inhibited in the free expression of their individual opinions. Nor
did division preclude each justice's views from being officially re-
ported. When confronted with the division generated by Hayburn's
Case, the Court not only implicitly respected freedom of individual
expression, but went on to expressly incorporate the seriatim practice.
The early Court's following of seriatim practice was purposeful
rather than accidental, and the continuation of the practice can be
traced. English practice did not require that individual opinions be ex-
94. Georgia v. Brailsford, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 402 (1792).
95. See Brailsford, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 405. Neither Justice Johnson as the most junior jus-
tice, nor Justice Cushing, apologized for their dissents in Brailsford. See id. at 405, 408.
96. Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 408 (1792).
97. Id. at 409 n.(a).
98. See id. at 409-10.
99. Id. at 409.
100. 1 CHARLES WARREN, THE SuPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 77-78 (1923)
[hereinafter WARREN, TnE SUPREME COURT] (quoting GEN. ADVERTISER (Phila.), Aug. 16, 1792;
GAZETTE U.S., Aug. 25, 1792; U.S. CHRON. (Providence), Aug. 30, 1792; MASS. Spy, Aug. 30,
1792).
101. Id. at 79 (letter of Aug. 12, 1792).
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pressed in every case. In 1822, Jefferson observed "that from the ear-
liest ages of the English law. . . the judges of England, in all but self-
evident cases, delivered their opinions seriatim, with the reasons and
authorities which governed their decisions."' 02 The early United States
Supreme Court varied the practice by delivering opinions seriatim in
potentially controversial and significant cases. 103
Given the nature of the issues in those cases, and the precarious
position of the Court as an uncrystallized institution, seriatim opi-
nions allowed the justices to assume responsibility for their reasoning
and decisions. The Court's determination of which cases were signifi-
cant was discretionary, and exercising that discretion increased the po-
tential for public, political, and internal discord. For example, in Bas
v. Tingy,104 Justice Chase complained that "[tihe Judges agreeing
unanimously in their opinion, I presumed that the sense of the Court
would have been delivered by the president, and therefore, I have not
prepared a formal argument on the occasion." ' Yet, Justice Chase's
complaint is not indicative of previous opinions delivered seriatim.
The two dissents in the first hearing of Brailsford'6 are the only dis-
senting opinions in cases in which the Court delivered opinions seria-
tim. Though infrequent, dissenting opinions were more common when
the Court did not follow the seriatim practice.101
102. FORD, supra note 88, at 223-25.
103. "Out of sixty-three cases reported for the period [before 1801] twelve [actually thirteen]
appeared as seriatim opinions; thus nearly one-fifth of the adjudications found all the justices
expressing their individual convictions, and among the number were such pivotal cases as Chish-
olm v. Georgia, Hylton v. United States, Ware v. Hylton, and Calder v. Bull." DONALD G.
MORGAN, JUSTICE WILLIAM JoHNSON: THE FIRST DISSENTER 45-46 (1954) [hereinafter MORGAN,
FIRST DISSENTER]; see Donald G. Morgan, Mr. Justice William Johnson and the Constitution, 57
HARv. L. REv. 328, 331 n.13 (1944) [hereinafter Morgan, Johnson and the Constitution]; Levin,
supra note 93, at 512 n.42.
104. 4 U.S. (4 DalI.) 37, 43 (1800).
105. Warren, supra note 93, at 654 n.1, uses Chase's opinion to establish that the practice of
having the opinions of the Court delivered by the Chief Justice did not originate with Marshall.
Warren also pointed out that Chase's absence from the August 1800 term had drawn "savage
attack" from the Anti-Federalist newspapers . . . for he was speaking ... in Maryland in behalf
of Adams' candidacy for the Presidency." Id. at 156 n. 1. Thus, Chase may have been complain-
ing about the criticism more than the Court's following of the seriatim practice.
106. Georgia v. Brailsford, 2 U.S. (2 Dal.) 402 (1792).
107. Justices Iredell and Blair dissented in the rehearing of Brailsford, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 402
(1792). Justice Wilson dissented in Wiscart v. D'Auchy, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 321 (1796), and was
joined by Justice Paterson. See Jennings v. Perseverance, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 336, 337 (1797)
("Though I was silent on the occasion, I concurred in opinion with Judge Wilson upon the
second rule laid down in Wiscart v. D'Auchy.").
Nor do the reports of previous opinions delivered seriatim support disagreement in the Court's
reasoning. In Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 336 (1797), Justice Iredell disagreed with the rea-
soning of other opinions. See id. at 398. Justice Chase, in Calder, and Chief Justice Elsworth, in
Fenemore v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 357 (1797), limited their concurrences with the
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Public response to the Court's decision in Bas v. Tingy't 1 supports
the idea that discretionary seriatim practice was predicated upon the
potential for public or political response to decisions, and the idea
that individual responsibility was intrinsic.
[F]or the first time in the history of the Government, there was
uttered a suggestion that a Judge should be impeached for rendering
a judicial decision, when the Aurora stated that the decision was
'most important and momentous to the country, and in our opinion
every Judge who asserted we were in a state of war, contrary to the
rights of Congress to declare it, ought to be impeached."' 9
Though the justices had agreed upon the interpretation of the legisla-
tion in question, the Court, in its discretion, had determined that indi-
vidual expressions of reasoning, and individual responsibility for that
reasoning, would clarify and strengthen the decision.
In sum, history establishes that freedom of individual expression
was purposely institutionalized and continued by the Court, with a
focus on assuming responsibility through concurrences and dissents in
potentially significant or controversial decisions. The early Court es-
tablished the philosophy that the credibility of the Court as a unit
would be clarified and strengthened if individual justices articulated
their own opinions.
2. Early "Opinions of the Court "-and Early Dissents
John Marshall's appointment as Chief Justice in February 1801 sig-
naled a change from seriatim practice to the practice of delivering cau-
cus opinions. This sudden change can be traced to Marshall's personal
philosophy and the strength of his personality. Although the Court
strictly adhered to this practice for only the first four years of Mar-
shall's tenure as Chief Justice, individual expression through either
concurring or dissenting opinions was indelibly marked as an excep-
tion to the unity of the Court. Yet, the history of unity is contempora-
neous with a history of tension between the stricture of unification
and individual responsibility.
In the first decision after Marshall's appointment to Chief Justice,
Talbot v. Seeman," 0 Marshall forever changed the practice of the
Court's decisions. See, e.g., Fenemore, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 364 (Elsworth, C.J., concurring)
("With respect, however, to the right of disaffirmance, I .wish to be understood, as limiting it to
the continuance of the certificate in the hands of the original party . .
108. 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 37, 43 (1800).
109. See WARREN, supra note 100, at 157 n.1 and accompanying text.
110. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 1(1801).
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Court by announcing the decision in a single opinion."' "The opinion
of the Court" had been given in earlier, minor cases. For example,
Chief Justice Elsworth, in Brown v. Barry,' 2 began by "delivering the
opinion of the court." Marshall went further and infused the Talbot
opinion with a Supreme Court persona: e.g., "the court cannot pre-
sume"; "the court is struck with"; and "the court thinks.""' Mar-
shall did not write the majority opinion as Chief Justice, but wrote the
opinion of "the Court" as an entity-separate from its individual
components. Thus, beginning with the first decision in which he par-
ticipated, Marshall steered the philosophy of the Court away from in-
dividual expression.''
Unlike the Court's incorporation of the English practice, there is no
recorded announcement of the Court's change to the caucus opinion.
Because the change began with Marshall's appointment, and the
Court only reverted to the seriatim practice in Marshall's absence,"'
this change is attributed to Marshall. In a biography of Marshall, Bev-
eridge described this as "one of those acts of audacity that later
marked the assumptions of power which rendered [Marshall's] career
historic.""16 The United States Supreme Court caucus opinion can be
linked also to Marshall's admiration for Lord Mansfield, who intro-
111. PERcIVA. E. JACKSON, DISSENT IN THE SUPREME COURT 21(1969) ("It is undeniable that
in the first case in which he participated and which he decided, following his accession to the
bench, Marshall undertook to put the English seriatim practice, which had theretofore been fol-
lowed by the Court, at rest, by writing for the Court."); see also ZoBell, supra note 84, at 193
("Only after... consideration of the early English practice and of the embryonic custom of the
Supreme Court does one become aware of the striking nature of the innovation which was intro-
duced when, in the first case decided after he became Chief Justice, 'Marshall, C.J., delivered
the opinion of the Court."').
112. 3 U.S. (3 Dallas) 365 (1797).
113. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) at 40-44.
114. As ZoBell states:
When "the Chief Justice delivered the opinion of the Court," he intended that the
words he wrote should bear the imprimatur of the Supreme Court of the United
States. For the first time, the Court as a judicial unit had been committed to an opin-
ion-a ratio decidendi-in support of its judgments.
ZoBell, supra note 84, at 193 (citation omitted).
115. In Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 358 (1827), Johnson delivered a dis-
senting opinion seriatim. See also Randolph v. Ware, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 503 (1806); United
States v. Heth, 7 U.S (3 Cranch) 399 (1806); Marine Ins. Co. v. Tucker, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 357
(1806); Marine Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 187 (1805); Lambert's Lessee v. Paine, 7
U.S. (3 Cranch) 97 (1805).
116. 3 ALBIERT J. BEVERIDOE, THE Lna oF JoHN MARSHALL 16 (1919). Beveridge continued:
For the first time the Chief Justice disregarded the custom of the delivery of opinions
by the Justices seriatim, and, instead, calmly assumed the function of announcing,
himself, the views of that tribunal. Thus Marshall took the first step in impressing the
country with the unity of the highest court of the Nation.
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duced caucus opinions on the King's Bench. 17 Marshall's theory of
unity behind the procedural ideal of caucus opinions was once ex-
pressed by him, perhaps notably, in a dissent:
The course of every tribunal must necessarily be, that the opinion
which is to be delivered as the opinion of the court, is previously
submitted to the consideration of all the judges; and, if any part of
the reasoning be disapproved, it must be so modified as to receive
the approbation of all, before it can be delivered as the opinion of
all.1'
8
The Court decided twenty-six cases, all unanimous, during the early
years of Marshall's tenure." 9 The fact that Marshall wrote for the
Court in all but two opinions, 120 in which he had sat for the decisions
below, attests to his influence. Yet there were five other justices on the
Court who did not object to the practice. Without their support, Mar-
shall's concept of unity could not have become the Court's practice.
However, history shows tension between the ideal and the reality of
the practice.
After four years of the Chief Justice delivering the unanimous opin-
ion of the Court, however, the reality of individual responsibility be-
gan to erode the ideal of unity.' Justice Chase's concurring opinion
in 1804 was followed in 1805 by Justice Washington's dissenting
opinion'22 and Justice William Johnson's concurring opinion.123 Also,
in 1806, Justice Patterson wrote a dissenting opinion,'2 and in 1807,
Justice Johnson wrote a dissenting opinion. 2 In 1808 Justice Johnson
117. See FORD, supra note 88; see also LEONARD BAKER, JOHN MARsHiA: A LIFE IN LAW
414-15 (1974).
118. 4 ALBERT J. BEVERsDE, THE LIFE OF JoN MARSHALL 320 (1919); see also Bank of the
United States v. Dandridge, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 64, 90 (1827) (Marshall, C.J., dissenting) ('I
should now, as is my custom, when I have the misfortune to differ from this Court, acquiesce
silently in its opinion .... ).
119. Morgan, Johnson and the Constitution, supra note 103, at 331. The unity of the Court
was disrupted only once, in 1804, by an eight-line concurrence from Justice Chase. Head &
Amory v. Providence Ins. Co., 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 127, 169 (1804).
120. Ogden v. Blackledge, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 272 (1804); Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. (I Cranch)
299 (1803).
121. A legal realist would advance an alternative rationale for Justice Johnson's break from
Chief Justice Marshall's delivery of a single opinion of the Court. Justice Johnson was an ap-
pointee of then-President Thomas Jefferson, a strong supporter of states' rights. It was no secret
that Chief Justice Marshall was a federalist in its traditional definition, and therefore, the con-
flicting political ideologies manifested themselves in Justice Johnson's dissents.
122. United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 358, 397 (1805).
123. Huidekoper's Lessee v. Douglass, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 1, 72 (1805).
124. Simms v. Slacum, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 300, 309(1806).
125. Exparte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 101 (1807).
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wrote two concurring opinions and two dissenting opinions; Justices
Washington and Livingston each wrote concurring opinions.126
Marshall began to assign delivery of the majority opinion to other
justices, 127 which he did three times in 1809 and once in 1810.'2 From
1813 to 1822, Marshall averaged about fifteen opinions of the Court,
and all other justices averaged twenty-one. 29 Marshall's assignments
did not dispel the inherent tension between free expression and unity.
By Marshall's last years, individual expression became more preva-
lent. 130
Individual expression began to emerge by dissenting opinions. Of
the seventy-four dissenting opinions reported from 1805 to 1833,
thirty-seven were submitted between 1827 and 1833.111 Conversely, of
the thirty-five concurring opinions reported from 1805 to 1833, only
seven were submitted between 1827 and 1833.132
Neither Marshall nor the Court could dissolve the tension between
individualism and the caucus-especially in important or potentially
126. MORGAN, FIRST DISSENER, supra note 103, at 306.
127. Id. at 180 ("And by 1809 Marshall had surrendered his supreme prerogative-delivering
the opinion of the Court.").
This change may not have been motivated by external political pressures as much as by inter-
nal pressure. The change occurred between 1809 and 1813, yet attacks from Roane and Jefferson
did not become acute until the early 1820's. Justice Johnson referred to the change in a letter to
Jefferson, ascribing the change to internal pressure:
Some case soon occurred in which I differed from my brethren, and I thought it .a
thing of course to deliver my opinion, But, during the rest of the session I heard
nothing but lectures on the indecency of judges cutting at each other .... [T]herefore
[I1 bent to the current, and persevered until I got them to.. . leave it to the discretion
of the... judges to record their opinions or not ad libitum.
Letter from W. Johnson to T. Jefferson, Dec. 10, 1822, Jefferson Papers (MSS; Library of
Congress).
128. MORGAN, FmrST DISSENTER, supra note 103, at 180 n.56:
Washington spoke for the Court in Pierce v. Turner, 5 Cranch 154 (1809); Cushing, in
Marine Insurance Company of Alexandria v. Young, 5 Cranch 187 (1809); and Liv-
ingston, in Keene v. United States, 5 Cranch 304 (1809), and Hudson v. Guestier, 6
Cranch 281 (1810). The reports give no indication that Marshall was absent from any
of these decisions.
129. MORGAN, FIRST DissENTER, supra note 103, at 180 n.57.
130. However, in 1827, in Ogden v. Saunders, 5 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213 (1827), the Court
briefly returned to its practice of delivering opinions seriatim. The majority, consisting of
Justices Washington, Johnson, Thompson, and Trimble, gave opinions seriatim; and Marshall
delivered a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Duvall and Story joined. The practice of seria-
tim opinions was not officially reinstituted, though.
131. These numbers are deduced from figures compiled by Morgan in MORoAN, FIRST DIS-
SENTER, supra note 103, at 189, 306-07. See also EvANs, supra note 93, at 138. Although this
table was compiled by volumes rather than by years, it can be roughly estimated from this table
that the rates of dissents from volumes 5-10 through volumes 21-30 rose from four percent to
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controversial decisions. The history of the Marshall Court is one of
tension. Traces of the early practice of delivering opinions seriatim
have persisted: individual opinions have emerged as respected asser-
tions of individuality. But the majority opinion remains the Court's
accepted practice. 1 33
Accommodation of these diverse philosophies is represented by
writings of Supreme Court justices who supported unanimity yet prac-
ticed dissent. 3 4 Justice Story, who ardently supported Marshall's lead-
ership, 35 held it an indispensable duty "not to surrender my own
judgment, because a great weight of opinion is against me, a weight
which no one can feel more sensibly than myself.' ' 36 But Story justi-
fied his individual expression by means of the importance of a given
case, 37 or by the involvement of a constitutional question.'38
The justifications of individual expression in important cases are
similar to the justifications of the early Court's discretionary adher-
ence to the seriatim practice. 3 9 Semblances of seriatim practice recur
133. Preservation of the majority opinion was codified from 1924 to 1972 in Canon 19 in the
American Bar Association's CANONS OF JUDIcIAL ETmcs:
It is of high importance that judges constituting a court of last resort should use effort
and self-restraint to promote solidarity of conclusions and the consequent influence of
judicial decision. A judge should not yield to pride of opinion or value more highly his
individual reputation than that of the court to which he should be loyal. Except in
case of conscientious difference of opinion on fundamental principle, dissenting opi-
nions should be discouraged in courts of last resort.
CANONS OF JUDIciAL ETrscs Canon 19 (1957). Yet even this prescript accommodated individual
responsibility "on fundamental principle." Id.
134. John Marshall himself wrote nine dissenting opinions. Machen, Dissent and Stare De-
cisis in the Supreme Court, 45 MD. ST. B. Assoc. 79, 99 (1940).
135. I trust in God . . . that the Supreme Court will continue fearlessly to do its duty;
and I pray that your invaluable life may be long preserved to guide us in our defence
of the Constitution. Will you excuse me for saying that your appointment to the
Bench has in my judgment more contributed under Providence to the preservation of
the true principles of the Constitution than any other circumstance in our domestic
history.
Letter from J. Story to J. Marshall, June 27, 1821, quoted in 2 WARREN, THE STORY-MARSHALL
CORRESPONDENCE, 1819-1831, at 7 n.2.
136. The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388, 455 (1815).
137. Id. ("Had this been art ordinary case I should have contented myself with silence
138. Briscoe v. Bank of Kentucky, 36 U.S. (11 Peters) 257, 329 (1837) ("[Ulpon constitu-
tional questions I ever thought it my duty to give a public expression of my opinions, when they
differed from that of the Court.").
139. West River Bridge v. Dix, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 507, 536-39 (1848). Justice Woodbury
wrote:
In the decisions of this Court on constitutional questions it has happened frequently,
that, though its members were united in the judgment, great differences existed among
them in the reasons for it, or in the limitations on some of the principles involved.
Hence it has been customary in such cases to express their views separately. I conform
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throughout the Court's history. In 1847, in the License Cases,140 "six
Judges render[ed] separate opinions upon the much vexed points as to
the exclusiveness of the power of Congress to regulate commerce, and
as to the definition of the word 'regulate." ' ' 4 Again, in 1853, in the
Passenger Cases, the Court virtually returned to the seriatim prac-
tice. 42 "[Tihe decision holding the laws of both States [New York and
Massachusetts] unconstitutional was rendered February 7, 1849, each
of the Judges reading an opinion, so. that seven hours were thus occu-
pied."' 43 Similarly, in 1952, in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Saw-
yer,'4 the Court emulated seriatim practice. Seven opinions were
given: six concurring to deny the President authority to take over the
steel mills, and one dissenting. Finally, as previously mentioned, in
1972 in Furman v. Georgia, each justice wrote separately.145
C. Taking Dissents Seriously: Some Great Dissenters
1. The Nineteenth Century
(a) William Johnson
Justice William Johnson was the first dissenter during the Marshall
Court's practice of caucus opinions. Johnson exercised individual ex-
to that usage in this case the more readily, as it is one of first impression before this
tribunal, very important in its consequences, as a great landmark for the States as well
as the general government, and, from shades of difference and even conflicts in opin-
ion, will be open to some misconstruction.
Id. at 539. Justice McLean wrote "[a]s this is a constitutional question of considerable practical
importance, I will state, succinctly, my general views on the subject." id. at 536.
See also Graves v. New York, 306 U.S. 466, 487 (1939) (Frankfurter, J., concurring):
I join in the Court's opinion but deem it appropriate to add a few remarks. The vol-
ume of the Court's business has long since made impossible the early healthy practice
whereby the Justices gave expression to individual opinions. But the old tradition still
has relevance when an important shift in constitutional doctrine is announced after a
reconstruction in the membership of the Court. Such shifts of opinion should not
derive from mere private judgment. They must be duly mindful of the necessary de-
mands of continuity in civilized society. A reversal of a long current of decisions can
be justified only if rooted in the Constitution itself as an historic document designed
for a developing nation.
140. Thurlow v. Massachusetts, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504, 573 (1847).
141. 2 WARREN, supra note 135, at 154.
142. Smith v. Turner, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283 (1849).
143. 2 WARREN, supra note 135, at 178.
144. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
145. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
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pression akin to the seriatim practice. Focusing on individualism
rather than disagreement, his opinions are often undifferentiated as
concurrences or dissents. Because they were reduced to ease the ten-
sion between individual and unanimous opinions, the consistency of
his separate opinions is difficult to trace. Vindication of legislative su-
premacy over executive and judicial power, however, underscored
Johnson's separate opinions.
Appointed to the Supreme Court by President Jefferson in 1805,
William Johnson served through 1833, nearly matching Marshall's
tenure of 1801-1835. In 1805, in Huidekoper's Lessee v. Douglass,'
4
Johnson disrupted the unanimity of the Court with a concurring opin-
ion questioning the majority's reasoning. In 1807 he delivered a full
dissent in Ex Parte Bollman.'47 Within the context of the period,
Johnson's persistent separatism was distinct. "Of a total of 70 dis-
senting opinions, 33-nearly half-were Johnson's. Similarly he sub-
mitted 24 of the 59 concurring opinions.'"4 Though concurring
opinions were integral to Johnson's exercise of individual expression,
Johnson became the "first dissenter."
Justice Johnson was motivated by his commitment to individual re-
sponsibility rather than by an inability to agree with the majority. In
Marine Insurance Co. v. Young, 49 individual responsibility induced
Johnson's separate opinion "to avoid having an ambiguous decision
hereafter imputed to me, or an opinion which I would not wish to be
understood to have given." In Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 50 Johnson
stated his two reasons for concurring were that, "our conclusions are
most satisfactory to ourselves, when arrived at in our own way" and
the "momentous importance" of the question involved. And in his
concurring opinion in Gibbons v. Ogden, 5 ' he wrote, "in questions of
great importance and great delicacy, I feel my duty to the public best
discharged by an effort to maintain my opinions in my own way."
Justice Johnson's focus on personal responsibility accounts for the
fine distinction between his full dissents and his opinions expressing
mere difference from the reasoning of the Court.5 2 This muted dis-
146. 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 1, 72 (1805).
147. 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 101 (1807).
148. Morgan, Johnson and the Constitution, supra note 103, at 332.
149. 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 187 (1809) (added by errata).
150. 14 U.S. (I Wheat.) 304, 362-63 (1816).
151. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 222-23 (1824).
152. "In this group of concurring opinions will be found some of his best opinions, wherein,
although he followed the majority of the Court, his reasoning was so different as to possess the
quality of real dissents-so much so as to perplex some scholars." A.J. Levin, Mr. Justice Wil-
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tinction is exemplified in Johnson's separate opinion in and subse-
quent historical analyses of Fletcher v. Peck.15 3 After writing that
"[iln this case I entertain, on two points, an opinion different from
that which has been delivered by the court," Johnson's next sentence
concurred with Marshall's opinion for the Court. 5 4 Johnson went on
to disagree with the Court's expansive construction of the Contract
Clause, but historians including Johnson's biographer are divided as
to whether Johnson was dissenting or limiting the Court's construc-
tion of the Contract Clause. "
A study of the consistency of Johnson's legal philosophy and use of
concurring as well as dissenting opinions demands consideration of his
four-year "lapse into silent acquiescence" in 1819.156 This four-year
silence can only be conjectured to have been a result of compro-
mise. 157
The Court's construction of the Contract Clause provides a useful
framework for studying Johnson's philosophy. An advocate of defer-
ence to legislative supremacy, Johnson chafed in his separate opinion
in Fletcher, at the judicial limitation of legislative action.'-,' Yet, John-
son acquiesced as the Court extended the clause's prohibitions on
state legislation. 15 9 He did not resist the Court's expansion of the Con-
liam Johnson, Creative Dissenter, 43 MICH. L. Rv. 497, 522-23 (1944) (citation omitted).
For example, Cotton mistakes Justice Johnson's concurring opinion in Gibbons v. Ogden, 22
U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824), for a dissenting opinion. See 2 JOSEPH P. COTTON, JR., CONSTITU-
TIONAL DECISIONS OF JOHN MARSHALL 37 (1905).
153. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 143 (1810).
154. Id. at 143 ("1 do not hesitate to declare that a state does not possess the power of
revoking its own grants. But I do it on a general principle, on the reason and nature of things: a
principle which will impose laws even on the deity.").
155. Authorities identifying Johnson's Fletcher opinion as a concurrence include MORGAN,
FIRST DISSENTER, supra note 103, at 210-16; Morgan, Johnson and the Constitution, supra note
103, at 352-53; A.J. Levin, Mr. Justice William Johnson and the Common Incidents of Life, 44
MICH. L. REv. 59, 90-91 (1945); C. PETER MAGRATH, YAzoo: LAW AND POLITICS IN Tm NEw
REPUBUC 80 (1966).
Authorities identifying it as a dissenting opinion include JOHN M. DILLON, JOHN MARSHALL:
COMPLETE CONsTITUrIONAL DECISIONS 216 (1903); 1 JOSEPH P. COTrON, JR., THIE CONSTU-
TiONAL DECISIONS OF JoHN MARSHALL 231 (1905); A. SIEGEL, THE MARSHALL COURT, 1805-1835,
at 116-17 (1987); Jackson, supra note 111, at 29; Robert L. Hale, The Supreme Court and the
Contract Clause: Ill, 57 HARV. L. Rav. 852, 873 (1944).
156. MORGAN, FIRST DISSENTER, supra note 103, at 290.
157. See Letter from W. Johnson to T. Jefferson, supra note 127. In Ogden v. Saunders, 25
U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 272-73 (1827), Johnson revealed that the unanimous decision in Sturges v.
Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122 (1819), had been the result of a "compromise" with the
minority.
158. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 143 (1810).
159. See Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819);
Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122 (1819); New Jersey v. Wilson, 11 U.S. (7
Cranch) 164 (1812).
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tract Clause until 1823, in a concurrence that defended the power of
legislatures in interstate compacts. I' ° Ultimately, Johnson delivered a
concurring seriatim opinion supporting the government's right "to
limit and define the power of contracting, and the extent of the credi-
tor's remedy against his debtor."' 6'
Thus, though Johnson's separate opinions were not easily distin-
guished as concurrences or dissents, and though he acquiesced in the
practice of the Court for a time, there was consistency in his individu-
alism. Justice Johnson's original commitment to legislative supremacy
evolved into a philosophy of positive law. 62
Throughout his twenty-eight years of service, Johnson used dissent-
ing or concurring opinions to take the position that both the executive
and judicial branches must look to either the Constitution or Congress
for their power. Beginning with his first dissent in Ex Parte Boll-
man, ' 63 Johnson maintained that the Constitution granted the Court
original jurisdiction but that Congress must authorize appellate juris-
diction. Thus, the Court had no general power to issue a writ of ha-
beas corpus without express authorization when the case had been
properly committed to a lower court. Johnson sustained this position
in dissenting opinions throughout his Supreme Court tenure and ex-
pressed the same position on questions of mandamus.164
This same positivist philosophy animated Johnson's dissenting posi-
tion that the powers of the courts were subject to the will of the legis-
lature. 61 Attributing supreme power to the legislatures, Johnson
demanded authorization for the Court's powers. For example, John-
son dissented to argue that the Court was unauthorized to dictate the
bounds of state power in the right of election in a naturalization
case.' 66 Nor did he think the Court was authorized to address topics
160. Green v. Biddle, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 1, 94 (1821).
161. Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 291-92 (1827).
162. See Morgan, Johnson and the Constitution, supra note 103, at 360; see also A.J. Levin,
Mr. Justice William Johnson and the Unenviable Dilemma, 42 MICH. L. REv. 803 (1944)
(equates Johnson's "functional interpretation of judicial power" to Holmes' philosophy of judi-
cial restraint); Levin, supra note 152, at 500 ("Holmes began a judicial re-examination which
harked back to the earlier dissents of Johnson"). But Oliver Wendell Holmes' reasons were quite
different. See SHELDON M. NOVICK, HONORABLE JUSICE 444 n.24 (1989).
163. 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 101 (1807) (Johnson, J., dissenting); see also Ex parte Watkins,
32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 568, 579 (1833) (Johnson, J., dissenting); Exparte Crane, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 190,
200 (1831) (Baldwin, J., joined by Johnson, J., dissenting).
164. Johnson's majority opinions in mandamus cases include M'Clung v. Silliman, 19 U.S.
(6 Wheat.) 598 (1821) and McIntire v. Wood, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 504 (1813).
165. See Yeaton v. Bank of Alexandria, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 49, 54 (1809) (Johnson, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part).
166. Shanks v. Dupont, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 242, 250 (1830) (Johnson, J., dissenting).
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that were not essential to the case, because "[w]e are constituted to
decide causes, and not to discuss themes .. ,,67
(b) Peter Daniel
Justice Peter Daniel, the first sustained dissenter, shares little with
Justices Brennan and Marshall other than zeal, but history makes
ironic bedfellows. Daniel was as relentless in his support of slavery
and racism, framed in the language of federalism, as Brennan and
Marshall were in their support of individual rights.
Justice Daniel served on the Taney Court for nineteen years, from
1841 to 1860. Unlike the separate opinions of Justice William John-
son, Daniel's dissents were motivated by disagreement with the opi-
nions of the Court rather than by the responsibility of individual
expression. Less reflective of the seriatim practice, Daniel's dissents
were not always accompanied by opinion. Even when joining the
judgment of the Court, his concurring opinions were identifiable as
vehement dissents from specific points in the Court's decision. Fur-
ther, unlike the opinions of one of the great nineteenth century dis-
senters, John Marshall Harlan, not one of Daniel's dissents has been
remembered as "an appeal to the brooding spirit of the law, to the
intelligence of a future day, when a later decision may possibly correct
the error into which the dissenting judge believes the court to have
been betrayed."'6 Daniel's opinions simply evaporated.
Justice Peter Daniel's service was not outstanding in duration, how-
ever, his service was outstanding in that he delivered the opinion of
the Court in eighty-four cases and dissented in 111. 169 More outstand-
ing than the sheer number of Daniel's dissents is their relentlessness; 70
they left no room for compromise. Through dissent, Daniel unequivo-
cally adhered to the sovereignty of the individual states.
In one of the first cases that Daniel reviewed, he joined the judg-
ment of the Court but dissented from two specific points of law. Prigg
v. Pennsylvania71 held that a Pennsylvania statute, which made it fe-
lonious to carry away or seduce any "colored" person from Pennsyl-
vania with intent to detain or sell the colored person, was
167. United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 610, 641 (1818) (Johnson, J., dissenting);
The Atalanta, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 409, 419 (1818).
168. CHA Lt~s E. HuGHEs, THE SuPaEM COURT OF THE UNITED STATEs 68 (1928).
169. H.B. Brown, The Dissenting Opinions of Mr. Justice Daniel, 21 AM. L. REv. 869, 870
(1887).
170. "One of the most pertinacious dissentients was Peter V. Daniel .... A protomodern
dissenter in frequency and tenacity was Justice Peter Daniel (1841-60)." BURTON J. HENDRiCK,
BULWARK OF THE REPuBuLc 417 (1937).
171. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 536 (1842).
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unconstitutional under Article IV.1 2 Daniel concurred that the statute
was unconstitutional. In the interest of states' rights, however, Daniel
could not agree that Congress prohibited any state legislation upon
the subject. 173
In another infamous slavery case fourteen years later, Daniel again
concurred with the Court's decision but adamantly disagreed with the
reasoning. Dred Scott v. Sandford74 held that Scott was not a citizen
because he was black, and that his temporary residence in the free
state of Minnesota was not emancipation from his slavery.' Daniel
dissented from the Court's finding that slaves were the same as other
property, writing "the only private property which the Constitution
has specifically recognized ... is the property of the master in his
slave; no other right of property is placed by the Constitution upon
the same high ground."'' 76 Daniel's dissents in these slavery cases typ-
ify his dissents in other areas.
Daniel brooked no infringement by Congress into the rights of the
states, even for internal improvements. The Court decided two cases
involving state statutes that imposed tolls on United States mail carri-
ers traveling on a road that Congress had built but then ceded to the
surrounding states.177 In both cases, Daniel dissented from the Court's
holding that the state statutes conflicted with the act ceding the road
to the states.' 78
Daniel's commitment to states' rights also motivated his dissents in
cases interpreting the regulation of commerce. In the best example of
this, the Passenger Cases,79 the Court extended the term "commerce"
to include all navigation, and held that state laws imposing taxes upon
arriving aliens were unconstitutional. Daniel entered a full dissent
upon the basis that persons were not "imports" within the meaning of
the Constitution, and he would not extend Congress' power over
"commerce" to include "intercourse" with foreign nations and
among the states. 0
172. No Person held to Service or Labor in one State, under the Laws thereof, escap-
ing into another, shall, in Consequence of any Law or Regulation herein, be dis-
charged from such Service or Labor, but shall be delivered up on Claim of the Party
to whom such Service or Labor may be due.
U.S. CONST. art. IV, sec. 2, cl. 3.
173. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 536, 659 (1842) (Daniel, J., concurring).
174. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
175. Id. at 450.
176. Id. at 490.
177. Searight v. Stokes, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 151 (1845); Neil, Moore & Co. v. Ohio, 44 U.S. (3
How.) 720 (1845).
178. See Searight, 44 U.S. (3 How.) at 181.
179. Smith v. Turner, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283 (1849).
180. Id. at 494.
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Just as Daniel dissented from any extension of the power of federal
legislation, he dissented from any extension of the powers of federal
courts. Although Daniel did not object when the Court first conferred
citizenship status upon corporations,' thereafter Daniel dissented
from the Court's treatment of corporations as citizens and from the
precedent, believing "wherever the construction or the integrity of
[the Constitution] is involved, I can hold myself trammeled by no
precedent or number of precedents." 18 2
Similarly, Daniel reiterated his dissent from the Court's expansion
of the admiralty jurisdiction of the district courts. When the Court
extended admiralty jurisdiction beyond the earlier limits set by the law
of England,'83 Daniel joined Justice Woodbury's dissent. Daniel ar-
gued that expanding admiralty jurisdiction was an encroachment upon
the right to trial by jury and upon state judicial power. Within a year,
Daniel dissented again from the Court's extension of admiralty juris-
diction, 184 and never withdrew from this dissent. 8'
Additionally, Daniel dissented from any threat to the right to trial
by jury. In Mitchell v. Harmony,'86 Daniel dissented because the judge
had commented upon the weight and sufficiency of the evidence. And
in Pennsylvania v. Ravenel,8 7 he wrote that "it is the peculiar prov-
ince of the jury to weigh [the] evidence, and to draw their own inde-
pendent inferences from it; and the only legitimate corrective is to be
found in the award of a new trial, or by a case agreed, or by a demur-
rer to evidence."' 8 Daniel's justified dissents do not intertwine with
his commitment to states' rights, but the singularity of his commit-
ment is no less apparent.
Even though Justice Peter Daniel "for nineteen years fought single-
handed for his convictions, and to the day of his death yielded not
one jot nor one tittle of what he believed to be right,"' 18 9 his dissents
are rarely remembered and not one of his sacred doctrines has been
181. Louisville, Cincinnati & Charleston R.R. v. Letson, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 497 (1844).
182. Rundle v. Delaware & Raritan Canal Co., 55 U.S. (14 How.) 80, 98-99 (1852).
183. Waring v. Clarke, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 441 (1847).
184. New Jersey Steam Navigation Co. v. Merchant's Bank, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 344 (1848).
185. E.g., Jackson v. The Steamboat Magnolia, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 296, 307 (1857) (Daniel,
J., dissenting); The Ship Howard v. Wissman, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 231, 234 (1855) (Daniel, J.,
dissenting); The Steamboat New World v. King, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 469, 478 (1853) (Daniel, J.,
dissenting); and The Steamboat Neptune v. Paine, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 557, 586 (1850) (Daniel,
J., dissenting).
186. 54 U.S. (13 How.) 115 (1851).
187. 62 U.S. (21 How.) 103 (1858).
188. Id. at Ill.
189. Brown, supra note 169, at 900.
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retained as law. 190 In retrospect, Daniel's dissents did not weaken the
authority of the Court. Rather, the authority of the Court was
strengthened by the failure of his dissents to impress themselves upon
the judicial consciousness.
(c) John Marshall Harlan
John Marshall Harlan was confirmed as a Supreme Court Justice
on November 26, 1877, and sat on the bench until five days before his
death on October 15, 1911. During these nearly thirty-four years,
Harlan dissented 380 times, delivering 316 dissenting opinions, 107 of
which were joined by at least three colleagues. 19' Harlan is perhaps
best remembered for his wonderful, lone dissent in Plessy v.
Ferguson92 which dramatizes the strength of commitment underlying
his dissents from the Court's limitation of legislative authority and its
expansion of "judicial legislation." Harlan's dissent in Plessy and
many of his other sustained dissents were vindicated by Court rever-
sals or legislative action. 193
Harlan was committed to the authority of the state and federal leg-
islatures. He dissented from opinions of the Court that found state
laws unconstitutional, and defended the states' exercise of police pow-
ers. Specifically, Harlan supported the power of the states to act as
guardians of the public peace and morals in the areas of child labor
laws, minimum and maximum wage laws, and control of intoxicating
liquors.' 4 He delineated a fine boundary between valid and unconsti-
tutional state police power under the Commerce Clause of Article I
and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Harlan would have denied the police power of the state if it inter-
fered with his broad interpretation of the Commerce Clause. He dis-
sented from opinions upholding, respectively, a West Virginia law
levying wharf duties, 95 a New York law that discriminated against
190. Conversely, history recognizes Justice Benjamin Curtis as the great "dissenting justice"
on the Taney Court for his lone dissent in Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (18 How.) 393, 529
(1856). Curtis filed seven dissenting opinions and cast 12 dissenting votes during his tenure. The
Court decided 467 cases during that period. ZontEi, supra note 84, at 198 n.69.
191. Henry J. Abraham, John Marshall Harlan:.A Justice Neglected, 41 VA. L. REV. 871,
872, 874 (1955).
192. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
193. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
194. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); Schollenberger v. Pennsylvania,
171 U.S. 1 (1898); Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100 (1890); Bowman v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 125
U.S. 465 (1888).
195. Transportation Co. v. Parkersburg, 107 U.S. 691 (1883).
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Pennsylvania corporations, 96 and a New York statute that allowed
discriminatory taxation of foreign corporations. ,97
Harlan's belief in the paramount authority of Congress to regulate
interstate commerce motivated his dissent in support of the Sherman
Antitrust Act of 1890. In his more than 10,000 word, lone dissent in
United States v. E.C. Knight, 98 Harlan supported the right of Con-
gress to forbid monopolies in manufacturing because manufacturing
would inevitably affect commerce. Harlan continued to support the
antitrust acts in dissent' 99 and, in his last year on the Court, he ob-
jected to the Court's narrowing of the antitrust acts by applying a
standard of reasonableness. m In line with this support of congres-
sional power over interstate commerce, Harlan also dissented in the
Employer Liability Cases.201
Harlan's conviction that the entire Bill of Rights was made applica-
ble to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment motivated his dissents in due process cases. Harlan dis-
sented from the Court's upholding of an amendment to California's
constitution that permitted criminal trials, even in capital cases, upon
affidavit without indictment.20 2 He also dissented from the Court's re-
fusal to make the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the
Eighth Amendment applicable through the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment 23 and from the Court's refusal to hold Utah
to the constitutional requirement of a jury of twelve. 204 Harlan contin-
ued his dissent when the Court refused to extend the right to immu-
nity from self-incrimination to the states"0 5 and when the Court
accepted an accused's waiver of trial by jury.206 Through dissent in the
196. Fire Ass'n v. New York, 119 U.S. 110 (1886).
197. New York v. Roberts, 171 U.S. 658 (1898). Harlan continued making this distinction in
his sustained dissents. See Security Ins. Co. v. Prewitt, 202 U.S. 246 (1906); Fidelity Mut. Life
Ass'n v. Mettler, 185 U.S. 308 (1902); Atchison R.R. v. Matthews, 174 U.S. 96 (1899); Henning-
ton v. Georgia, 163 U.S. 299 (1896); Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1896); Hooper v. Cali-
fornia, 155 U.S. 648 (1895); Barron v. Burnside, 121 U.S. 186 (1887); and Doyle v. Continental
Ins. Co., 94 U.S. 535 (1876).
198. 156U.S. 1(1895).
199. ICC v. Alabama Midland Ry., 168 U.S. 144 (1897).
200. United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911); Standard Oil Co. v.
United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
201. 207 U.S. 463 (1908). These dissents are also in line with his repeated dissents to restrict
the "fellow servant" rule: Alaska Mining Co. v. Whelan, 168 U.S. 86 (1897); Martin v. Atchi-
son R.R., 166 U.S. 399 (1897); Northern Pac. R.R. v. Charless, 162 U.S. 359 (1896); Northern
Pac. R.R. v. Peterson, 162 U.S. 346 (1896); Central R.R. v. Keegan, 160 U.S. 259 (1895).
202. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884).
203. O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323 (1892).
204. Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581 (1900).
205. Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
206. Schick v. United States, 195 U.S. 65 (1904).
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Insular Cases,2 Harlan advocated the application of the Bill of
Rights to the territories.
Originally confronted with the question of equal rights by cases that
challenged the Civil Rights Act of 1875, Harlan consistently dissented
from the Court's findings that the Act was unconstitutional. In the
Civil Rights Cases,2 8 Harlan clarified his earlier dissents:
[Wlith all respect for the opinion of others, [I] insist that the
national legislature may, without transcending the limits of the
Constitution, do for human liberty and the fundamental rights of
American citizenship, what it did, with the sanction of this Court,
for the protection of slavery and the rights of the masters of fugitive
slaves.209
In one dissent, he argued that a private conspiracy to forcibly prevent
the employment of African-Americans was a reinstitution of the
"badges and incidents of slavery" and a denial of rights guaranteed
by the Thirteenth Amendment. 210 In another, he disagreed with the
Court's refusal to apply the Fifteenth Amendment's prohibition
against state interference with voting rights in federal elections .21
In another line of cases, Harlan consistently dissented against state
legislation that he considered violative of the Due Process or Equal
Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. Harlan opposed
individual states denying equal rights to Chinese-Americans 12 and Na-
tive Americans,213 and his most significant dissents were in opposition
to the denial of equal rights to African-Americans.
Four transportation cases dealing with the separation of the races
came before the Court during Harlan's tenure, and he dissented in
each. In 1890, he refused to uphold the prosecution of a railroad that
maintained a route through several states but failed to provide sepa-
rate accommodations for the races as required by the law of one of
207. Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138, 153 (1904) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Hawaii v.
Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197, 226 (1903) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244,
375 (1901) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
208. United States v. Stanley, United States v. Ryan, United States v. Nichols, United States
v. Singleton, and Robinson v. Memphis & Charleston R.R. were later consolidated in 109 U.S. 3
(1883).
209. Id. at 53 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
210. Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1 (1906).
211. James v. Bowman, 190 U.S. 127 (1903).
212. United States v. Wong Kinm Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 705 (1898) (Fuller, J., dissenting;
joined by Harlan, J.); Baldwin v. Franks, 120 U.S. 678, 694 (1887) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
213. Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 110 (1884) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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the states. 24 In 1896, in Plessy v. Ferguson,25 Harlan wrote a power-
ful dissent from the Court's finding that a Louisiana law requiring the
separation of the races on railway cars was a reasonable regulation
under the Fourteenth Amendment. Harlan also dissented without
opinion in two later transportation cases. 216
In 1908, in Berea College v. Kentucky,21 7 Harlan refused to uphold
a Kentucky law forbidding any person or corporation to operate a
school "where persons of the white and Negro races are both received
as pupils for instruction." 28 Harlan dissented from the Court's dis-
tinction that the law, as applied to corporations rather than to private
persons or associations, reserved to the legislature the right to amend
the charters of corporations. Harlan argued that the law was clearly
aimed at all private institutions teaching white and African-American
students and that it violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment:
Have we become so inoculated with prejudice of race that an
American government, professedly based on the principles of
freedom, and charged with the protection of all citizens alike, can
make distinctions between such citizens in the matter of their
voluntary meeting for innocent purposes simply because of their
respective races? ... Many other illustrations might be given to
show the mischievous, not to say cruel, character of the statute in
question, and how inconsistent such legislation is with the great
principle of the equality of citizens before the law. 219
Throughout his long service, Harlan maintained a consistent dissent in
support of civil rights. 220
214. Louisville, New Orleans & Tex. Ry. v. Mississippi, 133 U.S. 587, 592 (1890) (Harlan,
J., dissenting).
215. 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
216. Chiles v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., 218 U.S. 71, 78 (1910) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Ches-
apeake & Ohio Ry. v. Kentucky, 179 U.S. 388, 395 (1900) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
217. 211 U.S. 45 (1908).
218. Id. at 69.
219. Id.
220. Harlan's opinion for the Court in Cumming v. Board of Educ., 175 U.S. 528 (1899),
has been read to contradict his stance for equal protection, but in Cumming there was no proof
of unequal treatment due to race. The distinction turned on sex rather than race. Also, the right
to education is not a fundamental right. Georgia's constitution provided for an "elementary"
school education and that provision was being met, and the plaintiffs had no contention with the
separation of the races. Id. at 543-44.
Vindications of Harlan's dissents affirm their appeal to "the brooding spirit of the law" and
"the intelligence of a future day." See Abraham, supra note 191, 890-91 (listing many of Har-
lan's dissents from later-overruled opinions, including Plessy v. Ferguson and Lochner v. New
York).
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2. The Twentieth Century
In a century marked by two world wars, the Great Depression, the
New Deal, and the social upheaval of the 1960s and 1970s, it is per-
haps not surprising that the decisions of the Supreme Court should
reflect a lack of unanimity among the justices. As Justice William
Brennan has observed,
[FIrom our beginnings, a most important consequence of the
constitutionally created separation of powers has been the American
habit.., of casting social, economic, philosophical, and political
questions in the form of actions at law and suits in equity. In this
way, important aspects of the most fundamental issues confronting
our democracy end up ultimately in the Supreme Court for judicial
determination. They are the issues upon which our society,
consciously or unconsciously, is most deeply divided.Y'1
Some have criticized the "fracturing" of opinion which has been
characteristic of the Court in the twentieth century, while others have
found it to be inevitable.mn But if dissent on the Court is reflective of
divisions within our society, it may be that repeated dissents illustrate
our deepest divisions. Our legal system is, after all, based upon prece-
dent. A justice will repeat a dissent only when he feels strongly
enough about a particular issue to sustain the dissent against a con-
trary precedent.
This section discusses the repeated dissents of five twentieth-century
Justices: Oliver Wendell Holmes, Louis Dembitz Brandeis, Hugo
LaFayette Black, William Orville Douglas, and the second John Mar-
shall Harlan. Together, these five Justices served on the Court for a
period from 1902, when Justice Holmes took his seat, until 1975,
when Justice Douglas retired. Their dissents offer a unique view of
three-quarters of a century of American law and of a society undergo-
ing vast changes. They also offer special resonance to the relentless
dissents of Brennan and Marshall in capital punishment cases.
221. William J. Brennan, Jr., How Goes the Supreme Court?, 36 MERCER L. REV. 781, 785
(1985) [hereinafter Brennan, How Goes the Supreme Court?].
222. E.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Agreement Among the Justices: An Empirical Note, 1984
SuP. CT. R v. 389, 389-90 ("No doubt the number and length of separate and dissenting opi-
nions continue to increase. This is not necessarily bad. Fracturing is inevitable. The Court selects
hard cases for decision, and cases are hard because existing precedents and the temper of the
times allow more than one outcome."); Charles E. Hughes, Address, 13 A.L.I. PRoc. 61, 64
(1936) quoted in FEIX FRANaFURTER, OF LAW AND MEN 42 (1956) (Chief Justice Hughes ex-
pressed surprise that "in the midst of controversies on every conceivable subject, one should
expect unanimity of opinion upon difficult legal questions.").
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(a) Oliver Wendell Holmes and Louis D. Brandeis
Oliver Wendell Holmes was appointed to the Court by President
Theodore Roosevelt in 1902. Holmes came to the Court from a posi-
tion as chief justice of Massachusetts' highest court. During his thirty-
year tenure on the Court, Holmes published 975 opinions 213 including
873 for the full Court, 14 concurring opinions, and 72 dissenting opi-
nions. 2 4 Holmes also dissented without opinion in 100 cases. 25
Louis D. Brandeis was appointed to the Court by President Wood-
row Wilson in 1916, serving until 1939. During the 22 years he sat,
Brandeis wrote 455 opinions for the Court, 10 concurring opinions,
and 65 dissenting opinions. 226 He dissented without opinion in 150
cases .227
During their time together on the Court, Holmes and Brandeis
found themselves "companions in dissent." 228 A journalist of the pe-
riod observed:
Oliver Wendell Holmes and Louis Dembitz Brandeis have achieved a
spiritual kinship that marks them off as a separate liberal chamber of
the Supreme Court. On the great issues that go down to the
fundamental differences in the philosophy of government, these two
are nearly always together; often they are together against the rest of
the court.229
The dissents for which Holmes and Brandeis are most noted are those
concerning the First Amendment and those concerning the ability of
the states to enact social legislation. Neither Holmes nor Brandeis,
however, was a "voice in the wilderness. '230 They wrote for the Court
or joined in majority opinions far more frequently than they dis-
223. ALBERT P. BLAUSTEIN & Roy M. MERSKY, THE FIRST ONE HUNDRED JUSTICES 144
(1978). For a list of Holmes' constitutional opinions through February 24, 1931, arranged topi-
cally, see Felix Frankfurter, The Early Writings of 0. W. Holmes, Jr., 44 HAv. L. REV. 717,
820 (1931) (Appendix Il1).
224. BLAUSTErN & MERSKY, supra note 223, at 144.
225. Id. Holmes has been called the "Great Dissenter," but the title does not stem from the
number of Holmes' dissents. At least ten other justices published more dissents. See BLAUSTEIN
& MERSKY, supra note 223, at 102. Instead, many of the points of view Holmes expressed in
dissent have been vindicated by time. See generally Kelman, supra note 36.
226. BLAUSTEIN & MERSKY, supra note 223, at 145.
227. Id.
228. Samuel J. Konefsky, Holmes and Brandeis: Companions in Dissent, 10 VAND. L. REV.
269 (1957).
229. Charles G. Ross, Freedom: His Goal and He Attained It, ST. Louis POST-DlSPATcli,
June 19, 1927, quoted in IRVING DILLARD, MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS: GREAT AMERICAN 14 (1941).
230. George W. Kirchwey, Foreword to ALFRED LIEF, THE DISSENTING OPINIONS OF MR.
JUSTICE HOLMES (1929).
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sented. Indeed, Holmes prefaced his first dissent by saying that he
generally found it "useless and undesirable, as a rule, to express dis-
sent." 23' Brandeis was also somewhat reticent about dissenting. He
disagreed with the Court in five cases during his first term, but sub-
mitted only two formal dissents. He prefaced each with an apology,
saying that the importance of the particular issues had induced him to
write. 232
Although Holmes and Brandeis often reached the same conclusion,
they traveled different paths. Holmes has been characterized as a
"scholar and philosopher, whose cynicism about man and society
made him contemptuous of the 'upward and onward' impulse of the
reformer. "233 His detachment and skepticism "at times bordered on
social apathy.' '234 He voted to uphold the power of state legislatures
to enact social legislation, but he did not pass on the wisdom of the
laws thus enacted.
Brandeis, on the other hand, was a "social crusader ' 235 who looked
beyond the immediate dispute to the underlying social implications. 236
Law, to him, was essentially an instrument of social policy.231 7 Bran-
deis often felt deeply about the necessity of the social legislation he
voted to uphold. Additionally, he emphasized that "no law ... can
be understood without a full knowledge of the facts out of which it
arises, and to which it is to be applied. ' 238 Brandeis brought the tech-
niques he had made famous in writing briefs to his job as a judge,
often using his judicial opinions to instruct his fellow justices on the
factual context of a particular legal issue.
Despite their distinct approaches, Holmes and Brandeis each di-
rected dissents toward what they deemed to be an abuse of judicial
discretion-the Court's propensity to invalidate state social legislation
as a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Their repeated dissents
document a deep division on the Court.
Lochner v. New York239 was the first of Holmes' notable dissents in
this area. This case also provides a proper bridge between the sus-
tained dissenters of the last century and the sustained dissenters of this
231. Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400 (1904).
232. Konefsky, supra note 228, at 271; see also FREuNmD, THE UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS OF MR.
JUSTICE BRANDEIS (1957).
233. Konefsky, supra note 228, at 281.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Alpheus T. Mason, Mr. Justice Brandeis and the Constitution, 80 U. PA. L. Rav. 799,
812 (1932).
237. Id. at 837.
238. Louis D. Brandeis, The Living Law, 10 ILL. L. REv. 461, 467 (1916).
239. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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century. In Lochner, a five-justice majority struck down a New York
statute which limited bakery workers to a ten-hour day.M The major-
ity found the statute to be "meddlesome interference with the rights
of the individual"'' 4 which was prohibited by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. In his famous dissent, typical for its detached view, Holmes
explained the proper role of the judiciary:
This case is decided upon an economic theory which a large part of
the country does not entertain. If it were a question whether I agreed
with that theory, I should desire to study it further and long before
making up my mind. But I do not conceive that to be my duty,
because I strongly believe that my agreement or disagreement has
nothing to do with the right of a majority to embody their opinions
in law .... The 14th Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert
Spencer's Social Statics.2 2
Soon after Lochner, Holmes' view in this particular area prevailed to
some degree. The Court addressed the validity of several more state
statutes regulating working hours and upheld them as health meas-
ures. 243
In the area of minimum wage statutes, Holmes' view was not
adopted as quickly. Initially, the Court affirmed an Oregon minimum
wage law in 1917 in Stettler v. O'Hara.2" But in Adkins v. Children's
Hospital,25 the Court struck down a similar law enacted by Congress
for the District of Columbia. The Court held the statute to be an in-
fringement of liberty of contract and thus violative of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Although Brandeis did not sit,2' Holmes dissented, ar-
guing that the power of Congress to enact such a law was free from
doubt U 7 "[P]retty much all law consists in forbidding men ,to do
240. Previously the Court had upheld as a proper exercise of police power a Utah statute
limiting miners to an eight-hour work day. Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366 (1898).
241. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 61.
242. Id. at 75.
243. E.g., Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U.S. 426 (1917) (Oregon statute limiting work hours of
men in certain industries); Bosley v. McLaughlin, 236 U.S. 385 (1915); Miller v. Wilson, 236
U.S. 373 (1915); Riley v. Massachusetts, 232 U.S. 671 (1914) (Massachusetts statute limiting
women to a 55-hour work week); Sturges & Burn Mfg. Co. v. Beauchamp, 231 U.S. 320 (1913)
(Illinois child labor law); Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (Oregon statute limiting women
to a 10-hour work day).
244. 243 U.S. 629 (1917) (per curiam). Brandeis, who defended the Oregon law in 1914, did
not sit. JACKSON, supra note 111, at 106-07.
245. 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
246. Id.
247. Id. at 567.
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some things they want to do, and contract is no more exempt from
law than other acts.' ,2
8
The minimum wage issue arose again in Murphy v. Sardell49 and
Donham v. West-Nelson Manufacturing Co.20 Holmes, believing
himself bound by stare decisis, acquiesced in the decisions of the
Court which invalidated the minimum wage statutes involved. As the
Sardell per curiam decision makes clear, "Mr. Justice Holmes re-
quests that it be stated that his concurrence is solely upon the ground
that he regards himself bound by the decision in Adkins v. Children's
Hospital. "2511
Brandeis, however, differed from Holmes in the precedential value
he ascribed to Adkins. Perhaps because Brandeis believed strongly in
the value of this type of legislation, he dissented without opinion in
both Sardell and Donham. After Holmes had left the bench, Brandeis
again dissented from the invalidation of a minimum wage law in Mo-
rehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo,252 joining the dissenting opinions
of Justices Hughes and Stone.
Holmes and Brandeis dissented together in cases where the Court
invalidated state legislation proscribing protective rates or price fixing.
In Adams v. Tanner,253 the Court addressed the validity of a state law
making it a criminal offense for an employment agency to collect fees
from workers seeking employment. A majority struck down the legis-
lation as an infringement of the Fourteenth Amendment. Brandeis au-
thored a dissenting opinion, in which Holmes joined. 254 The opinion
was typical of the style he had made famous through his "Brandeis
briefs." He posited that "[w]hether a measure relating to the public
welfare is arbitrary or unreasonable, whether it has no substantial re-
lation to the end proposed, is obviously not to be determined by as-
sumptions or by a priori reasoning. The judgment should be based
upon a consideration of relevant facts, actual or possible. ' '255 Then, in
great detail, Brandeis marshaled those facts. He cited numerous
sources and reports, and outlined the history of abuses by employ-
ment agencies which could reasonably lead a state to enact such legis-
lation.
248. Id. at 568.
249. 269 U.S. 530 (1925).
250. 273 U.S. 657 (1926).
251. 269 U.S. at 530. In United States v. Lehigh Valley R.R., 254 U.S. 255 (1920), Holmes
(along with Chief Justice White) stated he was acquiescing in the majority's opinion because he
felt constrained by precedent.
252. 298 U.S. 587 (1936).
253. 244 U.S. 590 (1917).
254. Id. at 597 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
255. Id. at 600.
RELENTLESS DISSENT
Holmes and Brandeis continued to dissent together in other cases
where the Court's majority struck down state legislation as violative
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus, they dissented where the Court
held certain state statutes unconstitutional as a deprivation of due
process256 or a violation of equal protection,2 7 finding that the states
had ample authority to legislate in these areas.
Holmes and Brandeis, however, did not always agree with respect
to state social legislation. In his famous opinion for the majority in
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,258 Holmes struck down, as a taking
of property, a statute which forbade the mining of coal where it
would cause subsidence of the soil under private dwellings and streets.
Brandeis dissented, finding the restriction to be a valid exercise of po-
lice power, in that it prohibited a use dangerous to the public.259
Holmes and Brandeis also differed in two cases addressing the va-
lidity of state statutes prohibiting the teaching of languages other than
English in primary schools.2w° Brandeis joined the majority, which
held the laws invalid. In a characteristic dissent, Holmes observed that
the states might reasonably want to ensure that all their students could
speak English.261
In a series of cases involving the rights of workers to organize and
strike, Holmes and Brandeis were again frequent companions in dis-
sent. In Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell262 and Eagle Glass &
Manufacturing Co. v. Rowe,20 the Court upheld injunctions that
barred union organizers from seeking to enroll workers who had
signed so-called "yellow dog contracts." These contracts between em-
ployers and their employees barred employees from joining unions.
The majority found that the employers were entitled to injunctions to
protect their constitutional right to freedom of contract. Brandeis and
256. See, e.g., Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Baldridge, 278 U.S. 105 (1928) (statute regulating
chain drug stores); Di Santo v. Pennsylvania, 273 U.S. 34 (1927) (statute requiring licensing for
selling steamship tickets); Weaver v. Palmer Bros. Co., 270 U.S. 402 (1926) (state prohibition
against the use of shoddy in bedding); Jay Burns Baking Co. v. Bryan, 264 U.S. 504 (1924) (state
law regulating the weight of bread).
257. See, e.g., Quaker City Cab Co. v. Pennsylvania, 277 U.S. 389 (1928) (state imposed
taxes on gross receipts of taxicab operators, distinguishing between corporations and indivi-
duals); Frost v. Railroad Comm'n, 271 U.S. 583 (1926) (state regulated those transporting per-
sons or property over a regular route on public highways for compensation).
258. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
259. Id. at 417 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
260. Bartels, 262 U.S. at 404; Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
261. Bartels v. Iowa, 262 U.S. at 412 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
262. 245 U.S. 229 (1917).
263. 245 U.S. 275 (1917).
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Holmes dissented, arguing that the injunctions should be dissolved. 2 4
Holmes and Brandeis dissented when the Court held that anti-in-
junction provisions of the 1914 Clayton Antitrust Act did not prohibit
enjoining pickets from conducting a secondary boycott, 265 and when
the Court invalidated, on Fourteenth Amendment grounds, an Ari-
zona statute that prohibited state courts from issuing injunctions
against peaceful picketing.26 In the latter case, Holmes made perhaps
his most emphatic statement concerning the Court's use of the Four-
teenth Amendment to invalidate state legislation:
There is nothing that I more deprecate than the use of the Fourteenth
Amendment beyond the absolute compulsion of its words to prevent
the making of social experiments that an important part of the
community desires, in the insulated chambers afforded by the several
states, even though the experiments may seem futile or even noxious
to me and to those whose judgment I most respect. 267
In Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Journeyman Stone Cutters' Ass'n,26
the majority upheld an injunction to restrain a boycott on the grounds
that the union was acting in restraint of trade in violation of the Sher-
man Antitrust Act. Brandeis' dissent, in which Holmes concurred,
stated that the Sherman Act prohibited only unreasonable restraints
on trade, and given the facts, the union's actions were not unreasona-
ble. 269
Holmes and Brandeis are equally well known for their dissents in
First Amendment cases. A series of freedom of speech cases arose un-
der the World War I Espionage Act and state criminal anarchy and
syndicalism laws. In weighing the First Amendment interests of the
individual against the legitimate interests of government, Holmes and
Brandeis often arrived at a different balance than did the majority of
the Court, disagreeing with the Court's finding of criminal action.2 70
264. Brandeis' argument is an interesting one; he found no evidence that any employee had
joined the union in violation of the contract. Furthermore, the organizer was asking employees
only to agree to join the union at some later date. Brandeis did not deny that for an employee to
join the union and remain employed would be a violation of the contract. Hitchman, 245 U.S. at
263-74 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
265. Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921).
266. Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312 (1921).
267. Id. at 344 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
268. 274 U.S. 37 (1927).
269. Id. at 58.
270. I have classified Holmes' and Brandeis' First Amendment dissents as "repeated dis-
sents." This may be a tenuous characterization; these dissents are not like the repeated dissents
of Black and Douglas or Brennan and Marshall, which were consistently for the same reason.
Nevertheless, Holmes' and Brandeis' First Amendment dissents are an important part of their
record.
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Holmes first dissented in a freedom of speech case in Abrams v.
United States.27 1 In an opinion in which Brandeis concurred, Holmes
concluded that the defendants had been sentenced to twenty years in
prison "for the publishing of two leaflets that I believe the defendants
had as much right to publish as the Government has to publish the
Constitution of the United States now vainly invoked by them. "272 In
Abrams, Holmes first presented his version of the "marketplace of
ideas" theory:
[W]hen men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths,
they may come to believe even more than they believe the very
foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is
better reached by free trade in ideas-that the best test of truth is the
power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the
market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes
safely can be carried out. That at any rate is the theory of our
Constitution. 273
After Abrams, Holmes joined two Brandeis dissents reaffirming the
position Holmes had staked out in Abrams.274 In Pierce v. United
States,2 75 Brandeis argued that to give a jury the power to punish
statements of conclusion or opinion by declaring them to be false
statements of fact was to deny small political parties the freedom to
271. 250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919). Before parting ways with the majority, Holmes, in conjunc-
tion with Brandeis, worked out a standard that was to form the basis for twentieth-century
freedom of speech jurisprudence. See ALPHEUs T. MASON, BRANDEIS: A FREE MAN'S LIFE 562
(1956). In Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919), Holmes wrote for a unanimous Court
that the First Amendment would not protect speech which created "a clear and present danger"
of evils that Congress had a right to prevent. The application of that test to the particular situa-
tion in Schenck seems less than clear; the defendants in Schenck were convicted under the 1917
Espionage Act for conspiracy to obstruct enlistment during wartime by publishing a leaflet.
There is, however, evidence that Holmes wrote the opinion reluctantly. Writing to a friend later,
he commented, "it is one of the ironies, that 1, who probably take the extremist view in favor of
free speech (in which, in the abstract, I have no very enthusiastic belief, though I hope I would
die for it), that I should have been selected for blowing up." 2 MARK DEWOLFE HowE, HoLMEs-
POLLOCK LETTERS 29 (1941).
Holmes also wrote the opinion of the Court in two concurrent cases, Frohwerk v. United
States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919) and Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919).
In another letter, Holmes wrote: "I sent you yesterday some opinions in the Debs and other
similar cases .... I greatly regretted having to write them-and (between ourselves) that the
Government pressed them to a hearing .... But on the only questions before us I could not
doubt about the law." I MARK DEWOLFE HowE, HOLmEs-LAsKi LErERS 190 (1953).
272. Abrams, 250 U.S. at 629 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
273. Id. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
274. Pierce v. United States, 252 U.S. 239, 253 (1920); Schaefer v. United States, 251 U.S.
466, 482 (1920).
275. Pierce, 252 U.S. at 269 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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criticize and to discuss issues. In Gitlow v. New York, 2 6 Holmes and
Brandeis dissented when the Court upheld the conviction of a promi-
nent socialist who had published a "Left-wing Manifesto." In his dis-
sent, Holmes maintained that the danger posed by such a publication
was not sufficiently "clear and present." 277
Holmes and Brandeis disagreed in Gilbert v. Minnesota,27 where
the majority sustained a conviction under a state statute that made it
unlawful to interfere with or discourage enlistment in the military.
Holmes concurred in the result, presumably because he felt the deci-
sions of the Court with which he had disagreed were not binding.
Brandeis dissented, advancing a new rationale (in which no other jus-
tice fully joined) for imposing greater restraints on state power than
on federal power. 279
Holmes and Brandeis both dissented from the majority's conclu-
sions in two cases involving the Postmaster General's control of the
mails. In Milwaukee Publishing Co. v. Burleson,8 0 the Postmaster
General denied second-class mailing privileges, as opposed to other
available rates, to a newspaper published by a prominent socialist agi-
tator. Holmes' dissent pointed out that the Espionage Act gave the
Postmaster General a right to refuse only those editions of the news-
paper that actually violated the Act, not the entire publication. 2s1
Brandeis analyzed the effect of the order, arguing that the Postmaster
General had no authority to essentially deny circulation of a newspa-
per because he thought it likely to violate a postal law in the future. 2s2
A year later, in Leach v. Carlile,23 the Postmaster General issued an
order prohibiting the delivery of mail to Leach on the grounds that he
had fraudulently advertised a patent medicine. The Court sustained
276. 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
277. In a letter to his friend, Holmes wrote: "My last performance... was a dissent ... in
favor of the rights of an anarchist (so-called) to talk drool in favor of the proletarian dictator-
ship. But the prevailing notion of free speech seems to be that you may say what you choose if
you don't shock me." 2 HowE, HoL ES-POiLOCK LETTERS, supra note 271, at 163.
278. 254 U.S. 325 (1920). Gitlow presented a new issue of state power. Holmes was no
longer willing to dissent in cases of federal law, and therefore there was no dissent from Holmes
in Gilbert.
279. Id. at 335-36 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Brandeis eventually gained Holmes' concurrence
for a much-modified statement of his new view in Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
280. 255 U.S. 407 (1921).
281. Holmes also wrote:
The United States may give up the Post Office when it sees fit, but while it carries it
on, the use of the mails is almost as much a part of free speech as the right to use our
tongues and it would take very strong language to convince me that Congress ever
intended to give such a practically despotic power to any one man.
Id. at 437.
282. Id. at 436 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
283. 258 U.S. 138 (1922).
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the order as within the Postmaster General's authority. Holmes and
Brandeis dissented, on the ground that the order constituted prior re-
straint prohibited by the First Amendment.'"
Many of the ideas that Holmes and Brandeis expressed in dissent
during their tenure on the Court have since become the law. The list
stands as eloquent testimony of the value of dissenting opinions. 2s5
The repeated dissents of Holmes and Brandeis demonstrate a belief
that "rights of property and the liberty of the individual must be re-
molded, from time to time, to meet the changing needs of society.' ,286
History has supported that belief.
(b) Hugo L. Black and William 0. Douglas
After the demise of his Court-packing plan, President Franklin
Roosevelt appointed two new justices. The first was Hugo Black, ap-
pointed in 1937 .287 Black had served in the United States Senate for
ten years, where he had ardently supported New Deal legislation. Dur-
ing his thirty-four years on the Court, Black wrote 481 majority opi-
nions, 88 concurring opinions, and 310 dissenting opinions. 28 Black
also concurred without opinion in 152 cases and dissented without
opinion 307 times.2 9
Roosevelt appointed William 0. Douglas in 1939. Douglas was a
corporate law expert who had been chair of the Securities & Exchange
Commission.2 At age forty, he was, at the time, the youngest justice
284. Id. at 140-41 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
285. After Lochner, and after Roosevelt's Court-packing plan, the Court upheld a variety of
state laws regulating the working hours of employees. See supra note 243. A year after the Court
struck down a minimum wage statute in Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587
(1936), a majority held a Washington state minimum wage statute to be constitutional in West
Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (Justice Roberts was the "swing-justice" whose
vote changed in West Coast Hotel). Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908), and Coppage v.
Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915), which had held that neither the states nor Congress could prohibit an
employer from discharging or refusing to hire workers because they were union members, were
expressly overruled in Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 (1941).
286. Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 376 (1921) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
287. Black's appointment met with strong public disapprobation because of his erstwhile
membership in the Ku Klux Klan. His background notwithstanding, Black in fact became "a
staunch defender of dissident voices during the McCarthy era, a protector of the constitutional
rights of the accused ... [and) a proponent for rights of racial equality" and for the one-man,
one-vote doctrine. Raymond G. Decker, Justice Hugo L. Black: The Balancer of Absolutes, 59
CAL. L. REv. 1335, 1335 (1971).
288. BLAusEiN & MERSKY, supra note 223, at 145.
289. Id.
290. "It is interesting to note that the appointment was viewed somewhat askance by the left
wing. The Nation, for example, commented, 'We wonder how hardy Mr. Douglas's liberalism
would prove to be in the cold isolation of the Supreme Court."' Marian D. Irish, Mr. Justice
Douglas and Judicial Restraint, 6 U. FLA. L. REv. 537, 538 (1953) (citation omitted).
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ever appointed. When he retired thirty-six years later, in 1975, he had
written 524 opinions of the Court, 154 concurring opinions, and a
startling 486 dissents.29' Douglas also concurred in 96 cases without
opinion and dissented without opinion in 309 cases. 292
Black and Douglas, like Holmes and Brandeis, were often compan-
ions in dissent throughout their time together on the Court. 93 How-
ever, as even a cursory inspection of their voting records reveals, the
dissents of Black and Douglas were different than those of Holmes
and Brandeis. Black and Douglas were prolific dissenters who showed
no reticence about dissenting. Black's dissents (with and without opin-
ion) almost equaled in number the cases in which he either concurred
or wrote the majority opinion. Douglas' dissents came even closer to
exceeding in number the concurrences and majority opinions he au-
thored.
Both Black and Douglas maintained some dissents that others con-
sidered to be quixotic. For example, in Connecticut General Life In-
surance Co. v. Johnson, 94 Black disregarded a half century of
precedent 295 and found that corporations were not "persons" within
the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. Douglas joined him in
this "iconoclasm ' ' 291 in Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander.29 In dissent,
Douglas claimed that the Fourteenth Amendment was not meant to
provide due process or equal protection rights to corporations. 298
These two cases suggest that neither Black nor Douglas felt bound
by precedent when disagreeing with the majority. One commentator
said that "the effort to advance the cause of personal beliefs has been
endemic with Justices Black and Douglas, and its path has been
marked with monuments of disregard for precedent.''2 99 Indeed,
Douglas plainly stated that he believed the claims of stare decisis to be
tenuous, especially in the area of constitutional adjudication.3 ° In
291. BLAUSTEIN & MERSKY, supra note 223, at 145.
292. Id.
293. "From the outset Black and Douglas have been in almost complete agreement, whether
in the heyday of the Roosevelt Court, when they were with the majority on social legislation, or
more recently, when they are likely to be determined dissenters on civil rights." Irish, supra note
290, at 549.
294. 303 U.S. 77, 87 (1938) (Black, J., dissenting).
295. Santa Clara v. Southern Pac. R.R., 118 U.S. 394, 396 (1886); Minneapolis Ry. v. Beck-
with, 129 U.S. 26, 28 (1889).
296. JACKSON, supra note 111, at 12.
297. 337 U.S. 562, 576 (1949) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
298. Douglas mentioned elsewhere the great possibilities for development and exploitation
afforded by arming corporations with constitutional prerogatives. William 0. Douglas, Stare
Decisis, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 735, 738 (1949).
299. JACKSON, supra note 11l, at 13.
300. See Douglas, supra note 298, at 737 ("So far as constitutional law is concerned stare
decisis must give way before the dynamic component of history.").
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spite of the fact that both Black and Douglas paid scant heed to prece-
dent, their judicial philosophies were quite distinct. Like Holmes and
Brandeis before them, they often arrived at the same conclusion by
different routes.
Black was a strict constructionist who purported to apply the words
and phrases of the Constitution with "doctrinaire rigidity."3'' Black
found personal rights to be absolutely guaranteed by the Constitution
and deplored the Court's frequently used process of balancing those
rights.
Of course the decision to provide a constitutional safeguard for a
particular right . . . involves a balancing of conflicting
interests .... I believe, however, that the Framers themselves did
this balancing when they wrote the Constitution and the Bill of
Rights. They appreciated the risks involved and they decided that
certain rights should be guaranteed regardless of these risks. Courts
have neither the right nor the power to review this original decision
32
At the same time, Black concluded that the Necessary and Proper
Clause and the Commerce Clause left to the government the authority
and the responsibility for balancing conflicts between property rights
and the general welfare.3 03 The function of the Court then was to sep-
arate and distinguish those rights held absolutely from actions that
properly could be regulated.3 t 4 Thus, when Black believed a precedent
"incorrectly" deprived an individual of a constitutionally guaranteed
right, he consistently voted to reject precedent and uphold the right.
Where Black found guidance in the words of the Constitution,
Douglas believed that the Constitution had interstices that could be
filled only by policy choices. "Precedents are made or unmade not on
logic and history alone. The choices left by the generality of a consti-
tution relate to policy."3 5 Douglas found that such choices "must be
made on the basis not of abstractions but of the realities of modern
.. life."' 6 He wrote that "[ilt is better that we make our own his-
tory than be governed by the dead. ' '3t 7 Douglas believed any search
for a static security in the law was misguided. 3M Instead, security was
301. Decker, supra note 287, at 1354.
302. Hugo L. Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U. L. REv. 865, 879 (1960).
303. Decker, supra note 287, at 1345.
304. Id. at 1353.
305. Douglas, supra note 298, at 739.
306. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 320 (1949).
307. Douglas, supra note 298, at 739.
308. Id. at 735.
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to be attained through constant re-evaluation. He quoted with ap-
proval the words of a judge who wrote, "the duty of every judge and
every court [is] to examine its own decisions . . . without fear, and to
revise them without reluctance."1
3 09
Black and Douglas repeatedly joined in dissent in First Amendment
cases. Consistent with Black's belief concerning constitutionally guar-
anteed personal rights, he found First Amendment protections to be
absolute.3 1 0 In this area Douglas and Black agreed,"' but their belief
was not shared by other justices. Thus, they repeatedly dissented
against the majority's insistence upon weighing First Amendment
rights of individuals against the legitimate interests of the government
to determine whether speech was protected. In their dissents, Black
and Douglas insisted that freedom of speech could not be abridged by
such balancing.312
In a series of cases beginning with Roth v. United States,313 Black
and Douglas dissented when the Court held that obscenity was not
to be accorded First Amendment protection.3 1 4 In Byrne v.
309. Id. at 747 (quoting Baker v. Lorillard, 4 N.Y. 257, 261 (1850)).
310. The First Amendment formed a vital part of Black's jurisprudence. "IT]he guaranties
of the first amendment [are] the foundation upon which our government structure rests and
without which it could not continue to endure as conceived and planned. Freedom to speak and
write about public questions is as important to the life of our government as is the heart to the
human body .... If that heart be weakened, the result is debilitation; if it be stilled, the result is
death." Milk Wagon Drivers Local 753 v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S. 287, 301-02
(1951) (Black, J., dissenting).
311. The First Amendment says that freedom of speech, freedom of press, and the free
exercise of religion shall not be abridged. That is a negation of power on the part of
each and every department of government. Free speech, free press, free exercise of
religion are placed separate and apart; they are above and beyond the police power;
they are not subject to regulation in the manner of factories, slums, apartment houses,
production of oil, and the like.
Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 286 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
312. E.g., Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395 (1953) (statute requiring license for open-
air meeting valid on its face where speaker who was refused license failed to seek judicial relief
and proceeded without license); Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952) (affirming convic-
tion under state statute prohibiting group defamation); Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622
(1951) (upholding ordinance prohibiting door-to-door solicitation for magazine subscriptions);
Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951) (upholding conviction for disorderly conduct of a
student who addressed crowd and made derogatory remarks about public officials).
313. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
314. E.g., United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363 (1971) (First Amend-
ment does not protect against seizure of obscene photographs by customs agents); United States
v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351 (1971) (First Amendment does not protect booksellers who mail obscene
materials to adults for private use); Byrne v. Karalexis, 396 U.S. 976 (1969); Ginsberg v. New
York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968) (upholding state statute forbidding sale to minors of magazines de-
picting nudity, sexual excitement, sexual conduct and sadomasochistic abuse where such maga-
zines were not obscene for adults); Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502 (1966) (upholding
conviction of publisher of literature designed to appeal to the prurient interest of a "clearly
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Karalexis,3"5 Douglas protested against the exception the majority
made for obscenity.
We forget today that, under our constitutional system, neither
Congress nor the States have any power to pass on the value, the
propriety, the Americanism, the soundness of any idea or expression.
It is that insulation from party or majoritarian control provided by
the First Amendment . . that distinguishes our society from the
other planetary regimes.11
6
Black and Douglas also dissented when the Court upheld laws they
believed imposed prior restraints on potentially "obscene" materi-
als. 3 17
The investigations of the House Un-American Activities Committee
generated a series of First Amendment cases that the Court reviewed.
In Barenblatt v. United States,"' a witness before the Committee re-
fused to answer questions concerning past and present affiliations
with the Communist Party. The Court upheld the witness's conviction
for contempt of Congress, but Black, joined by Douglas and Chief
Justice Warren, dissented.3 9 Black argued that the conviction violated
the First Amendment freedoms of speech and association as well as
the Fifth Amendment right to due process. 312 Black and Douglas, as
well as Warren, repeated this dissent in subsequent similar cases.121
A decade earlier, Black and Douglas had dissented where the Court
upheld loyalty programs against First Amendment challenge. In
defined deviant sexual group," though not to the prurient interest of the "average" person);
Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966) (upholding conviction of publisher for pandering
in advertising and methods of distribution where literature itself was not obscene).
315. 396 U.S. 976, 977 (1969).
316. Id.
317. E.g., Times Film Corp. v. Chicago, 365 U.S. 43 (1961) (municipal ordinance requiring
public-exhibition movies be submitted for examination by a censor); Kingsley Books v. Brown,
354 U.S. 436 (1957) (New York statute permitting a municipality to sue to enjoin the sale or
distribution of obscene written or printed matter). Black and Douglas concurred in Freedman v.
Maryland. 380 U.S. 51 (1965) (holding a statute requiring submission of films to censors must
provide procedural safeguards to eliminate the dangers of censorship).
318. 360 U.S. 109 (1959).
319. Id. at 134 (Black, J., dissenting).
320. Id. at 138 (Black, J., dissenting).
321. E.g., Braden v. United States, 365 U.S. 431, 438, 446 (1961); Wilkinson v. United
States, 365 U.S. 399, 415, 423 (1961). In Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72 (1959), the Court
sustained the conviction of the operator of a summer camp who refused to produce for a state
committee the names of attendees at purportedly communist activities at the camp. Again,
Black, Douglas, and Warren dissented, joining the opinion of Justice Brennan. Brennan wrote
that the camp activities were protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. at 86-87
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
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American Communications Ass' v. Douds,3 2 Black dissented when
the Court affirmed the validity of an executive order issued by Presi-
dent Truman establishing a loyalty security program. Although Doug-
las did not sit for Douds, he later said of the security hearings
spawned by the order, "[t]hose hearings were primarily concerned
with one's thoughts, ideas, beliefs and convictions. They were the
most blatant violations of the First Amendment we have ever
known.' '323 Black and Douglas both dissented in two later loyalty pro-
gram cases, maintaining that the programs violated employees' First
Amendment rights.324
Black dissented against what he saw as another deprivation of free
speech-compelled support of political causes. In International Ass'n
of Machinists v. Street,3 2 union members sued to enjoin the use of
union funds for political purposes. The Court did not reach the con-
stitutional issue, but found that the union had no authority to spend a
member's money for political purposes over the member's objection.
While Douglas concurred in the majority opinion,3 26 Black found that
compelled contributions to promote political causes violated free
speech rights. 27 He repeated his dissent in Lathrop v. Donahue,32
joined by Douglas.3 29
With respect to the Sixth Amendment, Black and Douglas insisted
in a series of dissents that defendants in criminal contempt proceed-
ings were entitled to a jury trial. 30 They continued these dissents even
after the Court adopted the view that defendants in criminal contempt
322. 339 U.S. 382 (1950).
323. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 456 (1968) (Douglas, J., concurring).
324. Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485 (1952) (no violation of First Amendment where
membership in a "listed" organization was prima facie evidence of disqualification for employ-
ment); Garner v. Board of Pub. Works, 341 U.S. 716 (1951) (upholding city ordinance which
required public employees to take oath and sign affidavit that they had never been affiliated with
any group advocating overthrow of the government).
325. 367 U.S. 740 (1961).
326. "[Tlhere is a practical problem of mustering five Justices for a judgment in this case
... [s]o I ... agree to the one suggested by Mr. Justice Brennan." Id. at 778-79 (Douglas, J.,
concurring).
327. Id. at 780.
328. 367 U.S. 820 (1961).
329. In at least one area of First Amendment law, Black and Douglas did not agree. Douglas
dissented in a line of cases upholding Sunday closing laws, while Black joined the majority.
Douglas believed state laws that required businesses to close on Sundays violated both the Free
Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment. See Arlan's Dep't Store v. Ken-
tucky, 371 U.S. 218 (1962); Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Mkt., 366 U.S. 617 (1961); Braun-
feld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 561 (1961).
330. United States v. Barnett, 376 U.S. 681 (1964); Piemonte v. United States, 367 U.S. 556
(1961); Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165 (1958); Isserman v. Ethics Committee, 345 U.S. 927
(1953); Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1 (1952).
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cases were entitled to a jury trial where the punishment for contempt
exceeded six months.3 3 '
Both Black and Douglas stubbornly asserted that the Fourteenth
Amendment makes the protections of the Bill of Rights applicable to
the states in toto. This point of view has not prevailed, although the
Court has now "selectively incorporated" most of those rights into
the Fourteenth Amendment. 32 Thus, before the Fifth Amendment
was made applicable to the states in Malloy v. Hogan,333 Black and
Douglas joined in dissent when the Court determined that testimony
compelled in state proceedings could be used in federal prosecu-
tions,334 and argued that the right not to be placed in double jeopardy
should also be made applicable to the states.33 5 In a related series of
cases, Black and Douglas dissented where the Court held that Con-
gress could impose a gambling tax and compel disclosures which
would incriminate the taxpayer under state law. 36
Black and Douglas also steadfastly maintained that the Sixth
Amendment should apply to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment. Beginning with Betts v. Brady,37 they dissented in cases
where defendants in state courts were denied the right to counsel. 38
331. Frank v. United States, 395 U.S. 147 (1969); Dyke v. Taylor Implement Mfg. Co., 391
U.S. 216 (1968); Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373 (1966); see also Muniz'v. Hoffman, 422
U.S. 454 (1975); Johnson v. Nebraska, 419 U.S. 949 (1974).
332. See generally LALKEN E TsiBa, Am mcAN CoNsTrrnoNAL LAW 772 (2d ed. 1988).
Douglas, joining in the Court's opinion in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 345-46 (1963),
stated that ten Justices have thought the Bill of Rights applied to the states (listing himself and
Justices Field, Harlan (I), Black, Murphy, Rutledge, Bradley, Swayne, "probably" Brewer and
"seemingly" Clifford).
333. 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
334. Knapp v. Schweitzer, 357 U.S. 371 (1958); Feldman v. United States, 322 U.S. 487
(1944).
335. 336 U.S. 684 (1949); Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959); Abbate v. United States,
359 U.S. 187 (1959).
336. Lewis v. United States, 348 U.S. 419 (1955), overruled by Marchetti v. United States,
390 U.S. 39, 54 (1968); Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954); United States v. Kahriger, 345
U.S. 22 (1953), overruled by Marchetti, 390 U.S. at 54. Black called this a "squeezing device
contrived to put a man in federal prison if he refuses to confess himself into a state prison as a
violator of state gambling laws." Kahriger, 345 U.S. at 40 (Black, J., dissenting).
337. 316 U.S. 455 (1942), overruled by Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339 (1963).
Black's dissent in Betts (joined by Douglas) stated: "I believe that the Fourteenth Amendment
made the Sixth applicable to the states. But this view, although often urged in dissents, has never
been accepted by a majority of this Court and is not accepted today." Betts, 316 U.S. at 474-75
(Black, J., dissenting). "A practice cannot be reconciled with 'common and fundamental ideas
of fairness and right,' which subjects innocent men to increased dangers of conviction merely
because of their poverty." Id. at 476 (Black, J., dissenting).
338. Gryger v. Burke, 334 U.S. 728 (1948); Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640 (1948); Gayes v.
New York, 332 U.S. 145 (1947); Foster v. Illinois, 332 U.S. 134 (1947). Professor Kelman noted
that Black oscillated between his own "anti-Betts" view and a generous application of the Betts
exception. Kelman, supra note 36.
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After the Court overruled Betts in Gideon v. Wainwright,339 Black and
Douglas joined Justice Stewart in two dissents from denial of certio-
rari. Stewart called for the Court to clarify if the right to counsel was
contingent on the mere labelling (i.e. felony or misdemeanor) of an
offense by the state.340
Black and Douglas were not initially in agreement about whether
the federal exclusionary rule, which excludes illegally seized evidence
from trials, should apply to the states. 4 1 Douglas believed the rule was
binding upon states through the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.
In Wolf v. Colorado and later cases, 3' 2 he dissented from the Court's
holdings that the exclusionary rule was not applicable to trials in state
courts. In Wolf, he stated that the Fourth Amendment had no effec-
tive sanction in the absence of such a rule.343 Black, on the other
hand, concurred in Wolf.344
When the Court overruled prior cases and determined that certain
rights were in fact constitutionally guaranteed, or were made applica-
ble to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, Black and
Douglas dissented if the Court refused to apply those rights retroac-
tively. For example, they dissented where the Court refused to apply
the exclusionary rule retroactively3 4 and where the Court held the
right to a jury trial in state courts to apply only prospectively.34
Given his record as an adamant upholder of personal rights, Black's
dissents in civil rights cases such as Griffin v. Maryland3 47 and Bell v.
Maryland348 seem uncharacteristic. Douglas did not join Black in these
dissents, reflecting their different views toward appropriate remedies
339. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). Black wrote the majority opinion in Gideon, where he "proceeded,
in a dignified way, to crow." JACKSON, supra note 111, at 233.
340. DeJoseph v. Connecticut, 385 U.S. 982 (1966); Winters v. Beck, 385 U.S. 907 (1966).
341. The federal exclusionary rule was established in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383
(1914).
342. Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954); Salsburg v. Maryland, 346 U.S. 545 (1954);
Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117 (1951); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), overruled by
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
343. Wolf, 338 U.S. at 40 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
344. Wof, 338 U.S. at 39-40 (Black, J., concurring). Interestingly, Black concurred when
the Fourth Amendment (including the exclusionary rule) was made applicable to the states.
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 661 (1961) (Black, J., concurring). He determined that although
the Fourth Amendment standing alone was insufficient to bar illegally seized evidence, the
Fourth Amendment in conjunction with the Fifth Amendment ban against compelled self-in-
crimination establishes a basis for requiring the exclusionary rule. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 661-62.
345. Angelet v. Fay, 381 U.S. 654 (1965); Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
346. DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631 (1968). The right to jur trial in state courts was
established in Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968), and Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145
(1968).
347. 378 U.S. 130(1964).
348. 378 U.S. 226(1964).
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for racial discrimination. In these cases, the Court reviewed a series of
convictions under state trespass laws where the defendants had partici-
pated in picketing or sit-ins to protest racial discrimination. Black,
joined by Justices Harlan and White, dissented when the Court voted
to reverse the trespass convictions.
3 9
In Boule v. Columbia,310 a companion case to Bell, the same three
justices dissented when the majority held that a new construction
given to a state statute and applied retroactively by the state supreme
court violated the defendants' due process rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment. In yet another case, where the defendants were con-
victed of both criminal trespass and breach of the peace, Black wrote
the majority opinion reversing the breach of peace conviction, but dis-
sented with White and Harlan against the Court's reversal of the tres-
pass conviction. 5 ' Black also dissented where the Court applied the
1964 Civil Rights Act retroactively to reverse convictions for criminal
trespass.35
2
Douglas, too, consistently dissented in a politically controversial
area where Black, his usual companion in dissent, did not join him.
During the Vietnam War era, Douglas dissented where the Court re-
fused to consider cases challenging the legality of both the war and the
military draft."'3 Douglas would have addressed the issues raised in the
challenges: that the draft was illegal because Congress had made no
declaration of war and because the United States had violated its
treaty obligations. 35 4
The habit of dissent apparent in the judicial records of Black and
Douglas has raised the ire of some"5 and received the approbation of
others.56 Regardless of opinion, however, these dissents proved influ-
ential. Professor Countryman wrote that it is well known that during
Douglas' time on the Court, most of the dissents of Holmes and Bran-
deis became the law. Less appreciated was that "during the same pe-
349. Bell, 378 U.S. 226 (1964); Griffin, 378 U.S. 130 (1964).
350. 378 U.S. 347 (1964).
351. Barrv. Columbia, 378 U.S. 146 (1964).
352. Lupper v. Arkansas, 379 U.S. 989 (1965); Blow v. North Carolina, 379 U.S. 684 (1965);
Hamm v. Rock Hill, 379 U.S. 306 (1964).
353. E.g., Massachusetts v. Laird, 400 U.S. 886 (1970) (Douglas, J., dissenting from denial
of motion to file complaint); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissent-
ing from denial of certiorari); Holmes v. United States, 391 U.S. 936 (1968) (Douglas, J., dis-
senting from denial of certiorari); see also, e.g., Morse v. Boswell, 393 U.S. 1052 (1969)
(Douglas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); Johnson v. Powell, 393 U.S. 920 (1968)
(Douglas, J., dissenting from denial of application for stay of deployment).
354. E.g., Laird, 400 U.S. at 900.
355. E.g., JACKSON, supra note 111, at 11-13.
356. E.g., Vern Countryman, The Contribution of the Douglas Dissents, 10 GA. L. Rav. 331
(1976); Decker, supra note 287, at 1335.
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riod of time even more of the dissents of Justice Douglas have become
the law."'357
Brandeis once wrote in dissent in Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas358
that "[sitare decisis is usually the wise policy, because in most matters
it is more important that the applicable rule of law be settled than that
it be settled right." The repeated dissents of Black and Douglas are a
most emphatic rejection of that point of view. They believed that it is
of the utmost importance that the law be "settled right," particularly
where constitutionally guaranteed rights of individuals are at risk.
(c) John Marshall Harlan
The second Justice Harlan was appointed to the Supreme Court by
President Eisenhower in 1955. During Harlan's sixteen-year tenure, he
wrote 166 opinions of the Court, 143 concurring opinions, and 242
dissenting opinions. 319 He also concurred without opinion 67 times
and dissented without opinion in 58 cases.316
In many ways, Harlan represents a position directly opposite that of
Douglas. Where Douglas believed courts should constantly reevaluate
their positions and change the law without reluctance, Harlan was a
"constitutional conservative" who frequently disagreed with the "in-
novations" of his fellow justices on the Warren Court.36' A large part
of his disagreement stemmed from his belief that the Supreme Court
357. Countryman, supra note 356, at 331. A majority of the Court has never accepted
Black's and Douglas' view that the First Amendment's guarantees are absolute. Nevertheless, the
two Justices had some success in this area. In particular, their point of view in the loyalty pro-
gram cases was eventually upheld in Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967), where
Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485 (1952), was reconsidered and rejected. Additionally, one
commentator has seen the influence of Black's absolutist view in the Court's current position on
libel and slander. Decker, supra note 287, at 1354.
With respect to Black's and Douglas' insistence that the Bill of Rights was made applicable to
the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, "[w]hile they never won that war, they won most
of the battles." Countryman, supra note 356, at 344. Jackson called this a "war of attrition."
JACKSON, supra note 111, at 12. Through selective incorporation, the Court made many of the
rights guaranteed by the first eight amendments binding upon the states. See, e.g., Benton v.
Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969) (Fifth Amendment guarantee against double jeopardy); Duncan
v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (Sixth Amendment right to jury trial); Malloy v. Hogan, 378
U.S. 1 (1964) (Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination); Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335 (1963) (Sixth Amendment right to counsel); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949)
(Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable search and seizure). These are all areas where
Black and Douglas dissented.
358. 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), overruled by Helvering v. Mountain
Producers Corp., 303 U.S. 376, 387 (1938).
359. BLAUSTEIN & MERSKY, supra note 223, at 146.
360. Id.
361. See generally Worman Dorsen, The Second Mr. Justice Harlan: A Constitutional Con-
servative, 44 N.Y.U. L. REV. 249 (1969).
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was "not designed to be, nor should it ever be, a tool to be used to
remedy the country's social and political ills. "3 62
This conviction was a result of his profound belief in the concept of
federalism as a means of diffusing power between the federal and
state governments . 6 Harlan believed the states should be allowed to
"solve their own problems, determine their own policies, govern their
own court systems, and establish their own criminal justice proce-
dures. '" Thus, the proper role of the Supreme Court in the arena of
state law ought to be narrowly limited. In Shapiro v. Thompson3l6 , he
voiced his concern with the direction he saw the Court taking:
Today's decision, it seems to me, reflects to an unusual degree the
current notion that this Court possesses a peculiar wisdom all its own
whose capacity to lead this Nation out of its present troubles is
contained only by the limits of judicial ingenuity in contriving new
constitutional principles to meet each problem as it arises. For
anyone who, like myself, believes that it is an essential function of
this Court to maintain the constitutional divisions between state and
federal authority and among the three branches of the Federal
government, today's decision is a step in the wrong direction. 3"
As a proponent of judicial restraint, Harlan respected precedent.
Indeed, he has been called the "modern Court's leading accommoda-
tionist. "367 Thus, the repeated dissents of Harlan have a different tex-
ture than those of Black and Douglas, or even Holmes and Brandeis.
Although Harlan often dissented from what he saw as the Court's im-
providently broad interpretations of the law, most often he would af-
terward accord at least "interim allegiance" to the Court's position if
he could not distinguish the precedent.36 On the other hand, even
though he felt bound by precedent, Harlan often spelled out the de-
fects he saw in the Court's position in a concurring opinion, rather
362. Stephen M. Dane, "Ordered Liberty" and Self-Restraint: The Judicial Philosophy of
the Second Justice Harlan, 51 U. CIN. L. Rav. 545, 569 (1982).
363. Drew S. Days, Justice John M. Harlan, 12 N.C. CENT. L.J. 250, 251 (1981).
364. Henry S. Bourguignon, The Second Mr. Justice Harlan: His Principles of Judicial Deci-
sion Making, 1979 Sup. CT. REv. 251, 252.
365. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
366. Id. at 677 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (majority holding that state residency requirement for
welfare recipients violates equal protection).
367. Kelman, supra note 36, at 274.
368. Id. However, Harlan voted according to his own view for the remainder of a Term, not
acquiescing in the Court's position until the following Term. See, e.g., North Carolina v.
Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 744 (1969) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (explain-
ing that he was not following his usual practice), overruled by Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794,
802 (1989).
1995]
646 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 22:591
than joining the opinion of the Court. Owing to his allegiance to prec-
edent, he sometimes found himself dissenting when he believed the
Court was not adhering to its own precedent, even though he had
originally disagreed with that precedent. 369
As one might expect, Harlan strongly opposed the total incorpora-
tion theory of the Fourteenth Amendment. He not only rejected this
belief held by Black and Douglas, but also disagreed with the Court's
use of selective incorporation-applying a specific right or guarantee
to the states. In place of the incorporation theory, Harlan employed a
test of "fundamental fairness": a state's action afforded due process
to the individual if it complied with notions of "basic fairness" within
the United States' legal tradition.370
As a result of his belief that the states should be able to handle their
own concerns differently from the federal government, Harlan dis-
sented in a series of cases which held specific rights in the first eight
amendments to be applicable to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment. 71 He dissented initially when the particular right was
made applicable to the states, and dissented again when he believed
the Court was extending that right. For example, Harlan dissented in
Duncan v. Louisiana 72 and Bloom v. Illinois,"3 the initial cases
wherein the Court held that state defendants have the right to a jury
trial3 74 He dissented again in Baldwin v. New York, a1 5 with the exten-
sion of the right to trials for misdemeanors punishable by one year.
Sometimes, however, Harlan felt bound to apply as precedent a
case with which he had initially disagreed .176 In Griffin v. Califor-
369. An example is Harlan's dissent in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 506 (1966). Har-
lan later dissented in Jenkins v. Delaware, 395 U.S. 213, 222 (1968), where he wrote: "As one
who has never agreed with the Miranda case but nonetheless felt bound by it, I now find myself
in the uncomfortable position of having to dissent from a holding which actually serves to curtail
the impact of that decision."
370. Dane, supra note 362, at 553, 557.
371. Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 117 (1970) (right to jury trial for misdemeanor
punishable by a maximum of one year); Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 801 (1969) (Double
Jeopardy Clause of Fifth Amendment applicable to states); Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 215
(1968) (jury trial for criminal contempt punishable by two years in prison); Duncan v. Louisiana,
391 U.S. 145, 171 (1968) (right to impartial jury); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 504 (1966);
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (privilege against self-incrimination); Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643 (1961) (exclusion of illegally obtained evidence); see also Smith v. Illinois, 390 U.S. 129
(1968) (right to cross-examine witness).
372. 391 U.S. 145, 171 (1968).
373. 391 U.S. 194, 215 (1968).
374. He was following his usual practice of dissenting in similar cases throughout the same
Term.
375. 399 U.S. 66, 117 (1970).
376. E.g., Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring); North Carolina v.
Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 744 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Griffin
v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring).
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nia,377 both the trial court and counsel had commented on a criminal
defendant's failure to testify, and the Supreme Court reversed the
conviction on the grounds that the Fifth Amendment was made appli-
cable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Harlan con-
curred in the opinion "with great reluctance," saying that "for me the
decision exemplifies the creeping paralysis with which this Court's re-
cent adoption of the 'incorporation' doctrine is infecting the opera-
tion of the federal system. 3 78
The area of voting rights is another where Harlan's strong belief in
federalism led him to oppose the majority position. In 1946, in Cole-
grove v. Green,379 Justice Frankfurter wrote an opinion for the Court
holding that the malapportionment of congressional districts in Illi-
nois was a non-justiciable issue which should be left to the states to
correct through the political process.3se In 1962 the Court overruled
Colegrove in Baker v. Carr3" and held that state malapportionment of
voting districts is a deprivation of equal protection under the Four-
teenth Amendment. Harlan wrote a dissenting opinion arguing that
no infringement of Fourteenth Amendment rights had been demon-
strated.1 2 He reiterated his views that the states should be free to deal
with their own problems and that the Court was overstepping its
bounds by trying to solve social ills through judicial activism.,s
Harlan repeated his dissent as the Court continued finding viola-
tions of equal protection in voting district cases. 384 However, he char-
acteristically deferred to the majority where he believed a prior case
necessarily determined the outcome, regardless of his distaste for that
particular outcome8 1
377. 380 U.S. 609 (1965). In Griffin, Harlan wrote: "I would not, but for Malloy, apply the
no-comment rule to the States." Id. at 616.
378. Id.
379. 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
380. Justices Black, Douglas and Murphy dissented from the Court's opinion and strongly
supported the proposition of one person, one vote. In his dissent, Black stated that as the dis-
tricts were currently drawn, some citizens had a vote only one-ninth as effective as the votes of
other citizens of the state. Id. at 569 (Black, J., dissenting).
381. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
382. Id. at 300 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
383. Id. at 334, 339 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
384. Hadley v. Junior College District, 397 U.S. 50, 69 (1970) (election of trustees of a jun-
ior college district); Wells v. Rockefeller, 394 U.S. 542, 549 (1969) (congressional districting);
Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 486 (1968) (general election of county commissioners);
Swann v. Adams, 385 U.S. 440, 447 (1967) (election of state legislators); Gray v. Sanders, 372
U.S. 368, 382 (1963) (primary elections for United States senators and statewide offices).
385. For example, Harlan concurred in Jordan v. Silver, 381 U.S. 415, 419-20 (1965), where
the Court held the senatorial apportionment of California to be invalid. "Finding . . . that the
judgment of the District Court is squarely required by Lucas v. Forty Fourth General Assembly
... I reluctantly acquiesce in the Court's summary affirmance." Id.
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For the most part, however, Harlan did not repeatedly dissent on
the same issue. Instead, he tended to use concurring opinions to insist
that his own point of view was the correct one. The great deference
Harlan gave to the principle of stare decisis meant that even his dis-
sents were often dictated by his strong belief that a judge should fol-
low precedent. Harlan dissented where he believed that his fellow
justices were ignoring that principle.
Justice Harlan's judicial philosophy has been aptly compared to the
point of view expressed by Wechsler in his "neutral principles"
speech.36 Wechsler offered a constitutional theory based on procedure
rather than content. He viewed the law as a process of "reasoned
explanation" 8 7 that could not properly be result oriented. The struc-
ture of Harlan's dissents evinces the primacy of procedure in his judi-
cial philosophy. For Harlan, the existence of a clear precedent
obligated a judge to acquiesce even if personally opposed. Thus, Har-
lan's dissents epitomize Wechsler's idea that the decisions of the
Court ought not rest on immediate results; decisions are to "be
framed and tested as an exercise of reason and not merely as an act of
willfulness or will." 38
D. Modern Times
More recently, Supreme Court decisions show individual expression
has become more prevalent than unanimity. The 1943 Term marked
the first time that justices disagreed in more opinions than they
agreed.389 Moreover, in 1980, Archibald Cox wrote that "[t]he most
striking aspect of the work of the Burger Court has been the insistence
of the Justices upon presenting individual views, and their persistence
in advancing those views even after a majority has disagreed. This is
not a new development, but the trend has become more pro-
nounced." 390
Statistics for the last years of the Burger Court and first years of the
Rehnquist Court show neither a reversal of this trend nor any great
disparity in the numbers. During the 1984 Term, in cases decided by
full opinion, the Burger Court was unanimous in 31.8lo of the cases,
386. Bourguignon, supra note 364, at 288-89 (citing Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Prin-
ciples of Constitutional Law, 73 HRav. L. REV. 1 (1959)).
387. Wechsler, supra note 386, at 15.
388. Id. at 11.
389. C. Herman Pritchett, Dissent on the Supreme Court, 1943-44, 39 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 42
(1945); see also C. HERMNt PRITCHETT, THE ROOsEvELT CoURT: A STUDY IN JUDlCIL POLmCS
AND VALUES, 1937-47, at 25-26 (1948).
390. Archibald Cox, Freedom of Expression in the Burger Court, 94 HA'v. L. REv. 1, 72
(1980).
RELENTLESS DISSENT
and dissenting opinions were written in 59.6% of the cases.39" ' In the
1985 Term, the Court was unanimous in 18.9% of the cases and dis-
senting opinions were written in 71% of the cases. 92 During the 1986
term, in cases decided by full opinion, the Rehnquist Court was unan-
imous in 18.40 of the cases, and dissenting opinions were written in
74.3% of the cases. 93 During 1987, the Court was unanimous in
35.9% of the cases, and dissenting opinions were written in 56.3% of
the cases. 94 These statistics demonstrate a history of individual ex-
pression and responsibility.
III. LEGITIMACY IN THEORY: THE JURISPRUDENTIAL VALUE OF THE
BRENNAN-MARSHALL RELENTLESS DISSENT
A justice's repeated dissent may be seen as a call for change in the
law. By repeating a dissent, the justice demonstrates unwillingness to
accommodate the law as it is espoused by the majority. The more fre-
quently the dissent is repeated, the more clearly the justice signals his
belief that the law ought to be different. Refusal to adapt even tempo-
rarily to the majority view underscores this strong conviction.3 9 The
repeat dissenter believes that, on this particular issue, it is more im-
portant that the law be settled "right" than that it be settled. 19 This
Part will examine the jurisprudential ramifications of the relentless
dissents of Justices Brennan and Marshall against the death penalty.
Further, it will explore whether such dissents are a legitimate use of
judicial power in a democratic society.
A. Overview
In dissenting against the death penalty under all circumstances,
Justices Brennan and Marshall gainsaid clear precedent.39 In this
country, the death penalty has been used to punish crimes since pre-
391. The Supreme Court, 1984 Term, 99 HARv. L. REv. 4, 324 (Table I(C)) (1985).
392. The Supreme Court, 1985 Term, 100 HAvv. L. Rav. 4, 306 (Table I(C)) (1986).
393. The Supreme Court, 1986 Term, 101 HARv. L. REv. 10, 364 (Table I(C)) (1987).
394. The Supreme Court, 1987 Term, 102 HARv. L. REv. 4, 352 (Table I(C)) (1988).
395. Kelman, supra note 36, at 254. According to Professor Kelman: "In favor of the course
of unremitting dissent as against the alternative of temporary subordination of minority views is
its quality of directness. The dissenter speaks in his own unmistakable voice, says what he thinks
the law ought to be, and wields his vote in conformity to that vision." Id.
396. The sustained dissent has a tactical dimension. Id. at 254. "[The continuing exhibition
of ... opposition shows the world that the issue [is still] in dispute, [thus inviting] fresh assaults
on the official position ..... Id.
397. As Justices Brennan and Marshall's stance that the death penalty constitutes cruel and
unusual punishment is squarely in opposition to the Court's ruling in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S.
153 (1976), 1 will not directly address the jurisprudential issues related to judicial discretion in
cases where there is no clear precedent.
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revolutionary times,398 except for the brief 1972-1976 hiatus.3 9 Since
1976, Justices Brennan and Marshall voted against the death penalty
in virtually every case, including every capital case where certiorari
was denied. Thus, these two Justices sought a great change in the law
as it existed, by means of judicial decision.
A sustained dissent raises jurisprudential issues inseparable from
those raised by the overruling of precedent. Both the repeat dissenter
and the majority that overrules a precedent depart from any strict for-
mulation of stare decisis. Yet, a sustained dissent raises a distinct issue
as well: continuing tension between the dissenter's stance and prece-
dent. A justice who repeats a dissent is necessarily aware that he or
she is not changing the law. Indeed, it must have been apparent to
Brennan and Marshall that the Court's decision on the constitutional-
ity of the death penalty was not likely to be soon reversed. Thus, it is
the justice's paradoxical duty to respect the very law that he or she
would change.400 Justice Brennan recognized the "unquestioned duty
to obey and respect the law"'4 1 while arguing that there is no obliga-
tion to subordinate one's own views to the views of the majority.4 2
Justice Marshall explicitly deferred to the law in his call upon lawyers,
398. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 335 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring) (citing Filler,
Movements to Abolish the Death Penalty in the United States, 284 ANNALS Am. ACAb. POL. &
Soc. Sci. 124 (1952)). In his Furman opinion, Marshall traced the history of the death penalty as
well as the abolitionist movement in the United States. He concluded that the use of the death
penalty was tempered considerably in its move from Europe to America. But although "strong
abolitionist movements have existed ... they have never been completely successful.... [N]o
more than one-quarter of the States.. . have, at any one time, abolished the death penalty." Id.
at 341.
Justice Black used the fact that the death penalty existed in the United States when the Bill of
Rights was enacted as the basis of his concurring opinion in McGautha v. California, 402 U.S.
183, 226 (1971), where he stated: "The Eighth Amendment forbids 'cruel and unusual punish-
ments.' In my view, these words cannot be read to outlaw capital punishment because that pen-
alty was in common use and authorized by law here and in the countries from which our
ancestors came at the time the Amendment was adopted."
399. The decision in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), left the constitutionality of the
death penalty temporarily in doubt, but, in 1976, the Supreme Court squarely upheld the death
penalty in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). In Gregg, the majority agreed that the imposi-
tion of the death penalty under a revised Georgia statute did not constitute cruel and unusual
punishment under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Id.
400. This paradoxical position may explain somewhat what Professor Kelman terms the
"one-sided acceptance." Kelman, supra note 36, at 263. A justice who believes in both his duty
to respect the law and his right to repeat a dissent may find that in some cases he need not
dissent. Instead, he may join the majority opinion because its result coincides with his view of
how justice is best served in the case. This is perhaps analogous to the doctrine that the Court
will only reach constitutional issues where the case cannot be resolved on another lesser basis.
401. William J. Brennan, Jr., In Defense of Dissents, 37 HAsrNs L.J. 427, 437 (1986)
[hereinafter Brennan, Dissents].
402. Id. Brennan also says, however, that a "[dlissent for its own sake" is not justifiable. Id.
at 435.
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judges and public officials to work within the existing system to pro-
vide those facing the death penalty the same opportunity to present
their best case to the courts as noncapital defendants receive. 403
What, then, is sufficient reason for a judge to continue to dissent
against the law he or she is bound to respect? When is it more impor-
tant to have the law settled "right" than to have it merely "settled?"
Lord Denning pinpointed the reason when he wrote: "I was reluctant
to dissent. But in the last resort I did so . . . for my own peace of
mind. So long as I did what I thought was just, I was content ....
But if I did what was unjust, I stayed awake worrying." 4 Thus, the
answer lies in the judge's conception of the demands of justice. But as
the jurisprudence of judges varies, where justice lies in a given case
inevitably will depend on the individual judge.4 05 Thus, when the re-
peat dissenter says, "Here I draW the line,"40 we have an opportunity
to examine the judge's jurisprudence and determine what constitutes
his ultimate "justice." Perhaps just as importantly, a judge's repeated
dissent on a particular issue offers insight into his view of the Court's
role in achieving justice within our legal system.
1. Morality in the Law?
The repeated dissents of Brennan and Marshall against the death
penalty raise perennial issues of legal theory. One such issue is the role
of morality in the law. The death penalty is, of course, charged with
moral overtones. The position of Justices Brennan and Marshall was
viewed by some as a moralistic stance.* But in claiming the death
penalty was unconstitutional, they were making a legal statement. For
403. Thurgood Marshall, Remarks on the Death Penalty Made at the Judicial Conference of
the Second Circuit, 86 CoLum. L. Rsv. 1, 8 (1986).
404. LORD DENNINo, THE FAMILY STORY 183 (1981).
405. Justice Jackson wrote that "the Court functions less as one deliberative body than as
nine." ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE AMERIcAN SYsTEM OF GovERNMEaNT 16
(1955). Justice Powell characterized the Court as "nine small, independent law firms." Justice
Lewis F. Powell Jr., Address at the American Bar Association Annual Meeting (1976) (excerpted
in What the Justices Are Saying..., 62 A.B.A. J. 1454 (1976)). Additionally, Professor Tribe
argued that the appointment of just one Justice to the Court can have a great impact on the
direction of the Court's decisions. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, GOD SAVE THis HONORABLE COURT 31-
32 (1985).
For an article that takes the idea a step further, see Earl Maltz, The Concept of the Doctrine
of the Court in Constitutional Law, 16 GA. L. REv. 357 (1982) (offering what Professor Maltz
calls the "atomistic approach" to constitutional analysis, which is based on viewing a decision of
the Supreme Court as an aggregate of individual approaches rather than the product of a single
unified theory).
406. Brennan, Dissents, supra note 401, at 437.
407. E.g., WALTER BERNS, FOR CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: CRI10 AND THE MoRALrrY OF THE
DEATH PENALTY 35-36 (1979).
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Brennan, the Constitution itself encompasses a moral standard-the
phrase "cruel and unusual" implies certain principles that place con-
straints upon the state. Primary among those principles was that
punishment must not be so severe that it degrades human dignity.409
Brennan argued that the state fails to respect human dignity when it
imposes the death penalty.410
It is well accepted that the law may encompass moral values. 41'
Justice Brennan's consistent view, despite Gregg v. Georgia,4 12 that
"cruel and unusual" meant something other than what the majority
of his fellow justices believed, demonstrated Brennan's belief in the
moral element in law. The law is not simply, as Justice Holmes put it,
"[tihe prophecies of what the courts will do in fact. ' 413 For Brennan,
notwithstanding adverse precedent, the moral element endured.414
But if law is a repository of moral values, whose moral values ought
the law reflect? One theory is that because ours is a democratic soci-
ety, the law ought to reflect the "conventional" morality of the ma-
408. Concurring in Furman v. Georgia, Brennan set out the standards of a cumulative test
for whether a punishment is cruel and unusual within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment.
Primary among the amendment's implicit principles is that a punishment must not be so severe
as to be degrading to human dignity. Mental as well as physical pain can cause a punishment to
be severe. Extreme severity is degrading to human dignity because it treats humans as objects to
be discarded. Brennan's second related principle is that the state must not inflict a severe punish-
ment in an arbitrary manner. Brennan argues that where a punishment is inflicted as rarely as
the death penalty, it is likely to be administered in an arbitrary manner. Third, a severe punish-
ment must not be unacceptable to contemporary society. To determine what is unacceptable, it is
necessary to look at objective factors. We must not look to whether a punishment is authorized
by legislatures, but instead to the actual use of an authorized punishment. The final factor is that
a punishment must not be excessive. A punishment is excessive if, in view of its purposes, a
significantly less severe punishment is adequate. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 269-82
(1972).
409. In Gregg v. Georgia, Brennan stated that he would hold on this ground alone that the
death penalty is a cruel and unusual punishment. 428 U.S. 227, 231 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing).
410. Id. at 230-31; William J. Brennan, Jr., Constitutional Adjudication and the Death Pen-
alty: A View From the Court, 100 HARV. L. REv. 313 (1986) [hereinafter Brennan, Constitu-
tional Adjudication].
411. E.g., OLIVER W. HOLMES, The Path of the Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 167, 170
(1920) ("The law is the witness and external deposit of our moral life. Its history is the history of
the moral development of the race."); H.L.A. HART, THa CONCEPT OF LAW 7 (1979) ("Not only
do law and morals share a vocabulary so that there are both legal and moral obligations, duties,
and rights; but all municipal legal systems reproduce the substance of certain fundamental moraf
requirements.").
412. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
413. HOLMES, supra note 411, at 173.
414. Enduring elements of law are not, however, limited to moral ones. See Brennan, Con-
stitutional Adjudication, supra note 410, at 437 ("[1I]n my judgment, when a justice perceives an
interpretation of the text to have departed so far from its essential meaning, that justice is
bound, by a larger constitutional duty to the community, to expose the departure and point
toward a different path.").
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jority. 4 1 Under this view, the fact that thirty-five states reenacted
death penalty statutes after Furman416 would be a clear demonstration
of the morality of capital punishment.
One criticism leveled at the conventional morality theory, as applied
to constitutional adjudication, is that the theory would leave the pro-
tection of minorities' rights in precisely the wrong hands. 4 17 In West
Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, the Court recognized
"[t]he very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain sub-
jects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them be-
yond the reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as
legal principles to be applied by the courts." 41 8
Neither Brennan nor Marshall accepted the conventional morality
theory at face value. Indeed, Brennan stated repeatedly that his inter-
pretation was one to which neither a majority of his fellow justices
nor a majority of his fellow countrymen subscribed.4 1 9 For Brennan,
the intrinsic morality of the Eighth Amendment controlled; the Court
should look to and apply its principles and values. "It would effec-
tively write the clause out of the Bill of Rights were we to permit legis-
latures to police themselves by having the last word on the scope of
the protection that the clause is intended to secure against their own
overreaching. 420
Both Brennan and Marshall recognized that the Eighth Amendment
must "draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that
mark the progress of a maturing society." ' 421 Each saw these evolving
standards as a limitation on constitutionally permitted punishments,
not as a means of validating otherwise unconstitutional penalties.
Brennan stated that severe punishments must not be unacceptable to
contemporary society. 42 He found, however, that mere legislative au-
415. Harry H. Wellington, Common Law Rules and Constitutional Double Standards: Some
Notes on Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 221, 246-47 (1973) ("The Court's task is to ascertain the
weight of the principle in conventional morality and to convert the moral principle into a legal
one by connecting it with the body of constitutional law.").
For an article which evaluates the conventional morality theory of judicial review, see
Wojciech Sadurski, Conventional Morality and Judicial Standards, 73 VA. L. REv. 339 (1987).
416. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 227, 232 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
417. JoHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 69 (1980) ("[Ilt makes no sense to employ the
value judgments of the majority as the vehicle for protecting minorities from the value judg-
ments of the majority.").
418. 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943).
419. E.g., Brennan, Constitutional Adjudication, supra note 410, at 437; William J. Bren-
nan, Jr., The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary Ratification, 27 S. Tax. L.J.
433, 444 (1986) [hereinafter Brennan, Contemporary Ratification].
420. Brennan, ConstitutionalAdjudication, supra note 410, at 329.
421. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
422. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 277 (1972).
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thorization is not sufficient to show acceptance. One must look at the
actual use of the penalty by society. 423 For Justice Marshall, it was the
moral values of an informed citizenry upon which the constitutional-
ity of the death penalty turned. 424 Marshall believed if the American
people were sufficiently well-informed on the death penalty, they
would consider it to be "shocking, unjust, and unacceptable. ' 425
2. What Role Stare Decisis?
A second issue raised by the repeated dissent is the proper role of
precedent. Stare decisis is based upon the idea that consistency will
yield fair and predictable results. A repeated dissent is a clear demon-
stration of a justice's belief that there are more important values at
stake in a particular case than the certainty offered by adherence to
stare decisis. The dissents of Justices Brennan and Marshall against
the death penalty made such a statement.
Historically, there has been considerable variation in the application
of stare decisis. The strictest form was adopted by the House of Lords
in 1898, but abandoned in 1966.26 Under this form, a court is abso-
423. Brennan concluded in Furman that society has essentially rejected the death penalty
because we have developed supposedly more humane methods of inflicting death, we no longer
permit public executions because they are debasing and brutalizing, the crimes for which death is
imposed have been drastically reduced, mandatory death sentences are no longer in common use
and the death sentence is rarely imposed. Furman, 408 U.S. at 296-300.
Despite the reenactment of the death penalty in so many states, Brennan's empirical observa-
tions continue to be accurate. The Court curtailed the use of the death penalty in Coker v.
Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977), where it held the death penalty to be "cruel and unusual
punishment" as applied to the rapist of an adult woman. From 1980 through May 24, 1991,
there were 146 executions in the United States; death is still a relatively rarely inflicted punish-
ment, given that there are more than 2000 people on death row. NAACP Legal Defense and
Educational Fund, Inc., Death Row, U.S.A. I (May 24, 1991) (unpublished compilation-on file
with author).
424. Furman, 408 U.S. at 360-69. In Furman, Marshall delineated four reasons that a pun-
ishment may be deemed cruel and unusual.
First, there are certain punishments that inherently involve so much physical pain and
suffering that civilized people cannot tolerate them, [such as] use of the rack or
thumbscrew .... These ... have been barred since the adoption of the Bill of
Rights. Second there are punishments that are unusual, [in that] they were previously
unknown as penalties for a given offense.
Id. at 330-31. If an innovative punishment is no more cruel than the punishment it supersedes, it
is probably constitutional. Id. at 331. It may also be constitutional if it is intended to serve a
humane purpose. Id. The third reason for finding a punishment to be cruel and unusual is that
"it is excessive and serves no valid legislative purpose." Id. Marshall finds this kind of punish-
ment to be "unconstitutional even though popular sentiment may favor [it]." Id. "Fourth,
where a punishment is not excessive and serves a valid legislative purpose, it still may be invalid
if popular sentiment abhors it." Id. at 332.
425. Id. at 361.
426. E. M. Wise, The Doctrine of Stare Decisis, 21 WAYNE L. REV. 1043, 1045-46 (1975).
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lutely bound by its prior decisions.4 2 7 American courts have not gener-
ally adhered to this form of the doctrine, 428 instead following more
relaxed 42 9 forms. In at least some situations, courts may depart from a
previous decision.4
30
Disagreement abounds concerning when departure from precedent
is proper, yet some themes recur. It is often argued that stare decisis
should have greater importance in cases of statutory construction be-
cause of the perceived ability of legislatures to reverse erroneous inter-
pretations of legislative intent. 43' Supporting this widely accepted view
is the fact that within the Court, "cessation of dissent occurs with
some regularity . . . in cases of statutory interpretation. '432
Many have argued that stare decisis is less important in constitu-
tional adjudication.4 3 3 The argument is premised on the idea that in
constitutional cases, legislative correction is virtually impossible when,
as a practical matter, the Court has the last word.4 34 Another argu-
ment is that even where such legislative correction is feasible, it cannot
remove "a kind of moral imprimatur" that results from upholding a
challenged activity. 435
Thus, despite the possibility of legislative change, constitutional
precedent arguably still should have diminished importance.4 3 6 Profes-
sor Monaghan suggests, however, that "the level of indifference to-
wards (or indeed distaste for) stare decisis has its real roots . . . [in]
the substantive constitutional philosophy endorsed by each commen-
427. Id. at 1045.
428. Id. at 1046.
429. Professor Wise called the more easygoing forms "latitudinarian." Id.
430. Cf. Frank H. Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 HARv. L. REv. 802, 818
n. 39 (1982) ("Stare decisis is applied so loosely that it seems fair to say that it does not exist as a
doctrine. The Court frequently changes rules it views as mistaken, invoking stare decisis only
when the first decision induced substantial detrimental reliance.").
431. E.g., Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 736 (1977).
432. Kelman, supra note 36, at 237. As a confirming illustration of the sway of stare decisis
in statutory construction, Professor Kelman cites a case where Justices Brennan and Marshall,
"evidently still in disagreement with the decision" in Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers,
428 U.S. 397 (1976), abandoned their dissent in Jacksonville Bulk Terminals v. International
Longshoremen's Ass'n, 457 U.S. 702 (1982). Id. In Professor Kelman's view, evidently, the ex-
ample has special force because Justices Brennan and Marshall are "two justices who are not
usually identified with stare decisis self-denial." Id.
433. E.g., Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 153-54 (1980) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (adhering to his dissent in Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977), and stating that
stare decisis should be relaxed in constitutional cases); Brennan, Contemporary Ratification,
supra note 419, at 444 ("Because we are the last word on the meaning of the Constitution, our
views must be subject to revision over time, or the Constitution falls captive ... to the anachro-
nistic views of long-gone generations.").
434. Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas, 285 U.S. 393, 406-07 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
435. Earl Maltz, The Nature of Precedent, 66 N.C. L. REv. 367, 392-93 (1988).
436. Id.
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tator." 411 Those, for example, who see constitutional clauses as open-
textured will consider an insistence on stare decisis self-defeating.
4 8
Stare decisis varies in prominence within the jurisprudence of dif-
ferent judges. 4 9 Judges simply do not agree on what values are suffi-
ciently compelling to justify departure from precedent. 440 In
constitutional cases, no Supreme Court justice sees precedent as abso-
lutely binding. 44' Thus, for each justice there is some point at which it
becomes unacceptable to follow precedent that would threaten other
values deemed more important. Repeated dissents, such as those of
Justices Brennan and Marshall in death penalty cases, sent a clear sig-
nal that the balance reached by the majority was unacceptable.
If, in the process of judging, the benefits of stare decisis are
weighed against other values, the role of morality in the law cannot be
viewed as an entirely separate issue from the role of stare decisis. In-
stead, the two concepts may be correlative. For where the moral ele-
ment in law assumes great importance within the jurisprudence of a
judge, the importance of precedent would seem to diminish. Recipro-
cally, a strong policy of stare decisis reflects a belief that the proper
role of the judge is to rely on precedent, and not on his view of the
moral element in law or even substantive justice. This latter theory
reflects the view that judges are primarily lawfinders and not lawmak-
ers. 442
3. The Proper Role of the Judiciary?
The proper role of the judiciary within our legal system is a third
and larger issue raised by the relentless dissent. The very fact that
Brennan and Marshall repeatedly dissented was a reflection of how
they defined their own roles as members of our highest court. As the
preceding discussion indicates, the question is closely related to the
issues of morality and stare decisis. 43 Like those issues, there exists no
consensus answer.
437. Henry P. Monaghan, Taking Supreme Court Opinions Seriously, 39 MD. L. REv. 1, 4
(1979) [hereinafter Monaghan, Seriously].
438. Id. Professor Monaghan says that "the minimal role of stare decisis in constitutional
cases reflects the .. .weakness of the doctrine in common law adjudication." Id. at 5. He as-
cribes this weakness to an influx of judges who are "quite comfortable simply overruling prece-
dents which they are unable to rerationalize." Id.
439. Maltz, supra note 435, ai 370-74.
440. Id. at 386.
441. See generally Henry P. Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. Rav. 353,
387 (1981).
442. Maltz, supra note 435, at 371.
443. I have discussed the issues of stare decisis and morality in the law first because they
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At one end of the spectrum is the view that the judge is a lawfin-
der.4" Carried to its logical end, this viewpoint does not permit a
judge to make or change the law or to impose his own view of justice
on the law. Stare decisis is the principle that guides judicial decisions;
morality, except as it may already be encompassed in the law, is irrele-
vant.
At the other end of the spectrum is the view that judges are not
constrained by rules, but may create law. That is, judges are free to
act in a legislative manner when they deem it necessary, for whatever
reason. 445 Between the two ends of the spectrum lie legal theories
which place constraints upon the judge's ability to create law, but
nonetheless view the judge as a legitimate law creator in some situa-
tions.46
In our democratic society, the question arises of the Court's author-
ity to go beyond merely interpreting and applying laws passed by Con-
gress. Indeed, "[olurs is not a government by the Judiciary.''" 4
Supreme Court justices are not elected officials. How legitimate, then,
is it for the Court to create law? Just how far does a justice's discre-
tion go? More precisely, in the context of the repeated dissent, what is
the Court's authority to change the law? Should the Court ever over-
seem to be the first and most immediately apparent issues pertaining to Justices Brennan and
Marshall's repeated dissents. However, I view them as a part of the larger issue of the proper
role of the judge. This, of course, is a very large issue which has engendered endless debate.
Here, I only attempt to outline general arguments.
444. See William A. Bowen, Dissenting Opinions, 17 GREN BAG 690, 697 (1905).
445. A permutation of this idea appears in Easterbrook, supra note 430, at 828-29. Judge
Easterbrook does not argue that there are no out-of-bounds choices for justices. He "would
argue vigorously that the Court must discover and carry out the design of any given provision;
that cost-benefit and moral concerns play no legitimate role in the process ... [and] that the
'evolution' of society after a provision has been drafted should be ignored by the Court." Id. at
828. Judge Easterbrook concedes, however, there is no way of ruling out-of-bounds any choices
that Supreme Court justices might make. This is so because nobody is authorized to refuse to
count the votes of a justice who selects an inadmissible option. "To decide what is out-of-
bounds is effectively to decide the case before the Court; the body that made the out-of-bounds
decision ... would acquire the same functions as the .. . Court and.., its problems as well."
Id. at 829.
Similarly, H.L.A. Hart has written that "[a] supreme tribunal has the last word in saying what
the law is and, when it has said it, the statement that the court was 'wrong' has no consequences
within the system; no one's rights or duties are thereby altered." HART, supra note 411, at 138.
However, Hart also says that "[a]t any given moment judges, even those of a supreme court, are
parts of a system the rules of which are determinate enough at the centre to supply standards of
correct judicial decision. These are regarded by the courts as something which they are not free
to disregard." Id. at 141-42.
446. E.g., id. at 121-50; BENJAmiN N. CARDozo, THE NATURE OF THlE JUDICIAL PROCEss 112-
14 (1921); JOSEPHi RAz, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND MORALITY 180-209 (1979).
447. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 753 (1972) (appendix to opinion of Douglas, J.,
dissenting) (extract from oral argument of the Solicitor General).
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rule clear precedents? Even if we grant that right because of the Su-
preme Court's unique role with respect to interpreting the
Constitution, should the goal of unanimity still outweigh the right of
an individual justice to maintain a dissent?4
Any insistence that there be constraints upon a judge's law-creating
or law-changing power stems from a concern for the legitimacy and
authority of the judiciary within our legal system. 49 Professors Nonet
and Selznick suggest that a legal theory concerned with establishing
the legitimacy of the law itself will emphasize procedural fairness
rather than substantive justice. 40 Under such theory, judges are pas-
sive dispensers of impersonal justice who obey a will external to their
own.45' The rule of law is paramount. Judges are primarily lawfinders;
judicial legislation threatens the integrity of the legal process and the
authority of the law.4S2 Therefore, opportunities for judicial legislating
must be strictly limited.
Within this kind of system, the doctrine of stare decisis provides
one form of "will" external to the judge's own. The constraints of
stare decisis confer legitimacy on the judiciary. Adherence to the rule
of law, whatever that rule may be, ought, at least, to result in proce-
448. Chief Justice Taft once stated to a colleague: "I don't approve of dissents generally, for
I think in many cases where I differ from the majority, it is more important to stand by the
Court and give its judgment weight than merely to record my individual dissent." ALPHaus T.
MASON, W.UmA How AD TAFT: CHIEF JUSrICE 223-24 (1965). For citations to the related issue
of criticism of plurality decisions, see Easterbrook, supra note 430, at 804 n.3.
449. See generally PnInLrPPE NONET & PHMLIP SELZNTCK, LAW AND SocIETY IN TRANSITION:
TOWARD REsPONSIVE LAW (1978).
450. Professors Nonet and Selznick call this kind of law "autonomous law," including the
legal theories of positivists Hans Kelsen and H.L.A. Hart, and natural law theorist Lon L.
Fuller. Id. at 17-18.
Among other related theories is that of John Hart Ely. Dean Ely suggests that the legitimate
role of the Court in constitutional adjudication ought to be to ensure that all individuals have
procedural access to the system. "IT]he general theory is one that bounds judicial review under
the Constitution's open-ended provisions by insisting that it can appropriately concern itself only
with questions of participation, and not with the substantive merits of the political choice under
attack." ELY, supra note 417, at 181.
I have used the model set forth by Professors Nonet and Selznick because it seems to be a
helpful aid in understanding the motivation of both those who favor the use of the repeated
dissent and those who find its use undesirable. I do not adopt their particular point of view,
which is within sociological jurisprudence.
I also do not suggest that those who adhere to what Professors Nonet and Selznick call "au-
tonomous law" are somehow uninterested in achieving substantive justice. First, it is difficult to
draw an absolute line between procedure and substance, no matter how helpful it may be to try.
Second, the judiciary is just one part or our legal system. A legal theory may characterize the
role of the judiciary as restricted to obtaining procedural fairness, while it nevertheless sees the
overall goal of a legal system to be substantive justice.
451. NONST & SEZtICK, supra note 449, at 57.
452. Id. at 60.
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dural fairness.4 13 Thus, procedural fairness is the concern and result of
this kind of law.
At the same time, stare decisis is not necessarily the only kind of
constraint which can confer legitimacy. What is important is that
judges even-handedly apply standards external to their own will and
that their discretion be narrowly defined. Therefore, legal theories
based upon natural law or natural right may also provide the neces-
sary external constraint to limit judicial discretion. 4 4 The theory that
conventional morality should be the standard to guide justices' deci-
sions may also fit within this type of law.
Result-oriented or instrumentalist legal theories are in a distinct cat-
egory. 455 These theories view the law as an engine of social ordering
and social change. 456 They seek substantive justice rather than proce-
dural fairness. Proponents of this legal theory would subordinate
rules to principles and policies.4 7 Judges, in keeping with social pur-
pose, can legislate for the public good.48 Their legitimate role is that
of lawmaker.
Under either kind of legal theory, there is potential for tension be-
tween the doctrine of stare decisis and the goals of the legal system.
Under the first, where law seeks its own legitimacy through the appli-
cation of rules and procedural fairness, precedents may conflict with
the "higher law" of a natural law theory. In addition, precedents may
conflict with conventional morality or other established external stan-
dards for decisionmaking. Adherence to stare decisis will create the
453. The danger of this kind of legal system is that it is "vulnerable to formalism and legal-
ism." Id. at 16.
454. Id. at 18. Professors Nonet and Selznick cast Lon Fuller's natural law theory within
"autonomous law." Fuller's theory is a minimalist natural law theory concerned with the legiti-
macy of the legal system as a whole, and not necessarily with individual laws. Thus his theory is
more concerned with procedural aspects of the law than with its substance and fits within "au-
tonomous law." See id.
455. Professors Nonet and Selznick term these theories "responsive law" and include among
them legal realism and sociological jurisprudence. Id. at 73.
Although I discuss these two kinds of legal theories as distinct categories, they are not mutu-
ally exclusive. "[Any given legal order or legal institution is likely to have a 'mixed' character,
incorporating aspects of all... types of law." Id. at 17.
456. Id. at 74.
457. Id. at 73-113.
458. Professor Monaghan, who takes a "relatively narrow view of judicial authority under
the Constitution," casts aspersions on "the new breed of social engineers who are assuming
judicial office in increasing numbers." Monaghan, seriously, supra note 437, at 7.
The problem accompanying a result-oriented legal system is, of course, the risk of unchecked
judicial discretion. Professors Nonet and Selznick recognize this problem and attempt to answer
it by saying that the integrity of an institution is protected when the institution is strongly com-
mitted to a distinctive mission. "Purposes set standards for criticizing established practice ...
[and] can control administrative discretion." NoNET & SEUzNIK, supra note 449, at 76-77.
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least tension when the system is viewed as deriving its legitimacy solely
from such adherence. Under the second type of legal theory, which
views substantive justice as the goal of adjudication, adherence to
precedent in a particular case may be seen as insufficient to serve that
end. When such conflicts arise between stare decisis and the judge's
perceived goal of adjudication, what is the judge's correct response?
Depending upon the jurisprudence of the judge, the judge may see his
legitimate role as requiring a departure from the dictates of precedent.
For Brennan and Marshall, the demands of stare decisis were not
great enough to compel their compliance with the majority in uphold-
ing the death penalty. Certainly, the two Justices believed that their
repeated dissents against the imposition of the death penalty were le-
gally legitimate. The next section examines how such a viewpoint may
fit within United States traditions of legal thought.4 9
B. Natural Law40
Natural law has been called "the point of intersection between law
and morals.'"461 Natural law theories share the idea that there are im-
mutable principles by which enacted or positive law may be evaluated.
These principles are the moral element-criteria for the goodness of
positive law. A law which satisfies all of the requirements for legal
validity may nonetheless be "unjust" if it does not satisfy these crite-
ria. Thus, according to natural law, the concepts of "legality" and
"justice" are distinct.462
459. Because of the complexity and great variety in this area, this examination can only be
preliminary. Exploration of all American legal thought is not possible; I have therefore arbitrar-
ily limited its scope to an examination of positivism, sociological jurisprudence, legal realism,
natural law theory, the Critical Legal Studies movement, and a loosely defined group of theories
including those of H. Wechsler, J. H. Ely, and J. Choper. Even with such a limitation, it is
impossible to explore more than a few facets in each area or to accurately characterize the beliefs
of all of the proponents of a particular school of thought.
460. Natural law views were widely held during the United States' revolutionary period and
have had a lasting impact on our law through the form given to the Constitution.
For the generation that framed the Constitution, the concept of a 'higher law,' pro-
tecting 'natural rights,' and taking precedence over ordinary positive law as a matter
of political obligation, was widely shared and deeply felt. An essential element of
American constitutionalism was the reduction to written form-and hence to positive
law-of some of the principles of natural rights. But at the same time, it was generally
recognized that written constitutions could not completely codify the higher law. Thus
in the framing of the original American constitutions it was widely accepted that there
remained unwritten but still binding principles of higher law.
Thomas C. Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REv. 703, 715-16
(1975).
461. A. PASSERIN D'ENTREVES, NATURAL LAW: AN HIsTORICAL SuRVEY 116 (1965).
462. For an overview and comparison of natural law, legal positivism, and social good (utili-
tarianism) philosophies and philosophers, see OTTO A. ButD, TBE IDEA OF JusncE (1967).
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According to natural law philosophers, the principles of natural law
are based on something broader and more enduring than mere con-
vention or agreement among people. These principles existed before
any social agreement or human institution. It is in this sense that law
is "natural;" it consists of "certain fundamental values . . . believed
to be absolutely valid." ' 3
Where positive law does not comport with the enduring principles
of natural law, adherents of natural law have found the authority of
positive law to be undermined. For natural law philosophers, "there is
no such thing as 'legal obligation' apart from moral obligation. Statu-
tory law and constitutional law do not give rise to an 'obligation' un-
less their dictates are congruent with moral imperatives, and then only
because of the congruence. "46 As a result, one does "not have an
'obligation' to obey an immoral law; at best it might only be prudent
... to do so'' 461 because of the consequences of failing to obey.
Given that positive law has authority only as it comports with moral
principles, it would seem that the doctrine of stare decisis must be
relegated to a lesser role in many natural law theories. In the context
of natural law, following precedent for its own sake would not make
sense, except as it may reflect a procedural aspect of the natural
law."1 Where the moral principles of natural law are substantive in
nature, a precedent which contradicts those principles will have no au-
thority. Precedent may, of course, serve to illuminate the natural law
principles to be followed in a given case.
The human faculty of reason plays a central role in natural law phi-
losophy. As an initial matter, natural law philosophers assume the va-
lidity of logical reasoning as a means of reaching the truth.467 They
463. D'ENTREvES, supra note 461, at 117. Many natural law philosophers have found such
fundamental values in innate characteristics of human nature or in essential human rights. Mod-
ern discussion of natural law theories grounded in rights are found in RONALD M. DWOaKIN,
TAKING RIoHs SERIOUSLY (1978); RONALD M. DwoRKIN, LAW'S EMPnRE (1986); JOHN FiNNIS,
NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS (1980); and JOHN RAwLS, A THEoRY OF JUSTICE (1971).
464. Anthony D'Amato, Lon Fuller and Substantive Natural Law, 26 Am. J. Ju1s. 202, 215
(1981).
465. Id.
466. For example, Lon Fuller espoused a natural law theory which may be termed proce-
dural. According to Fuller, a legal system will fail where: (1) issues are decided on an ad hoc
basis rather than by rule; (2) there is a failure to publicize or make available to the affected party
the rules he [or she] is expected to observe; (3) legislation is applied retroactively; (4) the rules are
not made understandable; (5) contradictory rules are enacted; (6) rules require conduct beyond
the powers of the affected party; (7) frequent changes in rules are made, so that the subject
cannot orient his [or her] action by them; or (8) there is a failure of congruence between the rules
as announced and their actual administration. LON L. FUtLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 33-39
(1964).
467. Phillip E. Johnson, Some Thoughts About Natural Law, 75 CAL. L. REV. 217, 218
(1987).
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start with broad principles which are "not themselves derived from
logic,"' 65 but whose validity may be assessed through reason. Those
principles are applied rationally to a given case or situation. "Natural
law reasoning . . is the method by which persons gifted with both
clear-headed perception and logical analytic ability can reason to-
gether about the values that ought to be the basis of law." 9 For Saint
Thomas Aquinas, the law was brought into being through reason and
consisted of "propositions or precepts articulated by reason.''470
Despite contemporary skepticism directed toward natural law theo-
ries, natural law reasoning, in a broad sense, is widespread. It has
been claimed that:
anyone who attempts to found concepts of justice upon reason and
human nature engages in natural law philosophy. Contemporary
philosophical systems based on feminism, wealth maximization,
neutral conversation, liberal equality, or libertarianism are natural
law philosophies. They start with assumptions about human nature
and what is good for people, and they claim to employ reason to
judge the relative justice or injustice of legal practices like slavery,
the free market, patriarchy, and socialism. Like the man who was
astonished to find that he had been speaking in prose all his life, we
who make it our business to resolve differences about questions of
morality and justice through the use of reason are surprised to find
that we are expounding natural law.
We can no more abandon natural law reasoning than we can stop
speaking in prose. We are all constantly making moral judgments
based on implicit views of human nature, such as whether man is
naturally acquisitive or cooperative, and whether the domination of
one group by another is a natural reflection of inequality or an
artificial interference with natural equality.471
Within the context of natural law philosophy, the repeated dissents
of Brennan and Marshall can be seen as a legitimate exercise of judi-
468. Id.
469. Id.
470. William E. May, The Meaning and Nature of the Natural Law in Thomas Aquinas, 22
AM. J. Juxis. 168, 170-71 (1977).
471. Johnson, supra note 467, at 217, 219. Professor Johnson adds:
The embarrassment of asserting supposedly self-evident principles in an intellectual
atmosphere in which everything is automatically called into question makes us try to
get by on as few such principles as possible-hence the prevalence in our day of natu-
ral law systems that are based on a single governing concept: economic efficiency,
equality, neutrality, autonomy (neutral conversation), or utility.
Id. at 219.
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cial power. Simply, if imposition of the death penalty does not com-
port with enduring moral principles, then laws permitting the death
penalty are not authoritative. Thus, if "It]he role of reason in natural
law theory is to bring the moral faculty of judgment into the decision
making process, "472 a judge may reason that he has an affirmative
duty to dissent from any majority decision which upholds the death
penalty. The existence of precedent will be irrelevant to the judge's
decision. Precedent cannot affect the fundamental contradiction be-
tween imposition of the death penalty and essential moral principles
that deny its validity.
Justice Brennan spoke the language of natural law in claiming that
the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause prohibits punishments that
do not comport with human dignity.473 Indeed, Justice Brennan em-
braced the resurgence of interest in natural law:
Perhaps some of you may detect, as I think I do, a return to the
philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas in the new jurisprudence. Call it
a resurgence, if you will, of concepts of natural law-but no matter.
St. Thomas, you will remember, was in complete agreement with the
Greek tradition, both in its Aristotelian and Platonic modes, that law
must be concerned with seeing things whole, that it is but part of the
whole human situation and draws its validity from its position in the
entire scheme of things. It is folly to think that law, any more than
religion and education, should serve only its own symmetry rather
than ends defined by other disciplines .... There is pervasive
recognition ... that law, to be effective, must conform to the world
in which it finds itself. That world is given; law does not make it. 11
Brennan found defects in both positivism and sociological jurispru-
dence because these non-natural law theories are insufficiently attuned
to the human situation.47
472. C.M.A. McCauliff, Constitutional Jurisprudence of History and Natural Law: Com-
plementary or Rival Modes of Discourse?, 24 CA&L. W. L. REv. 287, 321 (1988) (citing Alan
Gewirth, The Ontological Basis of Natural Law: A Critique and an Alternative, 29 Am. J. Juias.
95, 96 (1984)).
473. E.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 257-306 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring).
Justice Brennan ascribed a similar philosophy to his colleague in dissent, Justice Marshall. Com-
pare the language in Brennan, How Goes the Supreme Court?, supra note 221, at 787-88, to that
in William J. Brennan, Jr., Justice Thurgood Marshall: Advocate for Human Need in American
Jurisprudence, 40 MD. L. R~v. 390 (1981) [hereinafter Brennan, Justice Thurgood Marshall].
However, where Brennan's death penalty jurisprudence was openly aspirational, Justice Mar-
shall's jurisprudence had an instrumentalist cast. Marshall's dissent in Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U.S. 153, 231-41 (1976), turned on the premise that the death penalty is cruel and unusual be-
cause it is excessive and serves no valid legislative purpose, and because life imprisonment is
adequate punishment. I discuss Marshall's jurisprudence in more detail infra under Part Ill D.
474. Brennan, How Goes the Supreme Court?, supra note 221, at 787-88 (citation omitted).
475. Id. Brennan calls positivism "a notion of law wholly unconcerned with the broader
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For Justice Brennan, a "shift from emphasis upon abstract rules to
emphasis upon justice has profound importance for judicial decision-
making.' '476 He did not look to history and precedent to define what
was meant by cruel and unusual punishment. Instead, he looked to
enduring principles embodied in the Constitution. The law evolves
through adaptation of these broad principles to contemporary prob-
lems, without necessarily taking account of previous detours. "The
extralegal values pursued by society at large or by the individual. It lived in a heaven of abstract
technicalities and legal forms, and found its answers to human problems in an aggregation of
already existing rules, or found no answers at all." Id. at 787.
"[S]ociological jurisprudence too had a defect: 'While it shifted the emphasis away from posi-
tivism ... it did so at the expense of reality by substituting the abstract idea of society for the
actuality of the individual human beings who constitute society in fact."' Id. (quoting Rooney,
Report of Committee on New Trends in Comparative Jurisprudence and Legal Philosophy, 1964
A.B.A. SEC. OF INT'L & Com'. L. 195).
476. Brennan, How Goes the Supreme Court?, supra note 221, at 788 (emphasis added).
Brennan's natural law philosophy was explored in McCauliff, supra note 472, at 287. Analyzing
their First Amendment jurisprudence, Professor McCauliff contrasts the historical approach of
Justice Burger to the natural law approach of Justice Brennan. Although fairly hostile to the use
of natural law in constitutional adjudication, Professor McCauliff made some observations that
seem equally applicable to Brennan's death penalty dissents. For example, Professor McCauliff
stated that "Justice Brennan is less patient with indirect, experiential extraction of jurispruden-
tial values from history. He presents his own public distillation of constitutional values, and
directly applies them as absolute principles in the context of case-by-case claims of constitutional
guarantees." Id. at 287.
Brennan insisted that the meaning of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause is that pun-
ishments must comport with the overriding principle of human dignity. Furman v. Georgia, 408
U.S. 238, 257-306 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring). "The constant for Americans, for our an-
cestors, for ourselves, and we hope for future generations, is our commitment to the constitu-
tional ideal of libertarian dignity protected through the law." Brennan, Justice Thurgood
Marshall, supra note 473, at 394-95.
Professor McCauliff also noted that "[a]dherence to natural law frees Justice Brennan from
the constraints of history" and compared his jurisprudence to that of Justice Stephen Field, who
"often urged a move away from immediate precedent by couching his opinions in terms of natu-
ral law." McCauliff, supra note 472, at 290-91.
[Tihe use of natural law in opinion writing is ideal for setting forth a new departure
from the precedential status quo. It simply does not matter if the view set forth is
currently out of fashion because a natural law position claims for itself, not historical
development, but unchanging validity. According to natural law theory, although so-
ciety may have in error departed from that view sanctioned by natural law, the errone-
ous departure does not, to the natural law jurist, signify challenge to the validity of its
principles but merely underscores the human error of that departure. Thus the validity
of the principle remains untouched.
Id. at 333.
While Justice Brennan's jurisprudence is not derived from history but from abstract
principles of natural law, the historical survival of exceptional practices which deviate
from those principles does not carry weight with Justice Brennan. The practices are
simply long-standing wrongs which can now be righted by the application of the
proper principles.
Id. at 328.
Finally, "Justice Brennan always puts forth his own consistent position, even if he must assert
his views in lone dissent." Id. at 331.
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genius of the Constitution resides not in any static meaning that it had
in a world that is dead and gone, but in the adaptability of its great
principles to cope with current problems and current needs." 477
C. Positivism
John Austin, a nineteenth-century English philosopher, first formu-
lated legal positivism. 478 Austin was concerned with distinguishing the
law as it is from the law as it ought to be. 479 In Austin's view, shared
by later positivists, law and morals were distinct spheres that ought
not be confused." 0 "The existence of law is one thing; its merit or
demerit is another." 4 '1 Thus, positivism analyzes the law as it exists,
rather than with normative jurisprudence. Positivists do not deny,
however, that moral requirements may be written into specific laws.
But moral desirability of rules does not make them law, and a law is
still binding even if it violates a moral standard. 412 Austin wrote that
"[a] law, which actually exists, is a law, though we happen to dislike
it.2483
Professor Wise suggests that the development of positivism in juris-
prudence formed the essential background for the modern formula-
tion of stare decisis."8 According to Austin, law consists of sovereign
commands backed by threat of sanctions. Thus, the law is a set of
rules, obligatory by their very promulgation. 4 5 An earlier and con-
trasting notion is Blackstone's belief that judicial decisions are evi-
dence of the common law, and not the common law itself. 4 6 Once the
477. Brennan, Justice Thurgood Marshall, supra note 473, at 394.
478. See generally JOHN AUSTIN, THE PRovINcE OF JURISPRUDENCE DEFINED (1832) [herein-
after AUSTIN, JURISPRUDENCE DEFINED]; JOHN AUSTN, LECTUtRES ON JURISPRUDENCE, OR THE
PHILOSOPHY OF PosrTvE LAW (1863); Josm AusTIN, EsSAY ON THE USES OF THE STUDY OF JURIS-
PRUDENCE (1863).
479. H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARv. L. REV.
593, 594 (1958).
480. E.g., HOLMES. The Path of the Law, supra note 411, at 167.
481. JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 184 (Library of Ideas ed.,
1954).
482. Hart, supra note 479, at 599.
483. AUSTIN, JURISPRUDENCE DEFINED, supra note 478, at 184.
484. E.M. Wise, The Doctrine of Stare Decisis, 21 WAYNE L. REV. 1043, 1049 (1975).
485. Id. at 1048.
486. 1 Wn.I BLACKSTONE, COmENTARIES 70-71. On the same point, Justice Brennan
wrote:
[wihen the common law flourished greatly, law was merged . .. with the other disci-
plines and sources of human value. Custom, for example, was the cherished source of
the common law of that time. What was declared custom but the accumulated wisdom
of social problems of society itself? The function of law was to formalize and preserve
this wisdom, but it certainly did not purport to originate it.
Brennan, How Goes the Supreme Court?, supra note 221, at 786.
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idea is established that the law is separate from its social milieu and
binding in and of itself, the law takes on a life of its own.
Where Austin considered the law to be sovereign command, mod-
ern positivists take a different view. According to H.L.A. Hart, the
leading modern positivist, the law is the intersection of "primary"
rules and "secondary" rules.48 7 Primary rules, enacted by lawmaking
bodies, impose duties; they are obligatory.4 85 Secondary rules guide
the actions of the lawmakers.4 9 They guide introduction, extinguish-
ment, or modification of primary rules,'49 conferring power rather
than imposing obligations.4 9'
In Hart's view, the law has an open texture. 492 Two principal de-
vices used to create standards of conduct are precedent and legisla-
tion.493 At some point, each will prove indeterminate, because of the
generality and imprecision of language and because of human na-
ture. 49 4 With respect to precedent, Hart concludes there is no authori-
tative, correct rule extractable from cases. However, in applying
precedent there is often general agreement. 495 But courts bound by
precedent have many choices. They may reach an opposite decision,
narrow the precedent, admit exceptions, or widen the rule. 49 6 By fol-
lowing precedent, courts have created a vast number of rules which
are as determinate as any statute.'9 With respect to legislation, the
487. HART, supra note 411, at 78-79. H.L.A. Hart held the Chair in Jurisprudence at Oxford
University until 1969.
488. Id.
489. Id. at 79.
490. Id.
491. Id. Hart distinguishes among three kinds of secondary rules. Id. at 92-94. The first is
the "rule of recognition." This is a rule for conclusive identification of the primary rules of
obligation. Id. at 92. In a developed legal system, the rule of recognition will be complex; it may
identify primary rules by reference to their characteristics, such as enactment by a specific body,
customary practice, or relation to judicial decisions. Id.
The second kind of secondary rules in Hart's scheme are "rules of change." Id. at 93. These
rules provide for the introduction of new rules and the elimination of old rules. Id. Such rules
may specify who may legislate and what procedures are to be followed. Id. There is a close
connection between the rules of change and the rule of recognition; where rules of change exist,
the rule of recognition will include legislation as a means of identifying primary rules. Id.
"Rules of adjudication" are the third kind of secondary rule. Id. at 94. These are rules which
confer authority on individuals to determine whether a particular primary rule has been broken.
Id. These rules identify those who are to adjudicate and the procedures to be followed. Hart
points out that a system with rules of adjudication is committed to a rule of recognition. Id.
Where courts authoritatively determine that a rule has been broken, they necessarily determine
what the rules are. Id. at 94-95.
492. Id. at 124.
493. Id. at 121.
494. Id. at 124-25.
495. Id. at 131.
496. Id.
497. HART, supra note 411, at 132.
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role of the legislature is to change established precedent when such
precedent is indistinguishable from statutory law.4 98
Joseph Raz, another modern positivist, recognizes a broad law-
making role for judges.499 Raz distinguishes between unregulated and
regulated disputes. In an unregulated case, the applicable law has gaps
and thus does not require any particular solution.)° In a regulated
case, the law provides a solution;01 judicial discretion is not re-
quired.502 But the judge may act as lawmaker by distinguishing prece-
dent. According to Raz, distinguishing a rule changes its
applicability.0 3 Raz believes judges should overrule a law only when
certain, rather than merely confident, that the new law is an improve-
ment. ° 4 But he sets no standard as to how great an improvement is
required.0 5 In Raz's view, a judge has a legal duty to adopt those
rules that the judge determines are best.10 Raz recognizes that "judges
do rely and should rely on their own moral judgment. 50 7
Both Hart and Raz note a central paradox of positivism. "[Tihat a
court may make a binding decision does not mean that it cannot err.
It means that its decision is binding even if it is mistaken."ses Simi-
498. Id.
499. Raz distinguishes between judicial law-making and legislation, stating that there are no
pure judicial law-creating cases. Judges' law-creating powers are limited. In addition, judge-
made law is constantly subject to revision, and, in this sense, is less binding than enacted law.
JOSEPH RAZ, TE AuTHoiriT OF LAW 195 (1979). Finally, judicial law-making tends to be piece-
meal; judges avoid making broad statements of principles. Id. at 198.
500. Id. at 181. In unregulated cases, the law may, however, rule out inappropriate solutions
and offer some guidance in choosing among remaining solutions. Id. "Unregulated cases are
partly, not wholly, unregulated." d. at 195.
501. Id. at 182.
502. The judge merely identifies the law, determines the facts, and applies the law to the
facts. Id. at 181-82.
503. Id. at 185.
504. Id. at 190. Raz stated courts exercising their law-making power should "act as one
expects Parliament to act, i.e. by adopting the best rules they can find." Id. at 197. In response
to the criticism that courts do not have law-making power because they are not democratically
elected, Raz points out that in Great Britain, judge-made law is no more undemocratic than
much of the legislation enacted by the Parliament. Id. at 197-98. Of course, in the United States,
some constitutional cases cannot be reversed by the legislative branch. Raz believes that the justi-
fication for the Supreme Court possessing this power is tied to the justification for having a
constitution that limits the power of the majority. Id. at 198 n. 17.
505. Id. at 191.
506. Id. at 197. Raz recognizes there may be other legal duties that courts are bound to
observe which "may prevent them from adopting the best rule and may force them on occasion
to settle for second best." Id.
507. Id. at 199. Raz recognizes that there are moral restrictions on judges that do not apply
to legislators. These stem from the piecemeal manner in which judge-made law changes existing
law. Thus, the judge has to weigh the benefit of any change in the law against the possibility that
the change will result in pragmatically inconsistent law. This often leads to court conservatism.
Raz finds this conservatism to be justified sometimes, but not in all cases. Id. at 200-01.
508. Id. at 108.
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larly, "[a] supreme tribunal has the last word in saying what the law is
and ... the statement that the court was 'wrong' has no conse-
quences." 5°9 Thus, both positivists recognize a precedent is binding
even if resulting from a flawed decision-making process.5
10
In positivist theory, the most salient problem of the repeated dis-
sents against the death penalty by Justices Brennan and Marshall
stems from the preceding observation. Even if Gregg was wrongly de-
cided, the Court created precedent that the death penalty is not per se
cruel and unusual punishment. That precedent is the law; because of
the positivist separation of law as it is from law as it ought to be.
Brennan's and Marshall's broad statements, that the death penalty is
in all circumstances cruel and unusual, directly oppose precedent. No
matter how laudatory may be the morality implicit in their stance,
their position is not the law.
Given the premise of a clear precedent, Hart's positivism requires
the legislature to change the law.51 Therefore, after Gregg, Brennan
and Marshall may be said to have "misbehaved" when repeatedly dis-
senting against the death penalty. They stepped outside of their proper
roles as judges 2.5 1
Does the legitimacy of Brennan's and Justice Marshall's dissents,
questionable under positivism, stem from the breadth of their dis-
sents? Brennan and Marshall find the death penalty unconstitutional
in all circumstances, even though the two often also addressed the
case-specific issues.' 13 Would their actions have been more legitimate
if, rather than making blanket statements, they had distinguished each
case from precedent on particular facts? Arguably, the justices would
then be acting within Hart's quite flexible margin . 1 4
509. HART, supra note 411, at 138.
510. According to Hart, a legal system gives up infallibility to reach final decisions. Id. at
139.
Hart believes a legal system becomes threatened when judges fail to abide by the correct stan-
dards of judicial decision on more than an incidental or exceptional basis. Hart analogizes the
court to a scorer in a game; the scorer's rulings are final and authoritative. However, Hart
points out, the scoring rule for the particular game remains what it was before there was a
scorer, and it is the scorer's duty to apply the rule as best he can. If the scorer repudiates the
scoring rule and makes repeated aberrant rulings according to his own discretion, at some point
the players will no longer accept the scorer's rulings. If they do accept them, the game has
changed. Hart calls the new game "scorer's discretion." In comparison, judges are part of a
system of rules which supplies the standards for correct judicial decision. Judges must adhere to
the standards in order to maintain them, but the judges do not make the rules. Id. at 138-44.
511. 1d.at 132.
512. See id.
513. Kelman, supra note 36, at 265.
514. This is an unsatisfactory conclusion. One cannot help but feel that Hart's scheme does
not sufficiently address overruling of precedent. His scheme would prohibit a direct overruling
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Under Raz's positivism, which affords judges a broader lawmaking
role, the repeated dissents of Brennan and Marshall are a more legiti-
mate exercise of judicial authority. However, Raz's standard for judi-
cial conduct remains vague on how much discretion judges have to
repeat dissents. Undoubtedly, Brennan and Marshall were certain that
abolishing the death penalty was an improvement on the law, which
meets Raz's criterion for change. Nor is there doubt their dissents
were votes to overturn prior decisional law, not merely dissent for its
own sake.5"5 Brennan's and Marshall's repeated opposition to the
death penalty was in keeping with Raz's belief that judges have a legal
duty to adopt the best possible decision.
D. Sociological Jurisprudence
The predominant viewpoint in American legal thought in the latter
part of the nineteenth century was that the law was a closed, logical
system.116 Judges did not make law, but merely declared it.' Roscoe
Pound was one of the first5" ' to attack this viewpoint, which he
termed "mechanical jurisprudence,"51 9 the degeneration of a legal sys-
tem into "technical rules existing for their own sake and subserving
supposed ends of science, while defeating justice."' ' 0 Pound instead
but would allow a court to distinguish a law to the point where it is no longer a law.
Furthermore, Hart recognizes that the secondary rules of a legal system include rules of
change. HART, supra note 411, at 93. In our legal system, it is not only legislatures that change
the law. The rules of change must also take account of the fact that a majority of five justices of
the Supreme Court can change the law. Where, then, does one draw the theoretical line between
two justices and five justices voting to change the law?
515. "Deep conviction" may be, as Professor Kelman has stated, "the fuel that drives dis-
sent past the limits of hope, beyond appeal to the intelligence of a future day, and into the realm
of the quixotic .... But the other factor behind continued dissent is distinctly the child of
hope." Kelman, supra note 36, at 257 (emphasis added).
516. GRANT GiLmoRE, THE AGEs OF AMERIcAN LAw 62 (1977).
517. Id.
518. Id. at 69 n.4.
519. Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 CoLtUs. L. RaV. 605 (1908) [hereinafter
Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence].
520. Id. at 606. For Pound, judicial discretion was a part of any legal system
(Iln no legal system, however minute and detailed its body of rules, is justice adminis-
tered wholly by rule, without any recourse to the will of the judge and his personal
sense of what should be done to achieve justice in the cause before him. Both elements
are to be found in all administration of justice. But sometimes, as in oriental justice,
the one element greatly preponderates; at other times, as in Europe and America of
the nineteenth century, the other element all but holds the whole field.
Roscoe Pound, Justice According to Law, 13 COLUm. L. REV. 696, 696-97 (1913).
Pound later qualified his attack on mechanical jurisprudence. He finds that such an applica-
tion of the law is appropriate in both property law and commercial transactions. His rationale is
that, in these areas, there is no need for judicial discretion, as "the social interests in security of
acquisitions and security of transactions-the economic side of human activity in civilized soci-
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called for a philosophy of law based on an understanding of social
and political science.52' Sociological jurisprudence is "the movement
for the adjustment of principles and doctrines to the human condi-
tions they are to govern rather than to assumed first principles."52
Thus, Pound saw the law as purposive or instrumentalist. The end
of law was administration of justice, and the law was to be judged by
its results. 523 Pound deplored legal reasoning whereby concepts were
developed logically but at the expense of practicality. 54 The task of
the law is to enable people "to live together in civilized society with a
minimum of friction and a minimum of waste of the goods of exis-
tence. '5 25 The goal of judicial decision making is "social engineering"
to secure the maximum social benefit with the least sacrifice,5 26 by
"subsuming the claims of the parties under generalized social
claims' 527 and giving effect to as many such claims as possible."2
Implicit in Pound's theory is the idea that society's evolution neces-
sitates a reassessment of laws and their results. He argued that "what
the administration of justice in America needs is . . .a redrawing of
the authoritative picture of the society in which justice is adminis-
tered. '5 29 In Pound's view, ideals of the past are an inappropriate ba-
sis for contemporary laws, because society needs change. 30
According to Phillip Selznick, a modern adherent of sociological
jurisprudence,' 3' it is rational public consensus concerning legitimacy
ety-call for rule or conception authoritatively prescribed in advance and mechanically applied."
Roscoe Pound, The Theory of Judicial Decision, 36 HAav. L. REv. 940, 957 (1923) [hereinafter
Pound, Judicial Decision]. "In matters of property and commercial law ... mechanical applica-
tion of fixed, detailed rules or of rigid deductions from fixed conceptions is a wise social engi-
neering." RoscoE POUND, INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL HISTORY 154 (1923).
521. Roscoe Pound, Do We Need a Philosophy of Law?, 5 CoLum. L. REv. 339, 344-51
(1905). A similar point of view was expressed by Holmes. See Holmes, The Path of the Law,
supra note 411, at 167, 184. ("[Jjudges themselves have failed adequately to recognize their duty
of weighing considerations of social advantage. The duty is inevitable .... ").
522. Roscoe Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 YALE L.J. 454, 464 (1909) [hereinafter Pound,
Liberty].
523. See generally Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, supra note 519.
524. Pound, Liberty, supra note 522, at 457.
525. RoscoE POUND, CONTEMPORARY JuaSsric THEORY 82 (1940) [hereinafter POUND, Juxs-
TIC THEORY]. According to Pound, the legal order must take account of individual, public, and
social interests. Id. at 61. Of course, not every claim can be recognized, so the law must classify
claims, select those which are to be recognized, and fix the limits within which they will be given
effect, as none can be recognized fully, in view of other recognized claims. Id. at 59.
526. Pound, Judicial Decision, supra note 520, at 955.
527. Id. at 958.
528. Id.
529. POUND, Juisnc THEORY, supra note 525, at 83.
530. See id.
531. Contemporary sociological jurisprudence can be divided into two camps. There are
those who believe how the law ought to behave is beyond the jurisdiction of sociology. See, e.g.,
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that validates rules of law.32 The quality and content of public con-
sensus is important; there must be broad opportunity for the emer-
gence of public opinion through the free play of interests and ideas."
Public consensus is an inadequate support for the rule of law where
the consensus is not "genuine," but instead based upon "manipula-
tion, withholding of information, or unmitigated appeals to tradi-tion."1514
In Selznick's legal system, those in authority will transcend rule-by-
coercion, instead contributing to public consensus through education
and reason. 35 Additionally, Selznick states that if the law is to meet
social needs and aspirations, it must be able to sustain reasoned criti-
cism of the rules and of official discretion. 36 Within the Anglo-Amer-
ican legal tradition, freedom of the judiciary to adopt a critical stance
toward received law is one source of such "institutionalized criti-
cism."53 7 This capacity for criticism may expose defective reasoning.
Within sociological jurisprudence, application of precedent for its
own sake appears to be undermined by the idea that law must be justi-
fied by its ability to achieve social goals. Of course, precedent often is
beneficial; it can give stability and consistency to the law, thereby en-
hancing fairness. But if law is to achieve justice according to contem-
porary needs, the doctrine of stare decisis must at times give way.53
DONALD J. BLACK, SOCIOLOGICAL JUSTICE (1989). Under this view, the proper sociological per-
spective is that of an observer of the social characteristics or "social structure" of a case. Id. at
7, 20. Sociological principles can predict and explain the outcome of a particular case. Id. at 21.
But "a purely sociological approach to law should involve not an assessment of legal policy, but
rather, a scientific analysis of legal life as a system of behavior." Donald J. Black, The Bounda-
ries of Legal Sociology, 81 YALE L.J. 1086, 1087 (1972) (emphasis omitted).
It might be said that Black's view of legal sociology is not in fact a jurisprudential view at all.
This is the thrust of an article by Philippe Nonet in which he faults Black for his insistence on
separating sociology from normative philosophy. Philip Nonet, For Jurisprudential Sociology,
1976 L. & Soc'Y 525 (hereinafter Nonet, For Jurisprudential Sociology].
Pound's "jurisprudence of ends" is carried on in the other camp. Phillip Selznick and Phi-
lippe Nonet are two proponents of this second point of view, under which empirical study of
legal institutions is a means to an end, not the end itself. A legal system should be more than
procedurally fair-'"it should help define the public interest and be committed to the achieve-
ment of substantive justice." PMLIPPE NONET & PsILn SELZNICK, LAW AND SOCIETY IN TRANSI-
TION: TowARD RESPONsWE LAw 74 (1978). Thus, sociological jurisprudence is legitimately
evaluative. It sets normative standards and uses empirical data to assess the competency and
limitations of different kinds of legal institutions. Nonet, For Jurisprudential Sociology, at 544.
532. Philip Selznick, The Sociology of Law, 9 INT'L ENCYCLOPEDIA Soc. Sci. 50, 53 (David
L. Sills ed., 1968).
533. Id. at 53.
534. Id.
535. Id. at 52.
536. Id.
537. Id. Other sources of institutionalized criticism within the Anglo-American legal tradi-
tion are the availab.lity of counsel and the adversary concept of the legal process. Id.
538. See BENjAM N N. CARDozo, TE NATURE OF TE JUDICIAL PROCESS 149-50 (1921).
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Justices Brennan and Marshall also believed that the law can be a
vehicle for advancing our society. They did not doubt that abolishing
the death penalty would best serve societal needs and goals. There-
fore, in weighing the benefits of adherence to stare decisis against the
goal of achieving justice, they found precedent wanting.
Measured by the tenets of sociological jurisprudence, the repeated
dissents of Justices Brennan and Marshall were, at a minimum, legiti-
mate as "institutionalized criticism." The dissents served to keep open
a dialogue concerning the validity of the death penalty; calling for
continued rational assessment of the death penalty in light of contem-
porary needs. The dissents expressed belief that judges have an impor-
tant educational role in arriving at social consensus. Thus, the
repeated dissents are consistent with sociological jurisprudence.
Justice Marshall's view, expressed in both his concurrence in Fur-
man and his dissent in Gregg, comports with the views expressed by
Pound, Selznick, and other sociological jurisprudes who believed laws
are to be justified by the results they achieve.3 9 While Brennan's ob-
jection to the death penalty focused on upholding the broad constitu-
tional principle of human dignity, Marshall appealed to reason. He
asked that we as a nation recognize we cannot rationally justify the
death penalty as a necessary means to any legitimate social end.
Therefore, we ought to do away with it altogether.514
Justice Marshall believed contemporary values are an important
factor when defining social welfare. In Furman, he stated that a pun-
ishment "may be invalid if popular sentiment abhors it.' '14 Interest-
ingly, Marshall's language recalled Professor Selznick's, who insists
on a "genuine" public consensus to assess the legitimacy of law.542
539. See generally Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, supra note 519. Justice Cardozo
wrote: "Few rules in our time are so well established that they may not be called upon any day
to justify their existence .... If they do not function, they are diseased." Cardozo, supra note
538, at 98.
540. Justice Marshall considered six conceivable purposes for the imposition of the death
penalty: retribution, deterrence, prevention of repetitive criminal acts, encouragement of guilty
pleas and confessions, eugenics, and economy. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 343 (1972)
(Marshall, J., concurring). He eliminated each. In particular, he found that retribution by itself
is not a legitimate goal of punishment, because "the Eighth Amendment itself was adopted to
prevent punishment from becoming synonymous with vengeance." Id.; see also Gregg v. Geor-
gia, 428 U.S. 153, 236-42 (1976) (Marshall, ., dissenting). Marshall rejected "deterrence" argu-
ments. See Furman, 408 U.S at 345-54 (Marshall, J., concurring) (citing research that appears to
support the idea that the death penalty is no more effective a deterrent than life imprisonment);
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 233-36 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (criticizing a study that purports to demon-
strate that the death penalty is a greater deterrent than life imprisonment). The death penalty is
therefore excessive because there is no rational reason to prefer the death penalty to life impris-
onment as a deterrent to crime.
541. Furman, 408 U.S. at 332 (Marshall, J., concurring).
542. Selznick, supra note 532, at 53.
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Marshall stated that the opinion of an informed citizenry is what mat-
ters: "[tihe American people, fully informed as to the purposes of the
death penalty and its liabilities, would in my view reject it as morally
unacceptable.' 'S43
E. Legal Realism
Legal realism arose in the 1930's. While positivism focused on the
rules of a legal system, legal realism was characterized by a belief in
the artificiality, uncertainty, and flexibility of legal rules and princi-
ples. s5" Legal realists denied that decisions were made through the
purely logical application of legal rules, instead believing these deci-
sions were influenced by many factors.5 4 Legal realists were therefore
concerned with understanding how decisions were actually made.54
Two of legal realism's most vocal proponents were Karl Llewellyn
and Jerome Frank. 5 7 Llewellyn took an "institutional" approach, be-
543. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 232 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
544. In Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism-Responding to Dean Pound, 44
HARy. L. RaY. 1222 (1931) [hereinafter Llewellyn, Realism], Llewellyn attempts to characterize
the work of legal realists. He insists that legal realism is a movement rather than a school. "A
group philosophy or program, a group credo of social welfare, these realists have not. They are
not a group." Id. at 1256.
545. Id. at 1237 (legal realism is characterized by "[dlistrust of traditional legal rules and
concepts insofar as they purport to describe what either courts or people are actually doing");
Jerome Frank, Are Judges Human?, 80 U. PA. L. REv. 17, 40 (1931) ("Rules, whether stated by
judges or others, whether in statutes, opinions or text-books by learned authors, are not the
Law, but are only some among many of the sources to which judges go in making the law.").
546. Llewellyn stated that one of the "common points of departure" among realists is the
"temporary divorce of Is and-Ought for purposes of study." Llewellyn, supra note 544, at 1235-
36. By this he meant that realists attempt to study the law in an objective manner, without being
swayed by their views of what the law should be. "[T]he intrusion of Ought-spectacles during
the investigation of the facts [makes] it very difficult to see what is being done." Id. at 1237. But
Llewellyn recognized law as a means to social ends and not an end in itself. Thus, "any part [of
the law] needs constantly to be examined for its purpose, and for its effect, and to be judged in
the light of both and of their relation to each other." Id. at 1236.
An example of an extreme realist point of view is presented in John E. Nowak, Realism,
Nihilism, and the Supreme Court: Do the Emperors Have Nothing but Robes?, 22 WASHBURN
L.J. 246, 249 (1983). Professor Nowak divorces the realist approach entirely from any discussion
of the "ought." "My premise ... is that constitutional law is what Supreme Court justices do.
It is no more, no less. There are no demonstrably right or wrong decisions." Id. (citation omit-
ted). "The realist focus on power eliminated any basis for normative review of court rulings.
Case decisions could be explained, but not proved right or wrong." Id. at 252.
547. Llewellyn and Frank are not necessarily the most representative of the movement, but
because they were the most adamant in seeing their views as a part of a movement, their views
received the most attention within the legal community. G. Edward White, From Sociological
Jurisprudence to Realism: Jurisprudence and Social Change in Early Twentieth-Century Amer-
ica, 58 VA. L. REv. 999, 1017 (1972), reprinted in PAraERsS or AMERICe LEao THouoGHT 99,
121 (1978). As it is not possible to discuss the views of all those considered to be legal realists, I
have opted to discuss Llewellyn and Frank because of their historical importance in the move-
ment.
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lieving an understanding of the law was feasible only by studying the
way in which people and institutions are organized in our society.5
According to Llewellyn, "real" rules were the actual practices of the
courts. 49 He believed the study of observable behavior was necessary
to de-emphasize "precepts and principles" and reveal the "real"
rules.550
Frank's theories centered on judges' personalities."5 ' Frank insisted
the psychology of the individual judge was of overriding importance
in determining what that judge's decision would be. At the trial level,
Frank noted, judges have great discretion.1 2 Even at the appellate
level, where judges are presented with written records rather than live
witnesses, the varying reactions of the judges result in opposite con-
clusions ."'
Both Frank and Llewellyn believed judges rationalized decisions
within opinions.1 4 Opinions are "intended to make the decision seem
plausible, legally decent, legally right, to make it seem, indeed, legally
inevitable." 5" Because opinions are written by reasoning backward
from the judge's desired result, opinions citing the same "legal rule"
are not necessarily decided on the same "real" basis. 56
Given appellate leeway in applying precedent, the doctrine of stare
decisis is not only a means of retaining the status quo, but also a facile
means of change within the legal system.557 Llewellyn concluded that
where judges have so much freedom, applying precedent can only be
justified by policy considerations ."'
548. Karl N. Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence- The Next Step, 30 CoLum. L. REv. 431,
464 (1930) [hereinafter Llewellyn, Next Step].
549. Id. at 448.
550. Id. at 464.
551. See generally Frank, supra note 545.
552. Id. at 28.
553. Id. Frank cited United States v. Shipp, 214 U.S. 386 (1908), where a pure question of
fact was presented. The Court appointed a commissioner to take testimony and report that testi-
mony without comment. On the basis of the written testimony, the decision of the Court was
split five-to-three on the question of fact. The two sides came to opposite conclusions, and each
side stated that theirs was the only conclusion to be drawn from the evidence.
554. See also Joseph C. Hutcheson, Jr., The Judgment Intuitive: The Function of the
"Hunch" in Judicial Decision, 14 CORNELL L. Q. 274, 278 (1928) ("I decide the case more or
less offhand and by rule of thumb."). According to Judge Hutcheson, "the vital, motivating
impulse for the decision is an intuitive sense of what is right or wrong for that cause, and
... the astute judge, having so decided, enlists his every faculty and belabors his laggard mind,
not only to justify that intuition to himself, but to make it pass muster with his critics." Id. at
285.
555. Llewellyn, supra note 544, at 1238-39.
556. Frank, supra note 545, at 37.
557. Id. at 1253.
558. Id. at 1253. Thus, any judge blind to policy considerations should have no more "sanc-
tity" than any other judge when working with precedent. See id.
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Similarly, Frank recognized the essential flexibility of the doctrine
of stare decisis, allowing judges easily to get rid of an "obnoxious
judge-made rule."" 9 Frank directly addressed whether a court should
abandon or modify a rule when the court believes the social policy
behind the rule is undesirable or unjust.5 ° Frank's answer was firm.
He wrote, "if the precedent system means the perpetuation of judge-
made rules, shown to be unjust or undesirable ...then usually the
courts, when they accept that system, are not performing their func-
tion-the administration of justice. They are administering injus-
tice. ''561
Frank and Llewellyn believed that through awareness of the true
nature of the legal system, it would be possible to use the system effi-
ciently and to improve it.562 There was, however, no agreed-upon legal
realist program as to how the law ought to function ideally.5 63 While
sociological jurisprudence assessed laws according to whether they ful-
filled the needs and aspirations of society, legal realism took no par-
ticular stance on social values, morality, or ethics.5" There was fairly
general agreement on the part of legal realists that the effects of rules
should be taken into account by the courts in making or remaking
rules.565 But Llewellyn denied that there was any broad community
which could be taken into account.5" Instead, a particular part of the
law was only relevant to the particular part of the community that was
materially affected by the law.A67
559. JEROMi FRANK, COURTS ON TRAL': MYTH AND REALrrY IN Aamuc:AN JUSTICE 275
(1949). Three devices cited by Frank which are used by judges to avoid applying a precedent they
regard as undesirable are: (1) the "distinguishing" or "precise question" device, where the judge
states that the rule in a prior case must be limited to the "precise question" involved in that
earlier case; (2) "verbal stability" or the act of pretending to preserve an old rule by keeping it
verbally but stuffing the words of the rule with new meaning so that it becomes a new rule; and
(3) the "ratio decidendi" device, where the judge claims that the authoritative part of a decision
is not the decision itself or the rule on which that decision was based, but the ratio decidendi, or
right principle, which lies behind both. Id. at 275-80. Frank concludes then that for precedential
purposes, a case means only what a judge in any later case says it means. It is authoritative only
if the judge decides it is authoritative. Therefore, the doctrine or theory of stare decisis is very
different than its actual application by judges. Id. at 279-80.
560. Id. at 265-71.
561. ld. at 271.
562. FRANK, supra note 559, at 31; Llewellyn, Next Step, supra note 548, at 463.
563. Llewellyn, Realism, supra note 544, at 1254-55 ("When the matter of program in the
normative aspect is raised, the answer is: there is none.").
564. According to Professor White, the place of morals or ethics in the law was one of the
two main issues on which Pound and Frank and Llewellyn sharply disagreed. The other issue
was the worth of legal rules. G. Edward White, From Sociological Jurisprudence to Realism!
Jurisprudence and Social Change in Early Twentieth.Century America, 58 VA. L. REv. 999
(1972), reprinted in PArERNS OF AMErUCAN LEOAL THoGr 125 (1978).
565. Llewellyn, Realism, supra note 544, at 1254.
566. Id. at 1249.
567. Id.
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Legal realists' insight that judicial decisions are not merely logical
application of rules to facts is now a widely accepted notion. How
else, for example, does one explain public commotion such as that
raised by the nomination of Judge Bork to the Supreme Court?
Thus, from the legal realist point of view, it cannot be surprising
that Justices Brennan and Marshall differed from other justices on the
validity of the death penalty. That judges can arrive at different con-
clusions given the same facts is explicitly a part of the realists' descrip-
tive scheme.
Furthermore, if judges really have enormous leeway in using prece-
dent, as Llewellyn and Frank claim, then denigrating the dissents of
Justices Brennan and Marshall as rejections of the doctrine of stare
decisis would be nonsensical. This is true because a majority of the
Court could have arrived at the same conclusion as Brennan and Mar-
shall, that the death penalty is unconstitutional, while claiming to rely
only on precedent.
If a legal opinion is merely a post-decisional rationalization con-
trived to make the decision appear logically and legally inevitable,
then we can place no faith in the reasons given by Brennan and Mar-
shall for their repeated dissents. The reasons they gave may or may
not be the true motivation for their dissents. The corollary to this,
however, is that the reasons given by the majority for retaining the
death penalty are similarly suspect. Therefore, any objection the legal
realists might have to repeated dissents by justices likely would be
rooted in a sense of the importance of stability in the law.
F. Wechsler, Ely, Choper
Herbert Wechsler, John Hart Ely, and Jesse Choper are legal theor-
ists who can only loosely be termed a group.16 Each addressed what
Alexander Bickel termed "the counter-majoritarian difficulty. '" 5 69 Be-
cause Supreme Court justices are appointed, each theorist would re-
strict the Court's powers within certain limits to justify, protect, and
legitimate the Court's role within democratic government.
In Herbert Wechsler's 1959 paper delivered at Harvard Law School,
he offered the theory of Supreme Court judicial review based on
568. These writers "typify the neutral principles theorists." Nowak, supra note 546, at 253.
Professor Nowak recognized that Professor Choper may not belong in the neutral principles
school, but grouped him with the others because of Choper's work on the institutional role of
the Court. Id.
569. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THsE LEAST DANGEROus BRANCH 16 (2d ed. 1962).
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"neutral principles."570 Defining "neutral principles," Wechsler wrote
that a properly neutral decision is not result-oriented. "A principled
[neutral] decision . . . rests on . . .reasons that in their generality and
their neutrality transcend any immediate result." ' 7' In contrast, result-
orientation implies that "courts are free to function as a naked power
organ. 571 2 Further, Wechsler found the role of the Court is not to
make choices between conflicting values.5 73 The Court may condemn
or condone the value choices made by the legislative and executive
branches,574 but must defer if the Court has no sufficiently general
and neutral reasons for overturning. 5
Additionally, decisions based on neutral principles must fully dis-
close their foundations . 76 Wechsler recognized that justices have diffi-
culty agreeing on reasons for a particular result . 77 In such cases,
however, disclosing justices' positions is essential to clarify the
Court's stance and delineate the principles on which the decision is
based .578
Wechsler would have strongly disapproved of the repeated death
penalty dissents of Justices Brennan and Marshall as being impermis-
sibly value-laden and result-oriented. In rejecting the death penalty,
Brennan upheld human dignity as a primary constitutional principle,
while Marshall assessed the fit between the punishment and its legiti-
mate purposes. Analyzed according to Wechsler's standard of neutral
principles, however vague that standard may be, each stance would be
designated an impermissible attempt to impress the justices' own val-
ues on the decisions of the Supreme Court. Wechsler's position re-
quires deference to legislatures that legalized the death penalty. The
majority of the Court, in upholding the value choices made by the
legislatures, acts within the confines of its proper role.
John Hart Ely focused on the role of the Court in ensuring access
to the political process."79 Ely contested the characterization of the
570. Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARv. L. REv.
1 (1959). For a discussion of Wechsler's neutral principles theory as a part of what Henry Hart
and Albert Sacks termed "Reasoned Elaboration," see WinTE, TEE EVOLUTION OF REASONED
ELABORATION: JURISPRUDENTIAL CRITIcISM AND SOCIAL. CHANGE, reprinted in PATTERN4S OF
AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT 136 (1978).
571. Wechsler, supra note 570, at 19.
572. Id. at 12.
573. Id. at 16.
574. Id. at 15.
575. Id. at 19.
576. Id. at 19-20 (disapproving of per curiam decisions that fail to articulate the standards
on which they rely).
577. Id. at 21.
578. Id.
579. See generally ELY, supra note 417.
19951
678 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 22:591
Constitution as an evolving statement of general values.180 Rather, Ely
asserted, "the selection and accommodation of substantive values is
left almost entirely to the political process."" '' Thus, the meaning of
open-ended constitutional clauses is properly left to those participat-
ing in the political process. According to Ely, the Constitution is con-
cerned with procedural fairness in the resolution of individual disputes
and with ensuring broad participation in the political process.12 As a
result, the Supreme Court's role is to "concern itself only with ques-
tions of participation, and not with the substantive merits of the polit-
ical choice under attack. '"" For Ely, judicial review becomes an
important means for "unblocking stoppages in the democratic proc-
ess, '" S doing so by "clearing the channels of political change"5 5 and
"facilitating the representation of minorities."586
Ely's Supreme Court has a role with respect to the death penalty,
but the role differs from that assumed by Justices Brennan and Mar-
shall in Furman and Gregg. Ely probably would reject the substance
of Brennan's and Marshall's arguments and broad dissents as a mis-
use of judicial power.
For Ely, the issue raised by the death penalty is its uneven applica-
tion. "Obviously there is a very effective series of buffers at work
here, protecting those who make the laws . . . from the harshness of
their application.' '587 In light of his emphasis on democratic access
and the importance of equal protection in achieving that access, Ely
possibly would approve of repeated dissents that focus on and rightly
point out inequities in death penalty application. For example, in
McCleskey v. Kemp,"'5 Justice Brennan's dissent details statistical evi-
dence of racial discrimination in the imposition of the death penalty.
For Ely to object to that kind of repeated dissent would be fundamen-
tally inconsistent with his belief that the Supreme Court should pro-
tect minority access to the democratic process.18 9 The mere fact that a
majority disagrees with the dissenting justices should not be enough to
give a permanent imprimatur to a denial of equal protection.
580. Id. at 87. Ely contends that there is no satisfactory method of finding 'fundamental
values' embedded in the open-ended clauses of the Constitution. See generally id. at 43-72.
581. Id. at 87.
582. Id.
583. ELY, supra note 417, at 181.
584. Id. at 117.
585. See id. at 105-34.
586. See id. at 135-79.
587. Id. at 176.
588. 481 U.S. 279, 319 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan was joined in dis-
sent by Justice Marshall, and by Justices Stevens and Blackmun in part.
589. SeeELY, supra note 417, at 135-79.
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Jesse Choper believed the "overriding virtue of and justification for
vesting the Court with [the] awesome power [of judicial review] is to
guard against governmental infringement of individual liberties se-
cured by the Constitution." 519 His rationale for placing the guardian-
ship of individual rights in the hands of the Court is specifically that it
is the branch of government most removed from "political responsi-
bility and unbeholden to self-absorbed and excited majoritarian-
ism." 591 According to Choper, the smaller the aggrieved minority and
the more intense the opprobrium directed toward it by the majority,
the more critical is the need for protection of liberty through judicial
review. 92
According to Choper, the Supreme Court has limited "institutional
capital."5 93 Although judicial review is a necessary function, its exer-
cise can harm the Court itself.59 "The Court's capacity to beget pub-
lic enmity by decisions that reject political judgments believed
necessary for effective governance is easily fulfilled, and its ability to
obtain compliance with those mandates that thwart the popular will is
greatly circumscribed." 5 95 To protect the Court, Choper would ration
the use of judicial review. He proposes the Court abstain from decid-
ing constitutional questions either pertaining to national power versus
states' rights or to separation of powers between Congress and the
PresidentA9 Such a limitation would preserve the Court's prestige and
allow it to protect individual rights-the area where it is truly needed.
Choper explicitly rejected the idea that the Court should decline
protection of individual rights until sufficient public consensus ex-
ists.59 Doing so would shirk duty and thwart the Court's critical func-
tion as guardian of constitutional rights of the disenfranchised. 9 In
Choper's view,
[t]he Court's formidable and delicate task is to consult those
complex sources of historic and contemporary values that are the
ingredients of sound constitutional interpretation, as well as its
wisdom and conscience-and then to decide .... Even if the
590. JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REvIEw AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 64 (1980).
This has been dubbed "the 'Carolene Products footnote 4' approach to constitutional law" by
Professor Nowak. Nowak, supra note 546, at 253-54.
591. Choper, supra note 590, at 68.
592. Id. at 69.
593. Id. at 129-71.
594. Id. at 170.
595. Id. at 129-30.
596. Id. at 169, 175, 263.
597. Id. at 168.
598. Id.
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immediate decision is ignored, judicial courage is preferable to
obsequious abdication .... [IT]he mere articulation of cherished
constitutional ideals by a Court that is "right" may carry a
meaningful psychological impact that will serve the cause of liberty
at a later time when popular passion has cooled. 99
Whether or not Choper would personally agree with the stance
Justices Brennan and Marshall took against the death penalty, sus-
tained dissents meet the spirit of Choper's argument. Brennan and
Marshall dissented against what they viewed as a violation of the con-
stitutional right to be free from cruel and unusual punishments, an
essential individual liberty that is the birthright of all U.S. citizens.
Just as frequent re-enactment of capital punishment demonstrates
there is hardly public consensus against the death penalty, the Su-
preme Court repeatedly demonstrates disagreement with Justices
Brennan and Marshall that the death penalty is cruel and unusual.
Choper would not allow public sentiment to guide the Court. This
means, of course, that use of the death penalty should not sway the
Court if constitutionally guaranteed rights are at risk. May the
Court's majority demand compliance from the minority when that mi-
nority is convinced that individual rights are threatened? A logical
corollary of Choper's thesis is that dissenters should not be muzzled
because they differ on questions of individual rights. The position of
dissenters is analogous to that of the Court itself when taking an un-
popular stand. After all, "judicial courage is preferable to obsequious
abdication.'"6m
G. Critical Legal Studies
The Critical Legal Studies (CLS) movement may be the intellectual
descendant of legal realism. 60 Like the legal realists, critical theorists
analyze and critique the way our legal system really works. CLS has
been primarily descriptive. Indeed, a chief complaint of CLS is that
CLS has no constructive program.602
Critical theorists adopted skepticism of rules from the legal realists.
CLS thus espouses the idea that legal rules are indeterminate and can-
not compel any particular outcome in a given case. As a result, law
and politics are indistinguishable, 603 and judges can never be neutral
599. Id.
600. Id.
601. Mark Tushnet, Critical Legal Studies: An Introduction to its Origins and Underpin-
nings, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 505 (1986).
602. Id. at 510.
603. Id. at 506.
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or objective. 6 4 Inevitably, a judge will consider personal values and
ideological assumptions. 601
CLS critics combined this insight with a "progressive political cri-
tique . . .[that] espouses the view that our society and its institutions
fall dramatically short of our democratic and egalitarian ideals.' 606
One of the primary themes of CLS is that mainstream or "liberal ' 607
legal thought has unresolvable inherent contradictions.
Mark Kelman delineated the three central contradictions of liberal
legal thought.60s First, there exists within the legal system a commit-
ment to resolving disputes with mechanically applicable rules used in
non-discretionary fashion." There is an equal commitment to infor-
mal standards that allow for ad hoc decisions .610 This rules-standards
conflict results in the "logically or empirically unanswerable formal
problem" 61' that greater discretion can be granted or limited simply
through the form the legal command is made to take, with either pos-
sibility being "perfectly plausible. ' 61 2 Kelman points, for example, to
the Supreme Court's vacillations over the death penalty.
The Court eliminates a death penalty grounded in unguided jury
discretion, forcing the legislatures to write statutes establishing
604. Richard M. Fischl, Some Realism About Critical Legal Studies, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV.
505, 525 (1987).
605. Id.
606. Id. at 524. Tushnet states that a second intellectual support for Critical Legal Studies is
the progressive tradition in American historiography.
The progressive historians, including Charles Beard and Vernon Parrington, argued
that the best way to understand the course of American history was to pay attention to
the play of interest groups in American society. Much of their work was devoted to
debunking the claims of filiopietistic writers that the best way to understand the
course of American history was as the working out of the idea of progress within a
generally liberal political framework. The progressive historians looked at American
policies and politics and saw much more of economic interest at work; for that they
were, rather like CLS people today, called Marxists.
Tushnet, supra note 601, at 506 (citations omitted).
607. Of "liberalism," Kelman states: "While some CLS writers try to define what they mean
by liberalism at considerable length ... more often 'liberalism' is little more than a very loose
term for the dominant postfeudal beliefs held across all but the left and right fringes of the
political spectrum." MARK KELM"N, A GumE TO CmTIcAL LEGAL. STUDrES 2 (1987) [hereinafter
KELMAN, GUIDE].
608. Id. at 15-113.
609. Id. at 15.
610. Id.
611. Id. at 16.
612. Id. Additionally, Duncan Kennedy has posited that the ambivalence over choice of
form is rooted to a greater ambivalence over substantive political visions. Id. at 16 (citing Dun-
can Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARv. L. REv. 1685 (1976)).
Kennedy has claimed that rules express the substantive ideals of self-reliance and individualism,
while standards correspond to the ideal of altruism. Id.
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ostensibly rulelike aggravating circumstances that define capital
murder as long as they are not applied in a rigid, rulelike,
mandatory, nondiscretionary fashion, until there is a requirement,
vaguely guided by statutes that now seem to have only vague
exemplary power, that the jury hear of practically everything that
may mitigate punishment, once they are satisfied that an aggravated
form of murder has been committed. 61 3
The second contradiction inherent in liberal legal thought concerns
values. Traditional liberal thought supports the idea that values or de-
sires are arbitrary, subjective, and individual, while facts or reason are
objective and universal. 61 4 At the same time, social and ethical truths
can be known objectively through understanding true human nature;
in seeking moral truth, one can transcend the distinction between sub-
jectivity and objectivity. 6 ,
The third contradiction is between intentionalism and determin-
ism.6 16 Intentionalism emphasizes that one has ethical responsibility
for one's own actions.617 Determinism, on the other hand, looks at
conduct as predetermined and meriting neither respect nor condemna-
tion.6 18 According to Kelman, liberal thought "can be practically de-
fined . . . by its peculiar insistence that there is . . . a definable
domain of private empowerment in which free intentional action oc-
curs. ' 6 9 Regardless, it is "impossible to construct an adequate theory
of individual blameworthiness . . . in the face of the obvious fact that
circumstances clearly beyond the control of the actor have, at a mini-
mum, a strong bearing on the possibility that he will commit wrongful
acts." 620
Kelman argues that each of these three contradictions is pervasive.
Even where the law appears settled, a contradictory impulse exists,
though thoroughly repressed. 62' In each set of contradictory impulses,
one term is privileged, presumptively governing disputes in most situa-
tions, while departures from this norm are exceptions requiring special
justification. 612 Thus, critics find that rules are privileged over stan-
613. KELM", GumDE, supra note 607, at 27.
614. Id. at 64.
615. Id. at 3, 64-67. Kelman's discussion of this conflict is baffling. The initial premise is
clear, but it defies application.
616. Id. at 86.
617. Id.
618. Id.
619. Id. at 87.
620. Id. at 89 (citation omitted).
621. Id. at 3-4.
622. Id. at 4.
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dards,'623 that subjective choices of what is good prevail over state-de-
fined visions of good, 624 and that intentionalism is privileged over
determinism. 625 Critics conclude privileged impulses mark "a remarka-
bly right-wing, quasilibertarian order. '626
Mark Tushnet felt that the self-contradictory nature of mainstream
legal thought runs throughout American constitutional theory. 627
Mainstream theorists, according to Tushnet, seek a method of consti-
tutional interpretation to satisfy two central criteria. 628 First, judicial
invalidation of legislative action must be authorized in some circum-
stances. Otherwise, the interpretation method would deny one premise
of constitutionalism: majorities sometimes overreach. 6z9 The second
criterion is one of judicial restraint. 60 "The [interpretation] method
must keep judges from pretending that their policy preferences are
somehow written into the Constitution." 63' Tushnet frankly stated his
conviction that these two criteria are irreconcilable. 632
If judges cannot be restrained in any meaningful way because of the
inherent contradiction between reason and will, Tushnet suggests that
judges make explicitly political judgments when deciding cases. 633 He
concludes that the logical inference to be drawn from the legal real-
ists' rule-skepticism is that no court can create an absolutely binding
precedent and therefore, "in a liberal society there simply cannot be a
decision that has meaning beyond the circumstances in which it
arises. '634 He asks then "that judges not delude themselves into think-
623. Id. at 16.
624. Id. at 66. Kelman concludes that "the commitment to the subjectivity and arbitrariness
of preferences implies a commitment to a merely 'facilitative' state, one that does not seek that
particular good lives be led but simply allows persons to achieve their own vision of the good."
Id.
625. Id. at 86-87.
626. Id. at 4. However, the dominant position of CLS is not that the legal system tilts in
favor of capitalism. Tushnet, supra note 601, at 511. Arguably, rule skepticism makes it impos-
sible to say the system is tilted in any particular direction. Judges, who may reach any conclusion
they wish, may be biased rather than the system itself. Id.
627. E.g., Mark Tushnet, Critical Legal Studies and Constitutional Law: An Essay in De-
construction, 36 STAN. L. REv. 623 (1984); Mark Tushnet, Judicial Review, 7 H~Av. J.L. &
PuB. POL'y 77 (1984); Mark Tushnet, Darkness on the Edge of Town: The Contributions of
John Hart Ely to Constitutional Theory, 89 YALE L.J. 1037 (1980).





633. Mark Tushnet, The Dilemmas of Liberal Constitutionalism, 42 OHIo ST. L.J. 411, 424
(1981).
634. Id. at 425.
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ing that what they do has significance different from, and broader
than, what every other political actor does.' ' 3
Examined by the methods of CLS, the dissents of Justices Brennan
and Marshall may be one more example of the inherent contradictions
of constitutionalism. For Brennan and Marshall, like the other jus-
tices, were likely to base their decisions not on reason but on subjec-
tive values. They cloaked the subjectivity of their decisions in
supposed objectivity and enduring principles. The collegial Supreme
Court then functions as a device for aggregating the individual wills of
the individual justices. 636 Critics might find the two Justices' repeated
dissents against the death penalty merely a clear manifestation of the
fact that law does not differ from politics.
If we cannot achieve any rational balance between majoritarian rule
and judicial restraint, it makes no sense to say that justices cannot
dissent repeatedly. Once we give justices the power of judicial review,
nothing prevents them from doing as they wish. Thus, the difference
between Justices Brennan and Marshall and others in this regard may
simply be that Brennan and Marshall place lesser value on stare de-
cisis.
The difference between the majority and Brennan and Marshall
with respect to the death penalty was a manifestation of the rules-
standards conflict inherent in the Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Clause. The same can be said of the Supreme Court's death penalty
jurisprudence during the last decade or so. Deciding that the death
penalty is cruel and unusual under all circumstances would perhaps
decrease uncertainty and create a rule-like standard. But still the ques-
tion of what constitutes cruel and unusual punishment would not be
definitely answered. That question is fraught with conflicting im-
pulses, if as critics claim, our society is committed both to the subjec-
tivity of value choices and the objectivity of moral truths. No one may
have the last word.
H. A Note on Civil Disobedience
Were the relentless dissents of Brennan and Marshall comparable to
acts of civil disobedience? Is the idea of judicial civil disobedience an
oxymoron?
First, civil disobedience has been defined as an illegal act which is
undertaken for moral reasons. 67 Illegal may be defined to only refer
635. Id. at 425-26.
636. Id. at 415.
637. ROBERT T. HALt, THE MoRArTY OF CiviL DISOBEDIENCE 15 (1971).
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to acts that may possibly result in arrest and conviction.638 A conscien-
tious objector is one whose objection is recognized and established as
a legal right. 9 Thinking of dissenting justices as conscientious objec-
tors is more appealing; they have a legally protected right to dissent.
In fact, everyone knows they can dissent and many believe they
should. Campbell used the term "institutional disobedience" to de-
scribe dissent,' ° and said "judges . . .protesting as authorities within
institutional roles [are] analogous to civilians in non-institutional roles
who physically enact their protest." 64'
Examined under various legal philosophies, civil disobedience has
more meaning in some philosophies than others. Legal realists and
their successors, the CLS theorists, point out that rules are indetermi-
nate and flexible, making it possible to arrive at whatever conclusion
one wants. How then may one speak of a judge as being disobedi-
ent?642 In contrast, positivism encompasses the idea that judges can
indeed misbehave. If positive law is binding, then judges who refuse
to be bound could be called disobedient. There is still however the
problem that Hart and Raz pointed out: to say that a judge misbe-
haved makes no difference.
Natural law seems a particularly appropriate way to look at civil
disobedience, because it brings forward the "civil" aspect. Persons
acting in congruence with natural law principles, but breaking a va-
lidly enacted law that conflicts with natural law, may have to pay the
consequences in terms of arrest and prosecution. Yet, precisely be-
cause the person believes that the particular law lacks authority is why
he or she is willing to break it. Natural law recognizes that even
though an enacted law has no authority, there may be consequences to
breaking it.
IV. LEGITIMACY IN STRATEGY: JUDICIAL POLITICS AND THE BRENNAN-
MARSHALL POSITION
This Article has suggested the relentless dissents of Brennan and
Marshall were legitimate because they had strong roots both in history
and in legal philosophy. This section explores whether such dissents
were legitimate from a tactical and strategic perspective.
638. Id. at 20.
639. Id. at 30.
640. Campbell, supra note 84, at 306.
641. Id.
642. See John H. Schlegel, Critical Legal Studies for the Intelligent Lawyer, 60 N.Y. ST.
B.J. 13 (Jan. 1988) (realists "did not understand that all of a sudden they were opening the
theory up to the claim that nothing constrains judicial decision").
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A. Dissents from Cases Granted Plenary Review
One disadvantage to the abolitionist bloc is that their votes were a
known factor. Collegial lobbying greatly influences the tone and sub-
stance of a finished opinion, and thus the future course of the law. 643
The judgment itself, allegedly a product of coolly applying law to
facts, often depends on the results of intense lobbying. In a typical
death penalty case, no justice needed to have lobbied for Brennan's or
Marshall's vote.
To see why this is so, examine the results engendered by Brennan
and Marshall. Their dissents were "one-sided acceptance[s]" of
Furman6" and its progeny. When the two Justices provided the votes
needed to sustain a condemned's life in a particular situation regard-
ing the abstract constitutionality of the death penalty, an ad hoc alli-
ance was formed with the three or more justices who were willing to
limit the application of the death penalty under those circumstances. 645
This is illustrated by the voting pattern in Enmund v. Florida,
which held that the death penalty was an unconstitutionally severe
punishment for an armed robber who did not take a life or contem-
plate that life would be taken.6" Marshall provided the fifth vote for
the opinion by Justice White, finding Enmund's death sentence un-
constitutional. Perhaps Marshall joined White's opinion to strengthen
643. See generally DAVID O'BuaEN, STORM CENTER: THE SUPREME COURT n AMERICAN POIt-
TICS (1986); BoB WOODWARD & SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT
(1979).
644. Kelman, supra note 36, at 263. Professor Kelman offers, as the paradigm of the "one-
sided acceptance," the opinion pattern of Justice Black in the cases concerning indigent criminal
defendants' right to counsel decided between Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942), and Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). Black dissented in Betts, arguing for an absolute right to
counsel in felony cases. The majority held that absent "certain circumstances," the trial court
was under no obligation to appoint a lawyer for the defendant. Betts, 316 U.S. at 462.
Given Black's reputation for tenacity in First Amendment matters, Kelman was surprised by
the cases. See Kelman, supra note 36, at 264. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
645. See, e.g., Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S 66 (1987); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782
(1982); Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 919 (1982); Woodson v.
North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
646. 458 U.S. 782, 801 (1982) ("Enmund's criminal culpability must be limited to his partici-
pation in the robbery, and his punishment must be tailored to his personal responsibility and
moral guilt. Putting Enmund to death ... does not measurably contribute to the retributive end
of ensuring that the criminal gets his just deserts."). But see id. at 799 ("It would be very differ-
ent if the likelihood of a killing in the course of a robbery were so substantial that one should
share the blame for the killing if he somehow participated in the felony."). See also Tison v.
Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 157-58 (1987)
[Wle hold that the reckless disregard for human life implicit in knowingly engaging in
criminal activities known to carry a grave risk of death represents a highly culpable
mental state ... that may be taken into account in making a capital sentencing judg-
ment when that conduct causes its natural, though not inevitable, lethal result.
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the authority of the holding. Brennan wrote a one-paragraph separate
concurrence, reaffirming his dissent in Gregg.4 7 Another example of
the ad hoc alliance is Coker v. Georgia.6A
A more conspicuous example of "one-sided acceptance" is Ford v.
Wainwright,69 which held that the Constitution forbids execution of
the insane. In a curious amalgam of opinions displaying a species of
decision making seen frequently during the Burger Court,6 50 Marshall
announced the Court's judgment in an opinion joined by Brennan,
Blackmun, Powell, and Stevens, with Powell joining only as to parts
of the opinion and concurring separately to say so. 6 1 Meanwhile,
Justices O'Connor and White disagreed with the majority but agreed
with the result in part.612 Justice Rehnquist filed a straightforward dis-
sent in which Chief Justice Burger joined.653
Marshall in Ford did not have the votes to write an opinion declar-
ing the Florida statute unconstitutional on the ground that the Eighth
Amendment forbade all executions. The task of writing the opinion
would have fallen on another justice, who may have crafted a differ-
ent rationale. So Marshall had to concentrate on the narrower ques-
tions of whether the Eighth Amendment prevented Florida from
executing the insane, and what process was due the condemned who
advanced the insanity claim.6 5 4 Marshall had to assume the entire body
647. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 801 ("However, I adhere to my view that the death penalty is in
all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment."); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
648. 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (holding the death penalty unconstitutional as applied to the rapist
of an adult woman). Again, Justice White announced the judgment and filed an opinion in
which Justices Stewart, Blackmun and Stevens joined. Justice Powell concurred in the judgment
and dissented in part. Id. at 601-04. Powell believed death was a disproportionate punishment
for the rape, but did not believe death to be disproportionate in all cases where rape without
murder had been committed. Justices Brennan and Marshall filed separate, one-paragraph state-
ments, concurring in the judgment only. Id. at 600.
649. 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
650. "The unanimous decision and opinion in United States v. Nixon [418 U.S. 683 (1974)]
was exceptional. The justices have worked together to reach an institutional opinion in this way
only two or three times in the last thirty years. The trend is now toward less consensus on the
Court's rulings." DAvm O'BRrEN, STORM CENTER: THn SuREM COUxRT s AmmRICAN POLITICS
284-85 (1986).
651. Ford, 477 U.S. at 402 (holding that the Eighth Amendment bars executing the insane).
Justice Powell wrote separately to address the meaning of insanity in the context of an imminent
execution, and to differ with Marshall's views on procedures for determining competency to be
executed. Id. at 418-27 (Powell, J., concurring).
652. Id. at 427-431 (while the Eighth Amendment does not create a substantive right not to
be executed when insane, Florida law does; in addition, Florida does not provide the minimal
procedural protections required by federal due process).
653. Id. at 431-35 (finding it unnecessary to "constitutionalize" the already uniform view
that the insane should not be executed; arguing that the most the common law required was that
the executive make a determination of competency).
654. Id. at 404 ("The adequacy of the procedures chosen by a State to determine sanity...
will depend upon an issue that this Court has never addressed: whether the Constitution places a
substantive restriction on the State's power to take the life of an insane prisoner.").
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of federal death penalty law had been decided correctly since Furman.
Marshall implicitly acknowledged, as was necessary, that the question
was whether Florida could execute Ford under those circumstances. 655
The fact that the votes of the abolitionist bloc were known did not
diminish the weight of the votes. But the lack of lobbying may have
meant that the collegial argument was no longer pitched to those
Justices. Kelman wrote that "a justice's adherence to outvoted views
estranges him from the precise questions posed by succeeding cases
and wastes his potential influence on the evolutionary direction of the
655. Id. ("There is now little room for doubt that the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and
unusual punishment embraces, at a minimum, those modes or acts of punishment that had been
considered cruel and unusual at the time that the Bill of Rights was adopted.") (citations omit-
ted)). Professor Kelman argues that when a restrictive application of a precedent is necessary,
the least credible choice for author of the Court's opinion is a justice who originally dissented
from the precedent-setting case. Kelman stated that "such an assignment carries an implication
of hostility and of hidden agendas when what is wanted is the appearance of objective analysis."
Kelman, supra note 36, at 294. Although not without merit, this criticism is not entirely apropos
of Ford, as the facts and questions considered were thoroughly different from Furman or Gregg.
Kelman added:
I have a twofold objection to the recent employment of Justice Marshall to deliver the
Court's reversal of the death sentence in Caldwell v. Mississippi, 105 S. Ct. 2633
(1985). First, Justice Marshall's abiding belief in the unconstitutionality of capital
punishment in any circumstances undermines his value as administrator of the Court's
precedents in such cases. Second, in order to reach the Court's conclusion on the spe-
cific issue in Caldwell, concerning the propriety of prosecutorial argument to the jury,
it was necessary to distinguish a two-year old decision, California v. Ramos, 463 U.S.
992 (1983), in which Justice Marshall was a dissenter.
Kelman, supra note 36, at 294 n.268.
First, a comparison of Brennan's and Marshall's opinions in Furman and in Gregg reveals a
wealth of subtle differences, making it superficial to call Brennan the alter ego of Marshall sim-
pliciter. Secondly, Justice O'Connor was also able to distinguish Ramos, although on different
grounds than those Marshall employed in Part IV-A of the opinion, the only part which was not
also that of the Court. Cald well, 472 U.S. at 341 (O'Connor, J., concurring). In fact, the dis-
senting opinion in Caldwell, authored by Justice Rehnquist and joined by Chief Justice Burger
and Justice White, made but a feeble attempt to refute the distinguishing of Ramos. Id. at 351
("Although we noted in Ramos that the challenged information bore more than marginal rele-
vance to the jury's sentencing determination, Ramos is not distinguishable from this case on that
ground; there is no constitutional requirement that all information received by a sentencing jury
be 'relevant."').
In other contexts there is some merit to Professor Kelman's larger contention-that the re-
strictive application of the precedent should not be entrusted to an original dissenter because to
do so weakens the Court's institutional authority. But there again, as in so many other areas of
the law, death is different. Because of the peculiar nature of the sustained dissent in death pen-
alty cases, that of a running dialogue with the federalist notions of the "retentionists," and also
because of the ethical overtones of the issue, I believe the dissenters may safely be allowed to
write opinions for the Court without questioning their motives or presuming a continued disre-
spect for the core holding of Gregg. Since Furman and Gregg, the Court has said when the State
may execute and when it may not; without Brennan and Marshall there may have been a consti-
tutional abdication of all influence on the question of when the State may not. The tension here
was inevitable and necessary; even beneficial for the growth of the law.
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case law."'656 What Kelman was advocating, as the most strategically
sound position as well as that which most comports with the institu-
tional values inherent in stare decisis, was a policy of "damage-con-
trol" or "judicial Fabianism. ' 657 The goal of such a policy is "the
gradual reshaping of a bad decision into good, or at least less noxious,
law." 658 Kelman saw temporary acquiescence in the votes of "self-
subordinators ' 65 9 such as Stewart, Blackmun, Powell and Stevens,
limiting the original, dissent-inspiring principle while furthering a con-
sensus on the bench and thus the Court's institutional authority. In
the minds of those justices, perhaps inspired by the example of the
second Justice Harlan, there was an "institutional duty" or a "judi-
cial responsibility'"'" to hold their personal views back and to respect
656. Kelman, supra note 36, at 259.
657. Id. However, as Kelman noted, "the damage containment concern becomes operative
only when there are four other votes on the Court for limiting the foundation decision and when
an original dissenter can furnish the pivotal fifth vote." Id. at 259-60.
658. Id. at 259.
659. Id. at 231. Kelman seems to have gleaned this term from an article by Judge Roger
Traynor, Some Open Questions on the Work of State Appellate Courts, 24 U. Cm. L. REV. 211
(1957):
Paradoxically, the well-reasoned dissent, aimed at winning the day in the future, en-
hances the present certainty of the majority opinion, now imbedded in the concrete of
resistance to the published arguments that beat against it. For that very reason the
thoughtful dissident does not find it easy to set forth his dissent.
Once he has done so he has had his day. He should yield to the obligation that is upon
him to live with the law as it has been stated. He may thereafter properly note that he
is concurring under compulsion, abiding the time when he may win over the majority,
but he should regard dearly enough the stability of the law that governs all the courts
in the state not to renew the rataplan of his dissent.
Id. at 218-19. Cf. William J. Brennan, Jr., In Defense of Dissents, 37 HASnrros L.J. 427, 437
(1986):
This kind of dissent, in which a judge persists in articulating a minority view of the
law in case after case presenting the same issue, seeks to do more than simply offer an
alternative analysis .... Rather, this type of dissent constitutes a statement by the
judge as an individual: "Here I draw the line." Of course, as a member of the court,
one's general duty is to acquiesce in the rulings of that court and to take up the battle
behind the court's new barricades. But it would be a great mistake to confuse this
unquestioned duty to obey and respect the law with an imagined obligation to sub-
sume entirely one's views of constitutional imperatives to the views of the major-
ity .... We are a free and vital people because we not only allow, we encourage
debate, and because we do not shut down communication as soon as a decision is
reached. As law-abiders, we accept the conclusions of our decision-making bodies as
binding, but we also know that our right to continue to challenge the wisdom of that
result must be accepted by those who disagree with us .... The process enriches all of
us ....
660. Kelman, supra note 36, at 269; see also Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 518 (1976)
(per Stewart, J.); Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 99 (1966) (Stewart, J., concurring in the
judgment) ("Time has not changed my views. I still believe the Court misconceived the Equal
Protection Clause in Reynolds v. Sims [377 U.S. 533 (1964)] and its companion cases. But so
long as those cases remain the law, I must bow to them."); Burns, 384 U.S. at 98 (Harlan, J.,
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precedent. Coincidentally, in the last fifteen years those justices have
also held the balance of power on the Court; the coincidence gives one
pause.
Kelman overstated the problem. Even if the views of the perennial
dissenters are indeed discounted in the tactics of collegial lobbying,
still seven justices were left whose views were solicited. Assume a solid
bloc of four: Rehnquist, White, Scalia, and Kennedy, who will consis-
tently vote to uphold the death penalty in virtually every case.6" Label
this group the "retentionist" bloc, although that may be a misnomer
(this group's articulated concerns are more federalist). 662 In their
hearts they may be retentionists, but their legal position is that the
state legislatures have the ultimate choice.
This left a center of three: Blackmun, Stevens, and O'Connor, who
cover the spectrum from right to left. The three centrist votes would
have reactivated the votes and views of Brennan and Marshall. Unfor-
tunately, the pool of centrist justices shrunk with Powell's and Black-
mun's retirement. Although their influence on the course of law may
have been indeterminate, their presence alone continued the struggle.
Though a large toll has been taken in the past few years, three votes
was what it took to stop an execution. Without those votes, Brennan
and Marshall would not have been influencing the course of the law
directly, whatever their views.6 3
Temporary acquiescence presents dilemmas and ironies. Should an
originally dissenting justice who has since acquiesced by separate con-
currence adhere to that acquiescence when he or she is becomes the
key vote to overrule? Even more puzzling, when is the fifth swing vote
the key to unlocking the value of an application of the precedent?
concurring) ("Because judicial responsibility requires me, as I see things, to bow to the authority
of Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, . . . despite my original and continuing belief that the deci-
sion was constitutionally wrong ... I feel compelled to concur in the Court's disposition of this
case.").
661. See, e.g., Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990).
662. E.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 179-80 (1976) (opinion of the Court and of Ste-
wart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ., per Stewart, J.) ("The most marked indication of society's en-
dorsement of the death penalty for murder is the legislative response to Furman. The legislatures
of at least 35 States have enacted new statutes that provide for the death penalty for at least
some crimes that result in the death of another person."); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 384
(1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting, joined by Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist, JJ.) ("[In a de-
mocracy the legislative judgment is presumed to embody the basic standards of decency prevail-
ing in the society.").
663. Even in such a case, however, the position of Marshall and Brennan will not be without
value for the development of the law. In the words of Llewellyn, who was not fond of dissenting
opinions, "the dissent, by forcing or suggesting full publicity, rides herd on the majority." KARL
LLaw-EaYN, THE CommoN LAW TRAITION: DECtDtNG APPEALs 26 (1960). Even Llewellyn could
grudgingly concede that this was a useful function.
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When, as in Furman, two justices hold on the broad-based ground
that the death penalty is unconstitutional,"' and three on the ground
that the death penalty is unconstitutional-as-applied,6 s the rationale
of the decision is the narrowest ground.66 What if, however, the three
share the opinion that the death penalty as applied is unconstitutional,
but on different rationales?667 Should a swing voter acquiesce to form
664. 408 U.S. 238, 257 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 314 (Marshall, J., concur-
ring).
665. Id. at 240 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 306 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 310
(White, J., concurring).
666. Kelman, supra note 36, at 268 ("Suppose that two justices support the Court's disposi-
tion of the case on the strength of legal analysis, X, and three others under a broader analysis,
Y, with four justices dissenting (on anti-X and/or anti-Y grounds or for reasons unrelated to X
or Y). Any future case which comes within the scope of analysis X should produce the same
outcome in the Supreme Court, assuming no personnel changes on the Court and no shifting of
original positions.") (citation omitted); Gregg, 428 U.S. at 169 n.15 ("Since five Justices wrote
separately in support of the judgments in Furman, the holding of the Court may be viewed as
that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest
grounds.").
667. An examination of the opinions of Justices Douglas, Stewart, and White, in Furman
reveals both subtle and substantive differences. Douglas relied primarily on the Equal Protection
Clause. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 257 (1972). Stewart invoked the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to apply the Eighth Amendment to the States. He then stated that "it is clear that these
sentences are 'cruel' in the sense that they excessively go beyond, not in degree but in kind, the
punishments that the state legislatures have determined to be necessary." Furman, 408 U.S. at
309 (citation omitted). Stewart's opinion then dovetailed with White's by stating that "it is
equally clear that these sentences are 'unusual' in the sense that the penalty of death is infre-
quently imposed for murder, and that its imposition for rape is extraordinarily rare." Id. Ste-
wart did not rest here, however, but proceeded to conclude that the "Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments cannot tolerate the infliction of a sentence of death under legal systems that permit
this unique penalty to be so wantonly and so freakishly imposed." Id. at 310.
White's main concern seemed to be that "as the statutes before us now are administered, the
penalty is so infrequently imposed that the threat of execution is too attenuated to be of substan-
tial service to criminal justice." Id. at 313. Because the death penalty produces "such negligible
returns to the State," id. at 312, its imposition, under the legislative regimes before the Court, is
violative of the Eighth Amendment.
It is no wonder, then, that state legislatures that wished to re-enact the death penalty in the
wake of Furman were so confused. The narrowest ground for the holding is based on at least
two separate rationales, with a third position which seems to be an admixture of the first two.
The constitutional results of this confusion can be found in Gregg and the companion cases:
Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976);
Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); and Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
The voting patterns in these first post-Furman cases are instructive; all the cases reaffirmed the
core holding of Furman, that the death penalty is not per se unconstitutional. Stewart, Powell,
and Stevens formed a bloc which announced the majority opinions in all five cases. In the cases
which held the mandatory imposition of the death penalty unconstitutional (Woodson and Rob-
erts), they were joined by Brennan and Marshall, who concurred in the judgment only on the
basis of their opinions in Furman and Gregg. Burger, White, Blackmun, and Rehnquist dis-
sented, separately or conjunctively. In the cases upholding the legislative schemes for channeled
sentencing discretion (Gregg, Proffitt, and Jurek), Brennan and Marshall dissented, while the
others concurred in the judgment.
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an artificial majority, without first insisting that his or her reasoning
become the core of the opinion? In what sense is this acquiescence?
Perhaps these dilemmas are surmountable within the secrecy of the
conference room. But when justices suspend dissent to guide lower
courts and the nation and thus preserve the Court's authority part-
and-parcel of its "institutional capital,"" does the justice not create
further precedent-another obstacle to eventual reversal or reconsid-
eration? Perhaps this is why, even when concerns about stare decisis
are openly voiced, the true "self-subordinator" always hesitates. Deep
down, he or she will intuitively feel the dissent was right the first time;
if the principle is wrong, let us not engrave it in stone.
B. Dissents From Denial of Certiorari
Although the term dissent most often means disagreement with a
majority opinion, other types of dissents can be equally important.
One is a dissent from denial of certiorari. A brief description of the
certiorari process is necessary to clarify how important a dissent from
denial of certiorari can be.
When a petition for writ of certiorari is filed, copies are circulated
to the justices' chambers, and cases considered "certworthy" are
placed on a "discuss list." 669 Interestingly, of all types of cases, only
death penalty cases automatically make the list. "Whether the rule
• . . comes from general consensus, or from the knowledge that Bren-
nan and Marshall would always put them on anyway," those cases
will at least be discussed. 670
A case needs at least four votes to be granted plenary review. This is
when a dissent from denial becomes extremely important. A dissent
from denial is often written before a case is even denied certiorari. If a
justice feels that the case will not get the necessary votes for certiorari,
he can ask to have the case "relisted" or considered later.671 Mean-
while a dissent from denial is circulated to the other chambers.
This accomplishes two purposes. First, it facilitates discussion be-
tween the chambers, which under normal circumstances is virtually
non-existent. 67 2 Second, it can garner a crucial vote to grant certiorari.
This strategy picked up ten to thirty votes per term.673 Because those
668. For an analysis of the allocation of institutional responsibility by the court as a whole,
see Neil K. Komesar, Taking Institutions Seriously: Introduction to a Strategy for Constitutional
Analysis, 51 U. CHi. L. REv. 366 (1984).
669. H.W. PERRY, JR., DEcIDING TO DECIDE 43 (1991).
670. Id. at 97.
671. Id. at 171.
672. Id. at 149.
673. Id. at 173.
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dissents are circulated before the final decision on certiorari, they are
often not published, but are generally accepted by justices who recog-
nize their purpose.
For Brennan's and Marshall's dissents from denial that were pub-
lished, the Justices used a "stock" statement:
Adhering to our views that the death penalty is in all circumstances
cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 227, 231
(1976), we would grant certiorari and vacate the death sentences in
these cases. 674
This showed their unwavering opposition to the death penalty even in
cases which did not receive the notoriety received by cases granted cer-
tiorari. Brennan once said, "[p]erhaps few outside the Court realize
that, quite apart from his general opposition to all executions, [Mar-
shall] has filed more than 150 dissents from 'denial of certiorari' in
capital cases.' '675
Sometimes, however, Brennan or Marshall wrote longer dissents
from denial, with an instructive purpose. Because death penalty cases
often come up on both state and federal habeas petitions, the dissents
can be instructions to the lawyers arguing the cases. 6 6 Although this is
not explicit, it is a recognized occurrence.
Finally, a dissent from denial can show future litigants glimpses of
what would make a case "certworthy. '677 This, however, is frowned
upon by many members of the Court and is a good segue into the
effects that dissents have on the decision-making process of certiorari.
One characteristic of all opinions dissenting from the denial of
certiorari is manifest. They are totally unnecessary. They are
examples of the purest form of dictate .. . [TIhey are potentially
misleading. Since the Court provides no explanation of the reasons
for denying certiorari, the dissenter's arguments ... appear to be
more persuasive .... 67
Because the dissents often do not mention valid reasons for denying
certiorari, the Court appears to have acted differently. Additionally,
674. Perry, supra note 669, at 172 n.26.
675. RoGER GOLDMAN & DAVID GALLEN, TSURGOOD MARSHALL: JUSTICE FOR ALL 21 (1992).
676. Perry, supra note 669, at 176-77.
677. Id.
678. Id. at 174 (quoting Singleton v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 439 U.S. 940, 944-
45 (1978)).
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these repeated dissents can cause a "bitterness" around an issue, and
make a shift in doctrine less likely. 67 9
Criticisms aside, however, the fact that the death penalty cases at
least automatically qualify for the discuss list shows the effectiveness
of the repeated dissent from denial. In fact, one justice who was un-
opposed to capital punishment once circulated a memo arguing "we
just ought to summarily reverse all death cases" out of shear frustra-
tion . 60 Dissents from denial of certiorari can be as important as dis-
senting opinions in reviewed cases.
V. CONCLUSION
The retirements of William Brennan and Thurgood Marshall pro-
vide a fitting time for a re-examination of what made their judicial
careers unique. One aspect of that uniqueness was relentless dissents
in capital cases. The two Justices almost always voted identically on
this issue. 61'
It is fitting to close with a reminder about the public release of Mar-
shall's papers and the horror at least some of the Justices felt in re-
sponse to his making the papers publicly available. The papers, like
Marshall's dissents, were intended to fill in gaps between the lofty as-
pirations of the Court's opinions and the grainy reality of the people
whose lives were touched-often times fatally-by those opinions. In
Marshall's papers and his dissents, he was building a record for histo-
rians and anthropologists-and someday, I hope, for a majority of
the Supreme Court. Marshall's early release of his papers served a
larger vision that he held near and dear to his heart. By releasing his
papers so soon after his death, he was continuing his tradition of im-
pressing upon his colleagues that they must consider poverty and dis-
crimination in their deliberations.
679. Id. at 97.
680. Id.
681. 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (Marshall,
J., dissenting). See also Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 257, 314 (1972) (Brennan, J., concur-
ring) (Marshall, J., concurring).
